SEKHARRUDRA Vs. OIL INDIA LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) To understand and appreciate the challenge made in the instant writ petition, a brief recapitulation of the facts is considered necessary.

(2.) The petitioner who was working as a Grade VIII employee in Oil India Limited and posted at the relevant point of time at Narengi, Guwahati was sought to be transferred by an order dated 22.12.89 to Dumar in Bihar. The aforesaid transfer order was by way of promotion. The Union representing the writ petitioner took up the case protesting the aforesaid transfer and subsequently, a memorandum of settlement under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the Act) was signed by and between the parties on 7.8.90. In terms of the aforesaid settlement, it was agreed that the management of the Oil India Limited would not force the workman to go on transfer on promotion in case the workman was ready to forego the promotion. The petitioner thus continued to be stationed at Narengi until sometime in the year 1998 when he was transferred to Jorhat. The employees union once again took up the case protesting against the aforesaid transfer on the ground that the same was contrary to the memorandum of settlement signed by and between the parties on 7.8.90. The management, thereafter, issued a notice dated 16.5.98 under Section 19(2) of the Act and on the expiry of two months from the date of notice, the management of Oil India Limited once again transferred the workman concerned to Dumar in Bihar by an order dated 17.7.98. A conciliation proceeding was held by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Guwahati but as no amicable settlement of the dispute could be reached, the same was referred to the appropriate authority of the Central Govt. under Section 12(4) of the Act for reference to the Industrial Tribunal. The appropriate authority of the Central Govt. by communication dated 10.2.99 refused to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal on the ground that the transfer of a workman is the privilege of the management and no industrial dispute can be said to have arisen in the instant case. Thereafter, it become obligatory on the part of the petitioner to comply with the transfer order. The same not having been done, a charge sheet dated 11.5.99 was issued against the workman. It is in these facts that the present writ proceeding has been instituted calling into question the transfer order dated 17.7.98 as well as the charge sheet dated 11.5.99 along with the order of the Central Govt. refusing to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. The rejection of the writ petitioner's representation for reconsideration of the transfer order made by order dated 23.10.98 is the ancillary subject matter of the challenge in the present proceeding.

(3.) Mr P.J. Phukan, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, in support of the challenge made in the instant writ application has argued that notwithstanding the revocation of the memorandum of settlement dated 7.8.90 by issuing notice under Section 19(2) of the Act, the terms of the earlier settlement would govern the relationship between the parties until a fresh settlement was arrived at. In support of the above, the learned counsel has placed has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of the Life Insurance Corporation of India-Vs-D.J. Bahadur and Ors. reported in (1981)1 SCC 315. It has also been contended by the learned counsel for writ petitioner that the order of the Central Govt. refusing to refer the dispute for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of the Act is an arbitrary action and the cryptic order passed in this regard discloses no reasonable basis for the same. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the aforesaid refusal by the Central Govt. to make a reference would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. That apart, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the consequential charge sheet dated 11.5.99 as well as the rejection of the petitioner's representation made by communication dated 23.10.98 are wholly untenable in law, warranting necessary interference by this Court.