- (1.)THE petitioner was posted as Deputy Ranger in the district of Bolangir from 1953 to 1957. While he was working as such the Divisional Forest Officer, bolangir framed six charges against the petitioner, as contained in Annexure 2, and asked him to show cause why a disciplinary proceeding in respect of the said charges should not be started against him. The petitioner filed his representation against the same and thereafter the said charges with the representation of the petitioner were sent to the Chief Conservator of Forests. After the Chief Conservator of Forests approved the said charges, the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was referred to to the administrative Tribunal as per the Government direction dated 9th March, 1963 to all its departments contained in Annexure A. The Tribunal, after recording evidence adduced by both the parties and on giving them a hearing, found the petitioner guilty only in respect of the three items of charge No. 1 and of charge No. 3 to a limited extent. On the said findings the Tribunal as a measure of punishment recommended for the compulsory retirement of the petitioner from government service. Government accepted the report tentatively and the petitioner was asked to show cause against the proposed punishment. The petitioner again filed his representation against the same, and Government, on a consideration of the Tribunal's report and the petitioner's representation, by their order dated 6th April, 1974 (a part of Annexure 1) accepted the finding and the punishment recommended by the Tribunal. In pursuance of the said government order the Chief Conservator of Forests, by his order dated 10th april, 1974 (last part of Annexure 1), compulsorily retired the petitioner with effect from 12-4-74 forenoon. On the direction of the Chief Conservator of forests, the aforesaid Government order and the order passed by the Chief conservator of Forests were communicated to the petitioner by the Divisional forest Officer, Puri Division, under whom the petitioner was working at that time. The petitioner accordingly handed over charge of his office to another forest Ranger with effect from 12-4-74 forenoon. The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging (i) the findings of the Tribunal; and (ii) the legality of the departmental proceeding initiated against him and consequently the order compulsorily retiring him from Government service.
(2.)MR. Panda, the learned counsel for the petitioner, at first contended that the findings and conclusions of the Tribunal could not be maintained and were liable to be set aside as the said findings were not based on proper and convincing evidence, and no reasonable man could find the petitioner guilty of the charges framed against him on the evidence on record.
(3.)BEFORE assessing the merit of the above contention of Mr. Panda, I should at first advert to the scope and ambit of the writ jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the findings of fact of the Tribunal. Law is well settled that in matters of this nature the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, is not a court of appeal over the decisions of the disciplinary authority holding departmental enquiries against public servants. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1975 SC 2151 (State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao) have observed as follows:-" 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an Appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a Tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan, (1964) 5 SCR 64: (AIR 1964 SC 477 ). " from the above observations of the Supreme Court it is quite clear that this court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can interfere with the finding of fact of the Tribunal if it is shown that in recording the said finding the Tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or has erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding, and if a finding of fact is based on no evidence. A finding of fact cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence en record is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. Adequacy or sufficiency of evidence supporting the finding of the tribunal or any inference of fact drawn by it therefrom are not matters for the high Court to weigh or reassess, and the High Court cannot supplement its own inference or finding on the evidence on record if the Tribunal's finding and inference of fact are based on evidence on record. Their Lordships of the supreme Court in the above-mentioned case expressly deprecated the effort and the action of the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, in reassessing the entire evidence on record and then, after rejecting some evidence as no evidence, to give its own conclusion on a particular matter not in consonance with the findings of the Tribunal. Previous to the said decision, quite a number of decisions of the Supreme Court have laid down the scope and jurisdiction of the High Court in matters of this nature. In Muralidhar Jena's case (AIR 1963 SC 404) it has been held as follows:--
". . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is common ground that in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent tribunal in a departmental enquiry so that if we are satisfied that in the present case the High Court has purported to reappreciate the evidence for itself that would be outside its jurisdiction. It is also common ground that if it is shown that the impugned findings recorded by the Administrative Tribunal are not supported by an evidence the High Court would be justified in setting aside the said findings. . . . . . . . . " the other relevant observations of their Lordships in that judgment are:-". . . . . . . . . . . . It is necessary to bear in mind that the enquiry held by the tribunal is not governed by the strict and technical rules of the evidence Act. . . . . . . . . . "
X XX X "whether or not, the evidence on which the Tribunal relied was satisfactory or sufficient for justifying its conclusion would not fall to be considered in a writ petition. The question to be considered is whether the said conclusions (the conclusions of the Tribunal) could be set aside on the narrow ground that they are not supported toy any evidence. " in the case reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 (State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree rama Rao) it has been observed:--
" (7 ). There is no warrant for the view expressed toy the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under article 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of Appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant; it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole Judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. "
There are decisions of this Court and of other High Courts on this point, but in view of the above-mentioned authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court, it is needless for me to refer to the said other decisions cited by both the parties.