S.K.RAY,ACTG.C.J. - (1.)THIS revision has come before us by way of reference made at the instance of Honourable Das, J., who was of opinion that this case involved important questions of law. It arises out of a proceeding under Section 141, Criminal Procedure Code in which the petitioners were members of the second party and which was registered as Misc. Case No. 7/1 of 1972 in the court of Sub -divisional Officer and Magistrate, First Class, Bhadrak. The preliminary order was passed on 15.4.1972. The dispute relates to 15 decimals of land appertaining to Plot No.2137 and 8 decimals of land appertaining to Plot No.2139 in village Guamal, P.S. Tihidi, District Balasore. The parties concerned filed their affidavits in due course. As the Magistrate was unable to decide as to which of them was in possession of the subject -matter of dispute on the date of the preliminary order, he acted under Section 146, old Criminal Procedure Code by attaching it, drawing up a statement of the facts of the case and forwarding the record of proceeding to the Munsif, Bhadrak for determination of the question as to which the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order as explained in sub -section (4) of Section 145 of old Criminal Procedure Code, On receipt of the records, the Munsif registered a case numbered as Misc. Case No.47 of 1974 and after observing the procedure contemplated in Section 146, Criminal Procedure Code, passed the final order on 2.5.1975. The Munsif found that the first party members were in possession of only 4 decimals of land appertaining to Plot No.2137 while the second party members were in possession of the rest of area in Plot No.2137 in dispute and also of entire area in dispute appertaining to Plot No.2139. The records with his findings were then transmitted to the court of the Magistrate who, on receipt thereof, proceeded to dispose of the proceeding under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code in conformity with the decision of the civil court by his order dated 13.5.1975.
(2.)THE first party, thereupon, filed a criminal revision numbered as 28 of 1975 before the Sessions Judge, Balasore under Section 397 of the new Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Sessions Judge by his order dated 2.10.1975 allowed the revision by declaring the possession of the first party members in respect of the entire subject of dispute. Thus being aggrieved by that order of the learned Sessions Judge, the second party members have filed the present revision.
Two questions arose for determination: -

(a) Whether the present revision directed against the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 13.5.1975 is governed by the provisions of the new Criminal Procedure Code and, as such, maintainable; and (b) Whether the learned Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of the Munsif rendered in a reference made to him by the trying Magistrate ignoring sub -section (1 -D) of Section 146 of the old Criminal Procedure Code where under the finding rendered by a Civil Court on a reference made to it under Section 146 of old Criminal Procedure Code, was statutorily immunised from any review or revision.

(3.)I will now proceed to deal with the first question, namely, maintainability of the present revision directed against the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 9.10.1975. It is contended by Mr. B.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the opposite parties, that since the final order under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code was passed by the Magistrate on 13.5.1975 after coming into force of the new Criminal Procedure Code revision therefrom to the Sessions Court will be governed by the new Code, and, as such, a second criminal revision to this Court is barred under Section 397(3) read with Section 399(3) of the new Code. It is also contended that right to file a revision is not a vested right and as the impugned order was passed after coming into force of the new Criminal Procedure Code, revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and of the High Court is to be invoked under the new Code, not under the old Code. This is in accord with the plain reading of the language of Sections 397, 398 and 401 of the new Criminal Procedure Code and in conformity with the general doctrine that procedural law is generally retrospective, that is to say, the new procedure shall govern the proceedings which commenced before such procedure came into force and were continuing on the date of such commencement. This is the exact view of another Bench of this Court in the case of Bhima Naik v. State, (1975) 41 Cut LT 674 = (1975 Cri LJ 1923). There is nothing in the saving Section 484 of the new Criminal Procedure Code to the contrary that the proceeding under Section 145 initiated under the old Criminal Procedure Code will not be entertained under the new Criminal, procedure Code. Therefore, the revision having been filed in the court of the Sessions Judge from the order of the Magistrate dated 13.5.1975, it must necessarily be entertained under Section 397 of the new Criminal Procedure Code, but it must be disposed of as it the new Criminal Procedure Code had not come into force, as will be discussed hereinafter. The ban provided under sub -section (2) of Section 397 of the new Criminal Procedure Code would also not be attracted as the final order under Section 145 is not an interlocutory order. It is next to be seen if a second revision to this Court is barred under Sections 397(3) and 399(3) of the new Criminal Procedure Code. Sub -section (3) of Section 397 runs as follows: -
"If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them." Sub -section (3) of Section 399 runs as follows: - "Where any application for revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in relation to such person shall be final and no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other Court." It is clear from the language of these provisions that the prohibition is confined to a second revision application by the same person who filed the revision application before the Sessions Judge. Thus, where a person who filed a criminal revision before the Sessions Court and lost it cannot again come to the High Court in revision. The bar does not operate against a person who was opposite party in the Sessions Court and the revision before the Sessions Judge having been allowed he comes up to the High Court in revision. This revision will not be a second revision by him, because he having succeeded before the Magistrate had no cause to come up in revision before the Sessions Judge. Therefore, his application cannot be deemed to be a further application by the same person who filed a revision before the Sessions Judge. The petitioners in the present case who were second party members in the 145 proceeding had no occasion to file a revision before the Sessions Judge. Therefore, this second revision by them is maintainable. This identical view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court earlier in the case of Ramachandra Puja Panda Samanta v. Jambeswar Patra, 1975 Cri LJ 1921 (Orissa) as will appear from the relevant passage extracted therefrom as hereinbelow: - "7. The language of Section 397(3) and Section 399(3), however, leads to a different conclusion. The statute did not adopt the language used by the Joint Committee of the Parliament. The prohibition is confined to a second revision application filed by the same person. In Section 397(3) the crucial words are 'no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them'. Similarly, the material clause in Section 399(3) is 'no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained'. It is thus clear that the bar of a second revision was only confined to cases where the criminal revision was dismissed by the Sessions Judge. At the instance of the person who lost the criminal revision before the Sessions Judge no revision to the High Court lies. An illustration would make the position clear. A proceeding under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code between X and Y terminated before the Magistrate in favour of X. The criminal revision of Y before the Sessions Judge was dismissed. A criminal revision before the High Court at the instance of Y shall not be entertained. In the same illustration if Y's criminal revision before the Sessions Judge was allowed, a criminal revision to the High Court against the order of the Sessions Judge at the instance of X is maintainable. This is for the simple reason that the second criminal revision before the High Court is not at the instance of such person who filed the criminal revision before the Sessions Judge. On the language of Section 397(3) and Section 399(3) conclusion is irresistible that a second revision at the instance of successful party before the Magistrate who lost the revision before t
he Sessions Judge lies." In the result, therefore, it must be held that the present revision is maintainable.