- (1.) An application under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act has been decided by the Subordinate Court on 2/05/1997, This has been challenged by way of revision. The revision has been filed on 11/03/1998. It is stated that there is a delay of 189 days in presentation of the revision and an application for condonation of delay has also been filed.
(2.) I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the application seeking condonation of delay. It is stated in the affidavit filed by the Executive Engineer that the judgment was pronounced on 2-5-1997 and on coming to know from the Assistant Government Pleader that the judgment was delivered he requested to apply for certified copy and the Asst. Government Pleader applied for it on 21/08/1997. From this assertion it is clear that more than three months time was lost only for making the application for certified copy. If the judgment was pronounced on 2-5-1997 why was application not made till 21/08/1997 no explanation has been given. On 15/10/1997 according to the affidavit the Assistant Government Pleader handed over the judgment to the Executive Engineer. Then, he states that opinion was sought from the Government Pleader on 6-11-1997. Another twenty days were lost from receiving the copy till sending it for getting opinion. These 20 days delay has also not been explained. Opinion was given by the Government Pleader on the same day, but it was again sent for another opinion on 11-11-1997 to the Government Pleader in the High Court. He also was prompt to give his opinion on 14-11-1997. Then, it is stated in the affidavit that from 25-11-1997 to 1-3-1998 the post of Executive Engineer in the division was vacant, therefore the revision could not be filed. What has been done from 25/11/1997 has not been explained. It is also not stated that when the post of Executive Engineer of a division was vacant was the division closed down. It is not possible to accept that if the post of Executive Engineer was vacant in a division that division did not do any work for a period of four months. Therefore, the explanation that since the Executive Engineer's post was vacant the revision could not be filed is neither sufficient nor reasonable, therefore it cannot be accepted. There is another facet of the case. After the revision was presented on 11/03/1998 it had been returned by the registry for removing the deficiency, then it was presented on 25/07/1998, again it was returned on 11/08/1998 when it was presented back on 3/09/1998. So, the delay in re-presenting the file for about five months has also not been explained.
(3.) The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Courts need to be liberal in entertaining the petitions for condoning the delay particularly made by the Government in view of various judgments of the Supreme Court. He relies on a judgment reported in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 (5) Scale 105. The facts of the case before the Supreme Court were altogether different than the present case. In that case the delay of 883 days was condoned by Supreme Court but it had been proved that the litigant himself had taken all the measures to approach the Court in time and it was because of the negligence on the part of the Advocate concerned the delay had been caused. The litigant concerned had filed even a claim petition before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum and had succeeded in getting an award against the Advocate of Rs.50,000.00. Therefore, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in that judgment is not at all applicable to the present case. The learned Counsel has also relied on a judgment in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, 1996 (5) Supreme 75. In this case, the Supreme Court held:- "4. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the State - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - international or otherwise -is a routine. Considerable delay of process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amounts of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State arc lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be congnizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay."After making the above referred observations the Supreme Court condoned the delay in the circumstances of the case. But, the law had been lately laid down by the Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276. In a brief judgment, the Supreme Court laid down the law in the following terms : "6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed, in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs."The facts of the case were that the High Court had condoned the delay and the ground taken in the application seeking condonation of delay was; "at that time the Advocate-General's office was fed up with so many arbitration matters equally important to this case were pending for consideration as per the directions of the Advocate-General on 2-9-1995."The Supreme Court stated that, before the delay is condoned the Court has to record satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory. There is no question of equities in the matter. Once the Court is satisfied that the explanation offered for the delay is either reasonable or satisfactory the Court would be bound to condone the delay, but if Court is not in a position to record its satisfaction that the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory, there would be no question of condoning the delay. In the present case, as has been stated, I have not found the explanation either reasonable or satisfactory, therefore the delay cannot be condoned.;