LAWS(MPH)-2001-2-83

JAGANNATH PRASAD Vs. STATE OF M.P.

Decided On February 16, 2001
JAGANNATH PRASAD Appellant
V/S
STATE OF M.P. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE following question arising in the case has been referred to the Full Bench :

(2.) 2000 (1) MPLJ 525, and argued that it is the date of the order and not the date of application which shall be decisive in the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner had argued that the crucial amendment dated 8th March, 1999, brought about in the 'Niyam, 1972' would have a prospective and not a retrospective operation. Considering the conflicting views taken by the two Division Benches of this Court in Makhan Lal Ojha's case (supra) on the one hand and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Anand Bihari and another (supra) on the other, the learned Single Judge felt that the mailer required to he considered by the Full Bench and, therefore, he framed the question referred to above and ordered for placing the file before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench to decide the said question. Thus, this Full Bench is formed and the matter has been referred to it.

(3.) DILATING on the objects and the rationale behind the formulation of the scheme for the benefit of the Swatantrata Sangram Sainik in 1972, the learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the 'Niyam, 1972' were framed by the Government, at the time or celebrating the Silver Jubilee of the independence or our Country, to honour the sacrifices made by the Swatantrata Sangram Sainik in the freedom movement and also to give monetary help to the needy among them. According to the learned counsel, therefore, the 'Niyam, 1972' clothed the Swatantrata Sangram Sainik with the right to claim pension in this regard. His contention is that the 'Niyam, 1972' are declaratory in nature and the rights given under them are deemed to have vested from the date or their enforcement, i.e. 22nd July, 1972, the date of notification in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette (Extraordinary) being 18th September, 1972. His further contention is that in view or this matter these vested rights are substantive in nature, though they do not have a statutory recognition.