(1.) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 4-5- 2002 passed by the learned District Judge, Khurda at Bhubaneswar in Arbitration Misc. Case No. 187 of 2001 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter called 'the Act').
(2.) The facts giving rise to the proceeding under the Act are as follows :- The appellant by notice dated 13-7-1993 called for tender for construction of staff quarters at Rayagada i.e. 3 numbers of Type-I, 3 numbers of Type-II and 6 numbers of Type-III quarters at an estimated cost of Rs. 99,885.00. The respondent was one of the tenderers who had quoted Rs. 2,49,499.78 paise and the appellant accepted the said tender. After acceptance of the tender, both the parties entered into an agreement on 7-8-1993. The terms of the agreement provided for completion of the project within a time frame of three months, rescission of the contract on default of the respondent in completing the work as well as in arbitration clause. For reasons stated by the appellant in the appeal memo that the agreement was rescinded on 15-11-1996 and a dispute arose, under the terms of the contract, the dispute raised by the respondent was referred to the sole Arbitrator S. B. Lal, who was Chief Engineer (Arbitration), Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited for adjudication. The Arbitrator on consideration of materials placed before him by both the parties passed an award on claim item Nos. 1,2,3, 4, 6, 8 and 9, the total whereof comes to Rs. 1,18,643/- with pendente lite interest at the rate 15% per annum with further condition that the interest shall run at the rate of 18% per annum, if the amount of award is not paid within 90 days from the date of publication of the order. The said award was challenged before the learned District Judge, Khurda under Section 34 of the Act and the petition filed under Section 34 of the Act having been rejected, this appeal has been filed.
(3.) On perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the learned District Judge has not discussed the contention raised by both the parties at all and only quoting Section 34 of the Act observed that the grounds taken in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Act do not come within the purview of the said provision. Though this is a fit case for remand, the learned counsel appearing for both the parties submitted that instead of remitting the case back, this Court may decide the matter on merit. Accordingly, both the parties were heard at length.