LAWS(P&H)-1971-9-1

HARBHAJAN SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

Decided On September 09, 1971
HARBHAJAN SINGH Appellant
V/S
STATE OF PUNJAB Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeks a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated the 13th of March, 1970 (Annexure 'a' to the petition) of the Joint Registrar, Co-Operative Societies, Punjab (respondent no. 3) and declaring that the election of Kulwant Singh (Respondent No. 4) to the executive Committee of the Janta Co-Operative Sugar Mills Limited, Bhogpur (hereinafter referred to as the Mills) is null and void, and has arisen in these circumstances. The Mills is a co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act) and the Punjab Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules ). The governing body of the mills which under its bye-laws is known as the Board of Directors, and is hereinafter referred to as the Board, was to be elected in the month of March, 1970, and according to the programmed drawn up by the 'manager' the last date for filling of nomination papers by candidates was the 6th of March, 1970. The scrutiny of nomination papers took place on the 7th of March, 1970, by when only three candidates, namely, the petitioner, Kulwant Singh respondent No. 4 and one Mast Ram were left in the field in so far as the election from one of the Zones, namely, Zone No. 4 was concerned. The petitioner objected to the acceptance of the nomination papers of respondent no. 4 on the ground that the latter had already served on the Board for a period of more than six years and was, therefore, ineligible for election to the Board according to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 26-B read with clause (b)of Section 2 of the Act. These provisions are to the following effect:

(2.) IT is the case of the petitioner that the interpretation put by the respondent no. 3 on the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 26-B of the Act is wholly misconceived and I am of the same view. That interpretation was arrived at by respondent No. 3 thus:

(3.) SOME other contentions were also raised by learned counsel for the contesting respondents and the same may now be examined. The first was that "a continuous period of not less than six years" mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 26-B of the Act must be a period during the whole of which the person concerned held the position of a member of the committee in question in his capacity as "elected member" and that if such a person was for a part of the period a nominated or coopted member of the committee, such period could not be counted as part of the period of six years. The contention is wholly unwarranted in view of the language used in the sub-section, according to which the sole criterion of ineligibility is service on the committee which means service as a member. The sub-section goes no further and does not state that in order to attract the ineligibility the service must be of a particular type, so that what is to be seen is the period of membership of the person and not the mode in which such membership came to be held. In this view of the matter the entire period for which respondent No. 4 served as a Director on the Board would be counted towards the period of not less than six years without reference to the manner in which he became a member, i. e. , whether by election, nomination or co-option.