A. Pasayat, J. - (1.) ANXIETY to 'manage' the affairs of schools has become the epicenter of a large number of litigations. Schools which are supposed to be temples of education are frequently turning into battle fields of personal egos, political rivalries, group bickering and factional caviling. The society is now experiencing in addition to labour unrest, students unrest industrial unrest etc., a new type of unrest 'management' unrest. This is now fast introducing to educational institutions. More often than not, the sanctity of the institutions is getting lost, and the purposes for which the educational institutions are set up are frustrated. The present writ application is one of such numerous instances where accusations and counter accusations; allegations of contravention of provisions of law, foul -play and partisan approach by the authorities at the helm of affairs have been made. While the society expects the schools and other educational institutions to be run and managed by people really interested in the welfare of students, frequently it is seen that something murky is lurking in the background.
(2.) PETITIONERS , four in numbers, have filed this writ application under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order quashing the order of re -constitution as passed by the Inspector of Schools (opposite party No. 3) relating to the managing committee of Radhashyam Bidyapitha, a recognised unaided school, controlled and governed by the provisions of the Orissa Education Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and the Orissa Education Management of Private Schools Rules, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'), and for a direction that the Petitioners continue to be the members of a validly constituted managing committee and that their replacement by opposite party Nos. 4 to 10 is illegal and arbitrary. The averments made by the respective parties are full of disputes and denials. The undisputed position is that the school in question is a High School which was established in the year 1981, and recognition was granted on 16 -8 -1983 to the school. A managing committee was formed and approved on 5 -10 -1983, and its term was to expire on 5 -10 -1986. As required under R.4(1), a panel of names for the succeeding managing committee was submitted on the basis of resolution dated 20 -6 -1986, which was approved by the Inspector of Schools (opposite party No. 3) on 10 -11 -1986. After such approval, on the basis of a resolution dated 29 -11 -1986, opposite party No. 7 was elected as the President while the Petitioner No. 3 was elected as the Secretary. The term of office of a managing committee was statutorily fixed at three years at the relevant time, but subsequently in view of the amendment brought in by the R.called the Orissa Education Management of Private Schools (Amendment) Rules, 1989, the term is presently five years. The amendment is effective from 15th of July, 1989 (the date on which it was published in the Orissa Gazette). It appears the Inspector nominated seven persons for approval of the Director by letter dated 2 -3 -1988, which as annexed is Annexure -6 to the writ application. The Director approved the names submitted by the Inspector by order dated 8 -6 -1988, which is annexed as Annexure -7 to the writ application. On the basis of the order of the Director, the managing committee was re -constituted with seven nominated members in addition to the Headmaster and the teachers' representative. The concerned order of the Inspector of Schools is annexed, as Annexure -4 to the writ application. This order of the Inspector is the subject -matter of challenge. According to the Petitioners, they came to know for the first time from the averments in a writ application, i.e., OJC No. 112 of 1989 about the existence of such an order. In the said writ application the present opposite party Nos. 4 to 10 had challenged a decision of the Minister, Education whereby he had held that an appeal under R.3(1) was not maintainable, and there was a declaration that the order of re -constitution made by the Inspector of Schools was illegal. The said order of the Minister was quashed by this Court. The Petitioners contend that the averments made in OJC No. 112 of 1989 were to the effect that the present Petitioners and two others had voluntarily tendered resignation from the managing committee which necessitated formation of a new committee. They assert that there was no voluntary resignation and even if there was resignation, it was withdrawn prior to its acceptance, and in any event the formalities required to be observed before a resignation takes effect in terms of R.6(3) being absent, there was no presentational in the eye of law and as a corollary and consequence, the nomination of opposite party Nos. 4 to 10 is bound to fail and the Petitioners are entitled to a declaration that they are deemed to be in office and shall continue to do so till the expiry of the full term of five years. The functionaries under the Act and the Rules, and the opposite party Nos. 4 to 10 on the other hand contended that the so called withdrawal of the letters of resignation is a myth and there was no question of acceptance of resignation. According to them, no entity was authorised to and competent to accept the resignation and a meeting could not have been held to accept the resignation, as there would not have been any quorum to constitute a valid meeting. It is also pleaded that the Petitioners having gone out of their own volition, cannot take shelter behind the pleas of technicalities, and in any event taking an over all view of the entire matter on interference is called for.
(3.) IN this highly controversial and contentious factual backdrop, we feel that exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction is uncalled for. The extraordinary powers are not to be exercised to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion any substantial injustice. No interference is called for unless there is grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law. However, we would like to note some of the significant features which have reinforced our reluctance to interfere in the matter. Some of the relevant provisions of the R.on which reliance has been placed may be referred to. Strong reliance has been placed on R.6(3) by the Petitioners, which reads as follows: 6. Term of office of the Members of the Managing Committee: (1) to (2)... (3) Any member of the Managing Committee other than the ex officio members may at any time resign from the office by sending a letter of resignation to the President, but such resignation shall take effect from the date on which it is accepted by the Managing Committee. According to them, even when resignations have been offered, they are not effective until acceptance thereof in a meeting called for the purpose. By a literal interpretation of the rule the contention is attractive, but there may be instances where the holding of the meeting itself may be an impossibility. R.7(3) prescribes the quorum to be four at the minimum. The R.is quoted below: 7. Meetings of the Managing Committee: (1) to (2).... (3) The quorum for the meeting of the Managing Committee shall be four. Mere existence of and casual vacancy in membership shall not invalidate the proceedings of the Managing Committee. In the instant case, out of nine members, six including the President and the Secretary had tendered their resignations. The remaining number is three including two official members. The insistence on a meeting to accept resignation where the persons resigning may not attend would be counter productive. Procedure is handmaid of justice. It is intended to further the cause of justice and not to create stumbling blocks. We may illustrate an extreme case where all the nine members of a managing committee tendered their resignations then the question would be who would accept them and where. We may take another case where even after getting the letters of resignation the authorised persons with oblique motives do not convene a meeting. It would be against the spirit of legislative intent, to conclude that the resignation was not effective. Judged in this background, we find that there is no irregularity which emerges on account of non -convening of a meeting for purpose.;