RAGHU NATH Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) RAGHU Nath petitioner was convicted under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short, the Act), and was sentenced to 6 months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/ - by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Kaithal. On appeal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra, in an exhaustive and lucid judgment had averted to every contention raised on behalf of the petitioner and repelling the same, has maintained the conviction and sentence. He has now come up by way of revision.

(2.) IT is not necessary to recount the facts. The solitary argument raised with little persistence on behalf of the petitioner is that Dr. Narang having specifically stated that decorative kite colour paper contained soluble coal tar dye and that it can pass in the sweets; the petitioner was entitled to the acquittal by giving him the benefit of doubt. The identical contention was raised before the Appellate Court. It has been so adequately and lucidly met by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in paragraph No. 14 of the judgment that it would be obviously wasteful and repetitive to cover the same ground over again. Affirming the view of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and agreeing with a number of authorities cited on the points raised by the petitioner, I would reject the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner.

(3.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that the sample was taken on 17th July, 1975, i.e. more than 7 -1/2 years back. The petitioner, according to him, is not proved to be a previous convict. On that ground, he was urged that the benefit of probation be extended to him. I feel difficulty in accepting this contention of the learned counsel as taking into consideration the risk to the Society from the food adulterators the Legislature had to amend the Act itself by providing Section 20AA for the exclusion of the benefit of the probation of Offenders Act and Section 360 of the Code of Criminal procedure to the person accused of the offence under the Act. Even the Supreme Court has shown its disapproval for such a policy. The other request of the learned counsel for the leniency of the sentence, however, can be favourably considered taking into consideration the long trial to which the petitioner had been subjected for more than 7 -1/2 years. Taking into consideration the protected trial of the petitioner in which he continuously remained under the fear of incarceration in Jail. I think the sentence which he has already undergone would meet the ends of Justice. I accordingly reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the one which is already undergone by the petitioner. The sentence of fine, which its default clause, is, however, upheld.