HARBHAJAN Vs. RUPPA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) LAND measuring 970.46 acres situated in village Gual Pahari, Tehsil and District Gurgaon was acquired for development and utilization of land as Institutional-cum-Residential-cum-Commercial area vide notification dated 11.6.1982 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act"). The said land included the land owned by respondent No. 1 and his other co-sharers. Prior to the notification, the appellant entered into an agreement of purchase of the agricultural land measuring 66 Kanals 6 Marlas on payment of Rs. 2,22,000/- as earnest money on 17.8.1981. The other four co-sharers returned the amount of the earnest money to the appellant. The present respondent No. 1 has not returned the amount of Rs. 50,000/- which is payable by him. Since the amount was not paid and the Land was acquired, the appellant sought reference under Section 30 of the land Acquisition Act for apportionment of the amount of compensation.

(2.) IN reply to the claim of the present appellant, the respondent denied the right of the appellant to claim Rs. 50,000/- out of the share of the respondent. It is further stated that if there was any such agreement, it had become time barred and now it cannot be enforced nor Harbhajan Singh sought specific performance of the alleged agreement. It is further stated that the alleged joint agreement stood cancelled as it is no more binding on any of the co-promisors.

(3.) IN this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the judgment relied upon by the learned trial Court is distinguishable. It has been pointed out that the said judgment arose out of a suit for specific performance wherein it has been held that no decree for specific performance of the agreement can be passed since the land has been compulsorily acquired. Instead, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Mohammad Akil Khan v. Premraj Jawanmal Surana and another, AIR 1972 Bombay 217 to contend that the appellant is a person interested within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act and, thus, entitled to clam in the compensation to the extent of the amount of earnest money paid to the respondent.