SATHI RAMIREDDY Vs. LALITHA SUGAR MILLS
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
SREE LALITHA TRIPURASUNDAN SUGAR MILLS REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNER, NULI VEERRAJU, PENUGONDA, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT
Click here to view full judgement.
(1.) OF breach OF trustPrinciples stated. Facts :The petitioner herein handled the lorry (which has to be delivered to the Managing Partner Atyam Kamaraju after expiry of the lease period) and removed it from the premises of the sugar mill OF the respondent herein and took it away to his private residence at Eletipadu. It was also alleged that subsequently he obliterated the sign board thereon indicating it as the property of the Godavari Sugar Company Mill and printed it as a public carrier and has been utilising the said lorry thereafter in collusion and conspiracy with Kotla Venktramayya for his private purposes. Held :On the basis of those allegations it cannot, now be said prima facie no offence has been committed by the accused person. There are no grounds to quash the proceedings. Petition under Sec. 561-Crl. Procedure Code praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court will be pleased to quash the procedings in C.C.N. 123 of 1972 on the file of the Court ot the II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Tanuku. (PARA ) Mr. T. Veerabhadrayya, for the Petitioner, The Public Prosecutor and Mr. M. Rajasekhara Reddy.for the Respondent
(2.) This is an application to quash the proceedings in C.C. 123 of 1972 on the file of the Second Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Tanuku. The petitioner herein is the accused in the complaint filed by the respondent before the Magistrate. Mr. Veerabhadraiah, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein contends that on the allegations in the complaint petition it cannot be said that, prim \ facie a case has been made out that an offence has been committed and therefore I should interfere following the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab and quash the proceedings. The learned counsel has taken me through the complaint petition. His argument is that if a partner of a firm uses the property of the partnership firm exclusively for his own benefit, it does not amount to either criminal breach of trust within the meaning of Section 409 I.P.C., or theft witin the meaning of section 379, or dishonest or fraudulent concealment or removal of property within the meaning of section 424 I.P.C. Hs has relied upon the decision of Mirza J., of this court in Subbarayndu v. Srikrishna Mekan Rao wherein the learned Judge held that if one of the partners bieaks open the partnership shop and even walks away with the articles belonging to the partnership that does not amount to an offence under section 424 I. P. C. Mr. Veerabhadraiah also relies upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Velji Raghavaji v. State of Maharastra wherein it has been held that before a person can be said to have committed criminal breach of trust within the meaning of section 405, I.P.C. it must be established that be was either entrusted with or entrusted with dominion over property which be is said to have converted to his own use, and in order to establish ehtrustment of dominion over property to an accused person the mere existence of that person's dominion over property is not enough. It was further held by Madholkar J., in that case as under:
"Every partner has dominion oyer property by reason of the fact that he is a partner. This is a kind of dominion which every owner of property has over his property. But it is not dominion of this kind which satisfies the requirements of section 405. In order to establish entrustment of dominion over property to an accused person the mere existence of that person's dominion over property is not enough. It must be further shown that his dominion was the result of entrustment. Therefore as rightly pointed out by Harris, C.J., the prosecution must establish that dominion over the assests or a particular assest of the partnership, was by a special agreement between the parties, entrusted to the accused person. If in the absence of such special agreement a partner receives money belonging to the partnership he cannot be said to have received it in a fiduciary capacity or in other words cannot be held to have been entrusted dominion over pamership properties."
Mr. Veerabadraiah argues on the basis of this decision that because his client has dealt with the partnership property, as if it is his own, it does not amount to a criminal breach of trust within the meaning of section 409 I.P.C. It has to be seen from the allegations in the complaint petition that the petitioner herein handled the lorry (which has to be delivered to the Managing Partner Atyam Kamaraju after expiry of the lease period) and removed it from the premises of the sugar mill of the respondent herein and took it away to his private residence at EJetipadu. It was also alleged that subsequently he obliterated the sigh board thereon indicating it as the property of the Godavari Sugar Company Mill and printed it as a public carrier and has been utilising the said lorry thereafter in collusion and conspiracy with Kotta Venkatramayya for bis private purposes. These allegations, if they are made out, according to the learned counsel for Rajasekhara Reddy, appearing for the respondent herein, amount to dishonest removal or conversion of the property with fraudulent intention within the meaning of section 424 and it also amounts to a theft within the meaning of section 379 I.P.C. I am not herein concerned with the truth or otherwise of those allegations in the complaint petition. On the basis of those allegations it cannot, now be said prima facie no offence has been committed by the accused person. It is for the complainant to establish the truth of the allegations made therein, it is open to the petitioner herein to meet those allegations and prove that those allegations are false or that no offence has been committed by him. Really it is premature at this stage to say that on the basis of those allegations that no prima facie case has been made out. I am therefore, of the opinion that there are no grounds to quash the proceedings in C.C. 123 of 1972 as prayedi for herein. The petition is dismissed. M.N.R. Petition dismissed.;
Copyright © Regent Computronics Pvt.Ltd.