SOHAN LAL DHOL AND OTHERS Vs. GUR DEVI AND OTHERS
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
SOHAN LAL DHOL AND OTHERS
GUR DEVI AND OTHERS
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(1.) This is a rule directed against an order passed by the Rent Controller, Delhi, Mr. K. P. Barman, dated 16-6-1948. An appeal was taken against this order to the learned District Judge under r. 11 of sch. 4 to the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947. The learned Judge allowed the appeal and reversed the order of the Rent Controller. Against this order a revision was filed in this Court and rule was issued by Falshaw J. By way of preliminary objection, Mr. Amolak Ram Kapur has submitted that no revision lies against this order and has relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported as Messrs. Pitman s Shorthand Academy v. Messrs. B. Lila Ram and Sons,1950 AIR(EP) 181.
(2.) Mr. Chona has submitted that I can interfere with this order under Art. 227 of the Constitution. But the order which is complained against is dated 12-5-1949 when the Constitution had not come into force and it has no retrospective effect. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. , Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, 1927 AIR(PC) 242 have held that in the case of appeals no right of appeal arises where the decision appealed against is one prior to a subsequent Act which gives the power to the High Court to interfere. The power of superintendence given by Art. 227 is also of a similar nature and the observations of Lord Blanesburgh at p. 290 of the report seem to apply to this case. There it was said:
"The principle which their Lordships must apply in dealing with this matter has been authoritatively enunciated by the Board in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369, where it is in effect laid down that, while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have restrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. "
In a recent judgment of the Calcutta High Court reported as Rishindra Nath Sarkar v. Rai Saheb Sakti Bhusan Ray, 1950 AIR(Cal) 512, it was held that Art. 227 of the Constitution does not empower the High Court to interfere with an order which was a final order passed at a time before the Constitution came into force and when the High Court had no power to interfere with such an order under S. 115, Civil P. C. There are no express words in Art. 227 of the Constitution which give the High Court the right to interfere with a right in existence at the time of the passing of the Constitution; nor is there anything in the aforesaid article to indicate that there is such a power by necessary intendment. I, therefore, hold that I have no power to interfere with the order of the District Judge and dismiss this petition and discharge the rule. The opposite party will have his costs in this Court. I assess the counsel's fee at Rs. 32.
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