FIRM KASHIRAM BIHARILAL Vs. BADRILAL
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Firm Kashiram Biharilal
Click here to view full judgement.
Dixit, J. -
(1.) THIS application under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against an order dated 25 -12 -1952 in appeal of the District Judge Guna, whereby he modified a decision of the Rent Fixation Authority Guna and determined Rs. 27/ - per month as the fair rent of certain premises rented out by the opponent Badrilal from the petitioner. The applicant contends that the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan Samvat 2009 was operative only until 30 -6 -1951 and that thereafter neither the Bent Fixation Authority nor the District Judge has any jurisdiction to fix any rent in respect of the tenated premises.
(2.) THE Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan came into force on 9 -2 -1950. Section 1 (4) of the Act provided that the Act shall remain in force until 30 -6 -1951. The proviso to that section, however, laid down that the Government may, if it considered it expedient to do so, extend the duration of the Act by a further period of two years from the date on which the Act would otherwise expire. On 26 -3 -1951 the Government issued a notification continuing in force the Act till 30 -6 -1953. Mr. Patankar learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the proviso to S. 1(4) under which the Government extended the duration of the Act was not valid inasmuch as it gave to the Executive a legislative power which the legislature could not repose in any organ or body; that the extension of the Act for a further period of two years from 30 -6 -1951 by Government notification amounted to exercise of delegated legislative power and as such was ultra vires and that, therefore the Act ceased to operate on 30 -6 -1951.
Learned counsel based his argument on - - J.N. Gupta v. Province of Bihar', : AIR 1949 FC 175 (A); - - 'Joylal Agarwala v. The State', : AIR 1951 SC 484 (B); - - 'In re Veerabhadrayya', : AIR 1950 Mad 243 (C); - - 'Krishna Chandra v. Sushila Mitra', : AIR 1951 Ori 105 (FB) (D); and - - 'Ramkishan v. The State', : AIR 1951 All 181 (FB) (E). The learned Advocate -General in reply contended that there was not here in fact any delegation of the law -making power; the Legislature itself had applied its mind as to the maximum period upto which the Act could remain in force and what was left to the discretion of the Government was the determination of the circumstances and the manner under which the duration of the Act could be extended by two years upto 30 -6 -1953 and that the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of - - 'In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912',, AIR 1951 SC 332 (F); - - 'State of Bombay v. Narottamdas',, AIR 1951 SC 09 (G); : AIR 1951 SC 484 (B) clearly showed that no exception could be taken to such legislation.
It seems to me that having regard to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases referred to at the Bar, of which the most material is : AIR 1951 SC 484 (B), the point which the petitioner here wishes to argue is quite unarguable. The doctrine of delegated legislation has been exhaustively and elaborately considered in, AIR 1951 SC 332 (F), which has been summarised by the Supreme Court in - - 'Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman Patna Administration Committee',, AIR 1954 SC 509 (H). The one proposition which' seems to emerge clearly from these authorities and the decisions in : AIR 1951 SC 69 (G); : AIR 1951 SC 484 (B), and : AIR 1949 FC 175 (A), is that the Legislature cannot repose any power essentially Legislative in another body or organ; it cannot efface itself and set up a parallel legislative authority; it must exercise its judgment on vital matters of policy and enact the general principles which should be embodied in the legislation; but it can confer upon, any person or body fitted to exercise it, the power to work out details and particulars for carrying out its policy and in order to give effect to the legislation in a particular direction. It is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule for determining whether a matter is of principle and policy or whether it is one of detail, ancillary to the statute for carrying it into effect. The question, though often beset with difficulty, has to be answered with reference to the nature of the impugned legislation.
No such difficulty arises in the present case. For fortunately we have a decision of the Supreme Court in : AIR 1951 SC 484 (B), which directly covers the point which arises in the present case, namely, whether there is any delegation of any legislative power when the Legislature passes an Act providing that it shall remain in force for a certain minimum period and empowering another body to extend the Act thereafter, if it thinks fit, for a further period fixed by the Legislature itself. In Joylal Agarwala's case (B), the Supreme Court considered the question of the validity of the extension of the life of Essential Supplies (Temporary powers) Act 1946. Section 1(3) of the Essential Supplies Act provided that it shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period specified in S. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act 1946. Section 4 of the latter Act tan as follows:
........the period mentioned.....is the period of one year beginning with the date on which the Proclamation of Emergency in force at the passing of this Act ceases to operate or, if the Governor General by public notification so directs, the period of two years beginning with that date:
Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the extension of the said period is passed by both Houses of Parliament, the said period shall be extended for a further period of twelve months from the date on which it would otherwise expire so, however, that it does not in any case continue for more than five years from the dale on which the Proclamation of Emergency ceases to operate.
(3.) AFTER pointing out that the period of operation of the Essential Supplies Act mentioned in S. 1(3) was not necessarily one year from the date of cessation of emergency; that it could be two years if the Governor -General by notification so directed and it may even go upto a maximum period of five years in instalments of one year each under the proviso, and after emphasizing the fact that the fixation of the period of operation of the Act was not left to any other Act but was provided by the Act itself, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court said that the case of : AIR 1949 FC 175 (A), had no application and further observed as follows:
In the case now before us the Legislature has itself applied its mind and has fixed the duration of the Act, hut has left the machinery to reach the maximum period by instalments to be worked out in a particular manner. There is here no question of delegation at all much less delegation of any legislative power.;
Copyright © Regent Computronics Pvt.Ltd.