- (1.) Criminal M.P. 399/1991 is filed to grant leave to prefer an appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 161/1991) against the judgment dated 16/11/1990 in C.C. No. 179/1986 in the Court of the Special Judge for Economic Offences, Hyderabad acquitting the accused.
(2.) The petitioner (appellant) filed the complaint against the accused for offences under the Central Excise Act and for criminal conspiracy. The gist of the allegation is that the 1st accused and the 3rd accused companies who were engaged in the manufacture of cigarettes at their factory at Biccavolu have committed evasion of excise duty payable on cigarette with the help of the other accused. The trial court framed four charges. The 1st charge is under Section 120-B I.P.C. r/w Sections 9(1)(n), 9(1)(bb), 9(1)(bbb) of the Central Excises and Salt Act against A. 8 to A. 31 and A. 34 to A. 40. The second charge is under Section 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(bb) r/w Section 9(1)(d) of the Central Excises and Salt Act against A-1, A-3, A-7, A-8, A-18 to A-28, A-30, A-34, A-38 to A-40. The third charge is under Section 9(1)(b), 9(1)(bb) and 9(1)(d) of the Central Excises and Salt Act against A-1, A-4 to A-17, A-23, A-25 to A-31, A-34 to A-38, A-40. The fourth charge is under Sections 9(1)(b), 9(1)(bb) and 9(1)(d) of the Central Excises and Salt Act against A-1, A-3, A-8 to A-24. The learned Special Judge for Economic Offences found that the prosecution has failed to prove all the charges and acquitted the accused. In the memorandum of appeal a note is made which reads that A-2 was deleted by an order of Supreme Court holding A-1 and A-2 are one and the same. A-32 and A-33 were discharged while framing charges. As regards A-4, A-29 and A-31 the prosecution conceded that there is no proof against them in respect of the cigarettes from Biccavolu. Therefore, the appeal is filed against other accused.
(3.) The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court committed an error in discarding the statements recorded by the Central Excise Officers under Section 14 of the Central Excise Act from the witnesses and also from persons who subsequently became accused, which are now in the nature of confessional statements. Section 14, sub-section (1) of the Central Excise Act enables any Central Excise Officer duly empowered by the Central Government to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any enquiry which such officer is making for any of the purposes of this Act. Sub-section (2) says all that persons so summoned shall be bound to attend either in person or by an authorised agent and state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined or making statements and to produce documents and other things as may be required. Sub-section (3) says that every such enquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial Court rejected the statements of the witnesses on the ground that the persons are alive excepting one person who died and so the statements of those persons are irrelevant. As regards the confessional statements recorded from the accused by the Central Excise Officers, he found that they are not voluntary. Therefore, he rejected all the statements and confessions recorded under Section 14 of Central Excise Act.;