AMARNATH Vs. HUKUMCHAND
LAWS(MPH)-1980-2-31
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Decided on February 11,1980

AMARNATH Appellant
VERSUS
HUKUMCHAND Respondents

JUDGEMENT

BAJPAI ,J - (1.)By this second appeal, the defendant -tenants seek interference with the judgment and decree directing their eviction from the tenanted premises made by the trial Court and affirmed by the lower appellate Court. The trial Court found the ground of bonafide need of the suit accommodation by the respondent -landlord for the purposes of his own business as proved and, accordingly, decreed the claim for eviction on the aforesaid ground as specified in clause (f) of section 12 (1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The lower appellate Court however, further held that in addition to the ground under clause (f) the ground under clause (a) of section 12 (1) of the Act, i.e. default in payment of arrears of rent, was also available and the decree could be based on the same too because, according to the lower appellate Court since the appellant -tenants withdrew the amount of previous deposits after the dismissal of the suit in default, there was no deposits in compliance with the provisions of sub -section (1) of section 13 of the Act despite the fact that prior to the restoration of the suit, the Said amount which had been withdrawn was again deposited.
(2.)ON behalf of the defendant tenants, it was contended that so far as the availability of the ground under clause (a) of sub -section (1) of section 12 of the Act, as held by the lower appellate Court is concerned the same is not liable to be sustained because, undisputedly the initial deposits were within the prescribed time and even if the amount so deposited by mistake happened to be withdrawn the same was again re -deposited long before the restoration of the suit which had been earlier dismissed in default. Under there circumstances it was contended that even if there was a technical defect of the amount not remaining in deposit during the period when the suit stood dismissed the delay could always be condoned because the Courts always have the power to condone the delay in respect of the initial deposit. It was further contended that under the peculiar circumstances of the case that the suit happened to be dismissed and the amount were -deposited long before its restoration, a case was made out for condoning the delay.
As regards default in the matter of subsequent deposits month to month during the pendency of the suit it was contended that the defendant -tenants had been regular in making the payment and that more than sufficient amount of rent towards arrears of rent had been in deposit. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs -landlord could not point out any such defect in the monthly deposits. He simply made a general allegation that certain amount deposited by that tenants was towards electricity charges. He however failed to demonstrate any such shortage in payment. In view of the aforesaid circumstances this Court is of the opinion that the defendant -tenants were entitled to the benefit of sub section (3) of section 12 of the Act and no decree for eviction could be passed on the ground under clause (a) of section 12(1) of the Act. Even if the date on which the amount was re -deposited is to be treated as the date of first deposit the circumstances, justify condonation of the delay in the initial deposit.

(3.)WHILE assailing the finding concurrently recorded by both the Courts below about the bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiffs -landlord for his own business, the learned counsel for the appellants mad an effort first to show that the finding about the existence of need was vitiated inasmuch as the courts below had over -looked certain material pieces of evidence. It was pointed out that the Courts below did not take into consideration the circumstances that even after vacating the tenanted premises the plaintiff, landlord could find a place for keeping his shop in a portion of the hall wherein he had put his shop in a portion of the hall wherein he had put his machines of cutting. stitching and rolling paper. The argument was that once the plaintiffs could keep his shop in a portion of the said hall the Courts below should have held that the need, If any was satisfied. As regards sufficiency of space for storage it was pointed out that the plaintiffs had sufficient accommodation in the basement floor and that even during the pendency of the appeal two or three rooms belonging to the plaintiff had fallen vacant and they could constitute an alternatives suitable accommodation. In this respect statement for incorporating the plea of alternative accommodation having become available subsequently counsel for both the sides and on going through the evidence on record this Court is of the opinion that the finding about the bonafide requirement of the suit accommodation by the landlord for his own business is a pure question of fact, concurrently recorded by both the Courts below and does not call for any interference at this stage in second appeal.


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