GANESHDAS KALURAM Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
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NARASIMHAM, J. -
(1.) THIS is a reference under Section 66 (2), Income -tax Act, by the Income -tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench, under the directions of this Court contained in its order dated 3 -12 -1948 in S.J.C. No. 10 of 1947.
(2.) THE applicant Ganeshdas Kaluram is a yarn dealer of Cuttack town and he was assessed to income -tax for the year 1943 -44 at the rate of 12 1/2 per cent gross profits by the Income -tax Officer though in the
petitioner's accounts submitted to the Income -tax authorities he disclosed a profit of 7 1/2 per cent only.
In rejecting the petitioner's accounts as regards his profits the Income -tax officer was mainly influenced
by the following factors:
1. The petitioner kept a mixed account for all varieties of yarn which rendered proper check impossible. 2. He sold rupees two lakhs worth of goods for cash to unnamed persons thereby exposing himself to the suspicion that controlled prices were shown in the books whereas higher prices were charged from customers and the excess was pocketed by the assessee without being included in the profits. 3. The neighbouring shopkeepers who were also dealing with the same kind of goods showed a profit of 15 Per cent for the period in question. An appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income -tax was unsuccessful and then the petitioner preferred a second appeal to the Appellate Tribunal which made some slight modifications in his favour which are not material for the purposes of this reference. The petitioner thereupon applied to the Tribunal for stating a case which was rejected. Then a writ of mandamus was issued by this High Court and the Tribunal submitted the following questions of law as directed by the Court: 1. whether under the facts and circumstances of the case relating to the yarn accounts of the assessee it was legal to apply the proviso to Section 13. 2. If it be held that the proviso to Section 13 is inapplicable, whether the assessment under Section 23(3) on the basis of the profits of the neighbouring shop keepers is legal.
Neither the Income -tax officer nor the Appellate Assistant Commissioner nor even the Tribunal in its first order under Section 33 expressly stated that the Income -tax officer applied the proviso to Section 13
while estimating the gross profits of the petitioner. In para 6 of the order under Section 66(2) passed by
the Tribunal on 17 -10 -46 the application of the proviso to Section 13 was indicated. It was because of this
indication in that para, that the Court directed the issue of a writ of mandamus regarding the construction
of the proviso to Section 13 on which there is a sharp conflict of judicial authorities in India. The
petitoner's method of accouning is mercantile and there seems to be no doubt either about the method or
about the deduction of the profits of his business from the method so employed. Therefore if a narrow
construction be put on the expression 'method of accounting' specified in the proviso to Section 13 as has
been done by some High Courts it would appear that that proviso has no application to the present case.
The Income -tax officer did not reject the petitioner's accounts in toto but only rejected those portions of it
which showed his gross profits. He accepted the remaining particulars and estimated the gross profits at
12 1/2 per cent on the basis of the profits shown by the neighbouring shopkeepers. A question therefore arises as to whether when there is no doubt about the method of accounting but the Income -tax officer has
reasons to disbelieve a portion of the account to be false and fictitious he could legally apply the proviso
to Section 13. In 'Gurmukh Singh v. Commr. of Income -tax, Lahore' AIR 1944 Lah 353 (2), the majority
of Judges following Din Mohammad J. held that the proviso to Section 13 would apply. There is a
complete discussion of the entire law on the subject including the views of the various High Courts and it
is unnecessary to recapitulate them here. The minority of Judges, however, followed the view of Munir J.
who held that the proviso to Section 13 would not apply if the Income -tax officer ignores the accounts
submitted by the assessee on the ground that they contained false entries.
(3.) IN this case, however, we consider that any discussion about the relative merits of the majority view and the minority view in the aforesaid case is of mere academic interest. Even according to Munir J. if the
proviso to Section 13 is inapplicable the Income -tax officer has ample powers under Section 23(3) to
make assessment not only on the basis of the figures supplied by the assessee but on other materials that
might have come to his knowledge. Munir J. has relied on 'Subbayya v. Commr. of Income -tax, Madras'
AIR 1939 Mad 371, in support of his view. Thus even those authorities who doubt the legality of applying
the proviso to Section 13 to cases of this type seem to have no doubt that in such circumstances Section
23(3) alone would empower the Income -tax officer to assess the petitioner. In the present case as already pointed out the Income -tax officer has not quoted the particular section of the Income -tax Act which he
applied and it seems to be unnecessary for us to discuss elaborately whether the expression 'method of
accounting' contained in the proviso to Section 13 should be given a narrow or liberal interpretation.;
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