Manisana, J. - (1.)THIS revision arises from the orders dated 8.7.83 and 19.4.84 passed by the learned Munsiff, Shillong, in Misc. Case No. 12(H) of 1981. The Respondent filed an application under Section 4 of the Meghalaya Urban Area Rent Control Act, 1972, for short, the "Act'' for fixation of fair rent, The learned Munsiff on 8.7.1983 passed an order fixing fair rent. The Petitioner has not filed any appeal against the order as provided under" the' 'Act'. However, be has filed a petition for review of the order dated 8.7.1983. The learned Munsiff rejected the petition by an order dated 19.4.1984. Being aggrieved by the orders dated 8.7.1983 and 19.4.l984 of the learned Munsiff, the Petitioner has Tiled Civil Revision No. 10(SH)/1984 in this Court.
(2.)THE first question which arises, before dealing with the rival contentions, for consideration is whet are the rules of procedure applicable to the proceedings under the 'Act'. Under Section 4 of the 'Act', if any dispute arises regarding the rent payable in respect of any house, it shall be determined by the court. Section 5 of the 'Act', Inter alia, provides that no order or decree for recovery of possession of any house shall be made or executed, by any court us long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under the 'Act' and performs the conditions of the tenancy provided therein. Under Section 5 of the 'Act', institution of the suit for the recovery of possession of any house is not prohibited. The prohibition is the passing and execution of the decree or order for ejectment. Section 7 of the 'Act' is a provision for enforcement of duties of landlord as envisaged thereunder.
The question which arises for consideration is what is the 'court' to decide or pass an order under the 'Act'. As regards the 'Court' to pass a decree for eviction of a tenant is the court of ordinary civil jurisdiction constituted under the relevant laws. The decree is to be passed in a regular 'Suit' as distinct from 'proceedings'. Section 2(a) of the 'Act' refers to the Court already constituted. Therefore the 'Court' which is to decide or pass order under the 'Act' is the said constituted court of ordinary civil jurisdiction having territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction of the tenant from house. The cause of action of the 'Court' for passing any order under the 'Act' is a 'proceeding' which does not amount to a suit. However, any order or decision under Section 4, 5(3) and 5(4) and 7(2) of the 'Act' will be deemed as a decree for the purpose of, appeal under Section 8 of the 'Act'.

(3.)THE question which remains for consideration is what is the procedure applicable to the 'proceedings' under the Act. The 'Act' is silent in this regard. The preamble of Code of Civil Procedure indicates to what particular instances the enactment (Code of Civil Procedure) is intended to apply. Section 4, Code of Civil Procedure lays down that Code of Civil Procedure shall not limit or affect any special or local law and that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure which are contrary to the local law will be excluded. This section does not bar the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure where the special statute is silent. The 'Act' which is a special or local statute refers to a already constituted court of ordinary civil jurisdiction as a 'Court' to decide the matters under the 'Act' and does not refer to the Presiding Officer of the 'Court' or persona designanta. Therefore said constituted court is governed by the rules of Code of Civil Procedure in view of Section 141, Code of Civil Procedure which presides that the procedure provided in regard to suits shall be followed in all the proceedings in any court of Civil Jurisdiction as far as it can be made applicable, la view of the discussion above, the procedure provided in Code of Civil Procedure in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all the proceedings under the 'Act' in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary in the 'Act'. This view of mine also finds support from the decision of the Privy Council, In Adaikappa : AIR 1948 PC 12 the Privy Council, in Adaikappa, has held that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto.
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