G.P.SINGH,C.J. - (1.) L . This order shall also dispose of Mise Petition No.191 of 1974 (Abdul Gaffar and others v. The Administrator, Indore Municipal Corporation and another.
(2.) BY these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners challenge the imposition of tax on advertisements other than advertisements published in newspapers under section 132 (2) (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, ) 956 by the Indore Corporation. The main contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the resolution imposing the tax did not contain any "system of assessment" as required by section 133 of the Act. The impugned tax was imposed by the order of the Administrator dated 7th September 1970. Section 132 enumerates the taxes which can be imposed by the Corporation, A tax on advertisements other than advertisements published in newspapers is one of the taxes which the Corporation can impose under the Act. The procedure of imposition of taxes is contained in section 133. Sub section (1) of section 133. provides that the Corporation may at a special meeting bring forward Appellant resolution to propose the imposition of any tax under section 132 defining the class of persons or description of property proposed to be taxed. The amount or rate of tax to be imposed and the system of assessment to be adopted. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the expression "system of assessment" means the entire procedure for assessment and collection of tax and that as the order of the Administrator did not contain any procedure for assessment or collection of the tax, there was noncompliance of the mandatory requirement of section 133 and the imposition was invalid. In our opinion, the argument is not sound. A reading of section 133 will show that it merely deals with the procedure for imposition of tax. The procedure for assessment, collection, remission refund and recovery of taxes, cesses; etc. is provided by the byelaws which can be made by the Corporation under section 427 (3) of the Act. Now in the intention of the Legislature was to provide for the procedure for assessment and collection of taxes in section 133 itself, there was no point in making a separate provision for framing byelaws for assessment, collection, etc. of taxes under section 427 (3). The expression "system of assessment" as used in section 133, in our opinion, means the stage of imposition of the tax and not other stages as a whole which are relevant for assessment or collection of tax. This view is strongly supported by a decision of the Supreme Court in Vallabhdas v. Municipal Committee. Akola AIR 1967 SC 133, In this case the Supreme Court construed section 67 (2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 which required a Municipal Committee to publish in accordance with rules a notice defining the class of persons or description of property proposed to be taxed, the amount or rate of tax to be imposed and the system of assessment to be adopted. It was held having regard to other sections in the Act which dealt with rules for assessment and collection of tax that the expression "system of assessment" in section 67 (2) was limited to the stage of the imposition of the tax and that it was sufficient if the notice referred to in that section mentioned the stage of imposition, the goods, property or persons to be taxed and the rate or rates at which they were to be taxed. Section 67 (2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act. 1922 was in pari materia with section 133 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Vallabhdas's ease, therefore, has full application here. System of assessment referred to in section 133 must, in our opinion, be restricted to the stage of imposition and it cannot be construed to include the entire procedure for assessment and collection of tax for which separate provision is made by the Act under section 427 (3). A reading of the order of the Administrator clearly shows that the stage at which the tax is imposed is the publication of the advertisement. This is the event which attracts the tax. The order also mentions the rates at which tax is imposed on different kinds of advertisements. In our opinion, the imposition is not invalid for noncompliance with section 133. 1975 MPLJ 326. 5. We have earlier stated that till 18th August 1978 no bye -laws had been made by the Corporation under section 427 (3) for assessment and collection of the tax. Can it then be said that the tax was inoperative before that date because no machinery existed for its assessment and collection ? In our opinion, the answer to this question must be given in the negative having regard to the provisions of sections 173 to 175 of the Act which provide a machinery for recovery of Corporation claims including taxes and which contemplate a quasi -judicial procedure and also provide for an appeal. These sections in so far as relevant read as follows : - "Section 173. Presentation of bill for taxes and other demands -(l) when any amount declared by or under the provisions of this Act to be recoverable in the manner provided in this Chapter, or payable on account of any tax imposed within the limits of the city shall have become due, the Commissioner shall with the least practicable delay cause to be presented to any person liable for the payment thereof a bill for the sum claimed as due. Contents of bill. (2) Every such bill shall specify - (a) the period for which, and (b) the property, occupation or thing in respect of which the sum is claimed, and shall also give notice of - (i) the liability incurred in default of payment, and (ii) the time within which an objection may be preferred as against such claim. Section. 