G. Mehrotra, J. - (1.) THE Petitioner Mrs. C.N. Lloyd has applied under Article 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 19 -5 -1958, passed by the Chief Executive Member, District Council, United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, Shillong, and has further prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the Respondents to forbear from giving effect to the impugned order. The Petitioner states that her father was the owner in possession of the lands known as Khliehriat Thalabeh measuring 42 bighas I katha 12 lechas in one block at Jowai under a lease granted to him by the Government of Assam and her mother was the owner in possession by inheritance from her ancestors of the land known as Ladthlaboh measuring 7 acres of land in one block at Jowai within United Khasi and Jaintia Hills. They had permanent, heritable and transferable rights in the said lands. The Petitioner's father died on 19 -9 -1925 and her mother inherited the said land and was in possession till her death on 29 -11 -1951. On her death both the lands were inherited by the present Petitioner and she has been in possession of the lands since then. One Sri Albert Laloo, Overseer -in -charge of the lands, District Council, Jowai wrongfully trespassed into a portion of the lands known as Ledthlaboh. The Petitioner filed a complaint petition to the Chief Executive Member, District Council complaining about the said trespass. A local enquiry was held into the matter on 31 -3 -58 by the Assistant Revenue Officer, District Council, Jowai, and under his direction the Petitioner produced before him all her documents, but the Assistant Revenue Officer had not given any decision in the matter till this petition was filed in this Court. The Petitioner also filed a petition before the Chief Executive Member, District Council, Shillong complaining that a portion of the said lands at Ladthleboh called 'Iewdie masi' was being illegally auctioned annually for the purpose of a Bazar by the authorities of the District Council, Jowai and the amounts of the auction sales were not being credited and paid to her. On 2 -7 -1958, the Petitioner however, received a Memo signed by the Assistant Revenue Officer, District Council, United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, Jowai saying that she had no authority to cut down any tree from the forest on the said lands and asking her to discontinue the same forthwith. It is this order which has been challenged by means of the present petition. The order is as follows: I am directed to inform you that you have no authority to cut down any tree from the above mentioned forest and as such you are hereby required to discontinue the same forthwith.
(2.) A copy of this letter was forwarded to the Secretary, Executive Committee, District Council, United Khasi -Jaintia Hills, Shillong with reference to the Chief Executive Member's order dated 19 -5 -58. He was further requested to issue formal orders for the shifting of the Cattle Market to the proposed site so that sketch map of the same could be prepared. As regards the claim of Mrs. C.N. Lloyd the Petitioner, it was mentioned in the note, that a full report on the same had been submitted along with all records produced by her vide No. DCJ/1864 dated 19 -9 -1956 on which no order has been passed. A counter -affidavit has been filed which is a long one, but does not give the relevant facts. In the counter -affidavit it is stated that late Mr. C.N. Shadwell was a non -tribal who took lease of a plot of Government land in the neighbourhood of Jowai for building purposes measuring 3 acres 1 rood and 32 poles from the 1st April, 1922 for a period of 20 years; which expired in 1942. After the death of Mr. Shadwell his wife tried to renew the lease and made an application, but the application was rejected. Mr. Shadwell had not acquired any permanent, heritable or transferable right to the plot of land in question and the Petitioner's mother was not the owner in possession. It is also stated that she has not succeeded in establishing her title to 46 acres of land. It is not necessary to go into the question of title to the land in question of the Petitioner. The Petitioner states that a portion of the property belonged to her father and the other portion to her mother. She inherited the property from her mother and has been in continuous possession and has got a fundamental right to hold and acquire the property. The contention of the Petitioner is that the order by which she was restrained from cutting forest trees is an interference with her fundamental right to own and possess property and it is for the opposite parties to justify the order under any provision of law. From a perusal of the order, it is clear that the intention was to shift the Cattle Market to the land in dispute and as that was contemplated the present prohibitory order was issued. If the land is required for the cattle market, proper proceedings for acquisition of the land can be taken. If the District Council thinks that the land belongs to it, the question of issuing a prohibitory order will not arise. The District Council can start a cattle market on the land, or if the Petitioner is in possession of the lands, the District Council will have to take proper steps to eject her. But no statutory provisions have been pointed out under which the District Council or the Assistant Revenue Officer has jurisdiction to issue such a prohibitory order. The Petitioner being in possession she could not be restrained from exercising her right over the land except by a lawful order, and as we have already pointed out no provision of law has been pointed out under which this order has been issued. In substance, the argument on behalf of the opposite party is that the District Council was the owner of this land and in the exercise of the right of ownership this notice has been given to the Petitioner. If a private owner of property issues a notice to a person, who according to him, is intending to interfere with his right of ownership, the Court will not quash any such order in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But where an authority exercising such a right is a public body and in the exercise of its right as such issues a prohibitory order interfering with the possessory right of a citizen, before such an order can be upheld, the public body has to show the authority of law under which such order has been issued. On its failure to show any such authority, this Court can issue a writ of mandamus directing the public authority to forbear from giving effect to any such order. Some argument was tried to be built on the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. It was contended that under the provisions of the Sixth Schedule the District Council is the owner of the land within the area of the United Khasi -Jaintia Hills. We do not think that the provisions of the Sixth Schedule make the District Council the owner of the entire land of the United Khasi -Jaintia Hills. It was then urged that the dispute relates to a question of fact regarding the title of the land and therefore this Court will not exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and issue a writ. It has not been stated in the counter -affidavit in clear terms that the Respondents are the owners of the land. What is stated therein is that the Petitioner has failed to prove her title to the land. To give proper relief to the Petitioner, it is not necessary as we have already pointed out, to go into the question of title to the land. The Petitioner's case is that the land was leased out to her predecessor -in -interest and that she has been in possession of the entire block of land after the death of her mother by exercise of the rights of ownership on the land and consequently any interference with her right to hold the property is unjustified unless done by the authority of law. On the admitted facts the contention is that the Petitioner can claim relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was then contended that the Petitioner had no interest in the land such as to give her a right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We are of opinion that on the allegation in the petition she has sufficient interest to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the petition cannot be thrown out on that ground. Reference was made to the case of Subodh Chandra Bose v. State of Assam numbered as Civil Rule No. 69 of 1954 , decided by a Division Bench of this Court on 27 -1 -1956. The facts of that case are distinguishable. The general proposition that this Court will not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in cases where the Petitioner has a remedy by means of a suit or in cases where controversial questions of fact are raised cannot be disputed. But in the present case the Petitioner cannot be said to have any other adequate remedy. We, therefore, allow the petition and issue a writ of mandamus directing the opposite parties not to give effect to the order of the 2nd July, 1958, with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100/ - (Rupees one hundred). Deka, J. I agree.;