S.Acharya, J. - (1.)THIS appeal arises out of the decision dated 17 -3 -1975 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Sambalpur in Title Suit No. 68/67. Under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as the' Act') the matter was referred to an Arbitrator for adjudicating the disputes between the parties. The award was received by the Court on 9 -10 -1974. On receiving the award the Court directed the parties to file objections if any to the award. The Appellant filed his objection to the award and prayed for setting aside the same. The State of Orissa, the Respondent herein, filed a counter to the aforesaid petition. Parties were ultimately heard on the said matter on 14 -3 -1975 and the Court posted that matter for orders to 17 -3 -1975. On 17 -3 -1975 the impugned order was passed by which the Appellant's petition for setting aside the a ward was rejected and the suit was decreed in terms of the award. The Appellant has preferred this appeal against the said order of the Court below.
(2.)IT is urged by Mr. Mohanty, the learned Government Advocate that this appeal being an appeal against the decree of the Court cannot be treated as an appeal under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act and so this appeal the relief for setting aside the award cannot be granted to the Appellant.
The impugned order is a composite order by which the Appellant's prayer to set aside the award has been refused and the award passed by the arbitrator has been made a rule of the Court and a decree has been directed to be drawn in accordance with the award. If the Court passes such a composite order, a party who had prayed for setting aside the award, can file an appeal under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act against that portion of the order by which the Court rejected the prayer made before him for setting aside the a ward. As the order of the trial Court is a composite one; in one part refusing to set aside the award and on the other part passing a decree under Section 17 of the Act, the Appellant can file an appeal under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act against that portion of the order by which the Court refuses to set aside the award as prayed for by the Appellant. My above view is supported by the decision in Raja Brijendra Singh s/o Raja Singh v. Butisaha S/o. Bodh Roy if Ors., A.I.R. 1061 M.P. 377 in which it has been held as follows:

The settled position of law now is that where the order of a Court is composite, which on one hand dismisses the objections of a party to the award, and, on the other, pronounces judgment on the basis of the award, then such an order should be treated as an order falling under Section 39 of the Act and an appeal is maintainable against it.

In para 17 of the case reported in Ariyur Mohammad Habeebur Rahman and Ors. v. Ansuri Varamma (died) and Anr. : A.I.R. 1974 A.P. 113, it has been held that where a composite order refusing to set aside the award and passing a decree in terms of the award is passed, the aggrieved party is entitled to file an appeal under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act and raise all objections which could be raised under Section 30 of the Act for setting aside the award. The same view was taken in Roshanlal Thakur v. Kishanlal Kapoor, 42 (1976) C.L.T. 637.

In the present case after the award was remitted to the Court, the Plaintiff -Appellant filed a petition for setting aside the award. Thereafter a counter to the said petition was filed by the Defendant in the suit. That particular matter was heard on 14 -3 -75 and posted to 17 -3 -1975 for orders. On the later mentioned date the Court passed the aforesaid composite order dismissing the Plaintiff's prayer for setting aside the award and confirming the decree. In the memorandum of appeal the Appellant no doubt has stated that he has filed this appeal on being aggrieved by the judgment and the decree of the Court below. In preferring an appeal against such an order the Appellant has to say so. He would of course have done better to state in addition to the above that he was aggrieved by the order of the Court refusing to set aside the award. The grounds on which the appeal has been filed clearly show that the appeal is directed mainly and solely against the order of the Court below refusing to set aside the award as prayed for by die Appellant. It is quite evident from the memorandum of appeal that the main prayer of the Appellant in this appeal is to set aside the award of the Court below. That being so the appeal is clearly maintainable under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act.

(3.)MR . Basu, the learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that as the Arbitrator in his award has no given any reasons for allowing only in part some of the Appellants claims and disallowing all the rest, the Arbitrator is guilty of misconduct and his such award cannot be sustained by a Court of law. The matter was referred to the Arbitrator' to settle disputes about claims on different heads amounting to a total sum of Rs. 49,069.00 preferred by the Appellant. The Arbitrator in his award has mentioned that hearing the Advocates and the parties in full and to their satisfaction and on a perusal of all the documents before him and keeping in view the claims of both the parties, he passed his award on each item of the claim as indicated under each head. In the award he has taken up each different item separately and whenever he has completely disallowed a particular claim he has stated that he was not convinced with the argument put forward by the claimant in respect of the said claim. In respect of the items where he has awarded some amounts he has stated that he granted those amounts on being convinced that the claimant was entitled to the said amounts on those heads. On summing up he has awarded a total sum of Rs. 3,900/ - on the claims preferred by the Appellant and has stated that if the said amount is not paid by a specific date then the Respondent shall pay the same with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the passing of the award till the payment of the said amount. True it is that the rival contentions of both the parties in respect of each items of claim have not been stated and no discussion of the reasons for awarding a particular sum or disallowing a particular claim has been made in the award. In the Division Bench case reported in State of Orissa. P.O. Chanda4, it has been held that where an Arbitrator has accurately and finally decided the essence of the dispute relating to the net amount payable to the contractor the omission of the arbitrator to give the details of the calculations or to give his findings as regards the rival contentions of the parties in respect of the interpretation of the conditions of contract will not invalidate the award. In the case reported in Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 378, it has been held that:
It is now a well settled principle that if an arbitrator, in deciding a dispute before him, does not record his reasons and does not indicate the principles of law on which he has proceeded, the award is not on that account vitiated. It is only when the arbitrator proceeds to give his reasons or to lay down principles on which he has arrived at his decisions that the Court is competent to examine whether he has proceeded contrary to law and is entitled to interfere if such error in law is apparent on the face of the award itself:

In the case reported in Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth v. Chinfamanrao Balaji : A.I.R 1965 S.C. 214. Their Lordships have observed that:

It is not open to the Court to speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. On the assumption that the arbitrator must have arrived at his conclusion by a certain process of reasoning, the Court cannot proceed to determine whether the conclusion is right or wrong. It is not open to the Court to attempt to probe the mental process by which the arbitrator has reached his conclusion where it is not disclosed by the terms of his award.

In the decision reported in M/s. Mehar Singh d: Sons v. State of Punjab : A.I.R. 1973 P&H 114, it has been observed that the law as it now stands:

is that an arbitrator being a domestic Tribunal is not required, while making an award, to refer to the evidence produced by the parties or to record reasons therein for allowing or disallowing the amounts claimed by them and it is not necessary for him to give specific finding on each of the separate claims and he can record one finding for various items of claim referred to him,

That being the law on the point as at present I have to hold that the arbitrator, in not giving the reasons for his conclusion or not mentioning the calculations by which he arrived at the amounts awarded by him, has not misconducted himself in the proceeding, and so his award is not vitiated on that account. Mr. Basu has not able to impeach the award on any other ground. I do not see any reason to allow the Appellant's prayer for setting aside the award in this case, and so the order of the Court below rejecting the Appellant's prayer to that effect is confirmed.

The appeal, therefore, has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances each party to bear his own costs of this appeal.