174, If bill not paid within 15 days' notice of demand to issne -(1) If the sum, for which a bill is presented as aforesaid, is not paid and no objection has been preferred within 15 days from the presentation of the bill, the Commissioner may serve upon the person to whom such bill has been presented a notice of demand in the form prescribed by bye -laws. (2) For every notice of demand a fee shall be charged ~t the rate specified in the bye laws and shall be payable by the said person, and the fees shall be included in the costs of recovery, Section. 175. In what case warrant may issue. -(1) If the person on whom a notice of demand is served under sub -section (1) of section 174 does not within thirty days of the service of such notice - (a) pay the sum demanded in the notice; or (b) show cause to the satisfaction of the Commissioner why he should not pay the same; or . (c) prefer an appeal in accordance with the provisions of section 184 against the demand; such sum with all costs of recovery may be recovered under a warrant in the form prescribed by bye -laws signed by the Commissioner. " A reading of section 173 will show that the Commissioner can cause a bill on account of any tax imposed which has become due to be presented to the person liable for the payment thereof. The bill has to show the period for which and the thing in respect of which the same is claimed. The bill has also to specify the time within which an objection may be preferred. On receipt of such a bill the person concerned may either pay the same or raise an objection to the payment before the Commissioner. If the bill is not paid and if no objection is raised, the Commissioner issues a notice of demand under section 174. It is implicit in the terms of section 174 that if a person on whom the bill is served raises objections within fifteen days, the objections should be decided by the Commissioner in a quasi -judicial manner and it is only when the objections are over -ruled that a notice of demand can follow. The order of the Commissioner rejecting the objections and issuing a notice of demand can be challenged in appeal because the notice of demand is appeal able under section 184. Now in cases where there are separate bye -laws for assessment of tax made under section 427 (3), the objections which a person can take under section 174 on presentation of a bill would be of a limited character. It would then not be open at this stage to challenge the assessment of tax. But in cases where there are no bye -laws providing for assessment of tax, the bill issued by the Commissioner under section 173 would be in the nature of provisional assessment of tax which can be challenged by raising objections under section 174. The objections in such a case will include also objections to assessment of tax and would be investigated judicially and if the objections are over ruled, the person concerned would have a right of appeal under section 184. We do not find any cogent reason to limit the scope of sections 173 and 174 for recovery of those taxes only for which a separate provision for assessment has been made. As earlier pointed out by us, the procedure and machinary for assessment of a tax from its very nature depends upon the nature of the tax. If the tax is a simple impost for which no separate procedure for assessment is necessary, sections 173 and 174 can be used not only for recovery but also for assessment of the tax in the manner indicated above. As the procedure under these sections is quasi -judicial in nature and is coupled with a safeguard 01 appeal, it cannot be said that the procedure is administrative and does not fulfil the requirement of the Constitution. In Astt. Collectos, C. K. v. N. T Co. of India Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court inferred a quasi -judicial procedure for assessment from rule 10 -A of the Central Excise Rules which apparently dealt with residuary powers for recovery of sums due to Government and did not expressly provide any procedure for assessment. Similarly, in Roopchand v. K. U. M. Samiti, Raipur (supra) a quasi -judicial procedure fur assessment was inferred from section 20 of the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 and rule 56 made there under although none of these provisions expressly provided for assessment of the fee imposed. These decisions support our conclusion that sections 173 and 174 impliedly provide for assessment in a quasi judicial manner in cases where there are no separate bye -laws for assessment of a tax. We are, therefore, unable to accept the argument that the tax was inoperative till 18th August 1978 for want of any machinery for its assessment or collection. 6. The petitions fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs in both the petitions. Security amount be refunded to the petitioners III both the petitions.;