LAWS(ORI)-1984-1-37

LOKANATH BEHERA ALIAS KHOKAN Vs. STATE

Decided On January 01, 1984
LOKANATH BEHERA ALIAS KHOKAN Appellant
V/S
STATE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant stood his trial being charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (the "Code' for short) with haying intentionally and knowingly accused the death of Jogi Behera (hereinafter referred to as the "deceased') and a co-accused person, namely, Govinda Behera, stood charged under Section 323 of the Code for causing hurt to Maheswar Behera (P. W, I); The co-accused person was acquitted of the charge. The appellant was acquitted of the charge of murder and convicted for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Code and sentenced thereunder to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years by the Court of Session, after acceptance of the case of t he prosecution, not only, on the basis of the evidence adduced by it but also from the admission made by the appellant, that on October 19, 1978, in the evening time, the appellant, then in his teens, dealt one blow by means of a lathi (M.Q.I) , after a sudden quarrel and on the spur of the moment of the chest of the deceased which, caused fracture of a rib, the fractured rib causing rupture of the spleen resulting . in the death of the deceased. The learned trial Judge found.

(2.) Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. S. C. Mohapatra has not assailed the finding recorded by the trial court that the appellant had dealt one blow on the chest of the deceased which ultimately proved fatal. He has challenged the legality of the conviction of the appellant under Section 304 Part I of the Code and has urged that the appellant's act would amount to causing hurt punishable under Section 323 of the Code although unfortunately there had been a fracture of the rib and the fractured rib ruptured the spleen causing the death of the deceased. It has been submitted on behalf of the State that from the evidence adduced and in the circumstances in which the appellant had assaulted the deceased, it could not reasonably be said that the act by which death was caused was done with the intention of causing death or of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, but the act done by the appellant was with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death and therefore, he could be convicted under the second part of Section 304 of the Code. It has been contended that if this Court holds that the appellant had no knowledge that his act was likely to cause death, the appellant would be held guilty of voluntarily causing grievcus hurt punishable under Section 305 of the Code.

(3.) In view of the submissions made at the Bar, this Court is to determine the nature of the offence committed by the appellant keeping in mind the provisions of the Code and the principles of law applicable to such cases.