SUSHIL YADAV Vs. GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS.
LAWS(CA)-2015-2-29
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
Decided on February 17,2015

Sushil Yadav Appellant
VERSUS
Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Shekhar Agarwal, Member (A) - (1.) THE applicant was working as ASI in Delhi Police. A departmental enquiry was initiated against her on 06.01.2010 on the charge that on 01.11.2009 Head Constable Randhir Singh had challaned a motor cycle under sections 3/181 & 39/192 of Motor Vehicles Act and impounded the same under Section 207 of the same Act. However, she made cutting in the challan book and changed the section into 129/177 of the Act and released the vehicle without orders of the Court and without informing the SHO. It was alleged that by doing so she had exceeded her jurisdiction and taken such an important decision suo moto. An enquiry was held and the Enquiry Officer (EO) submitted his report on 02.02.2011 in which he found the charge against the applicant to have been proved without any shadow of doubt. The Disciplinary Authority (DA) after considering the report of the EO and the representation submitted by the applicant passed an order dated 15.03.2011 by which the applicant was awarded punishment of censure. An appeal filed against this order was rejected on 09.04.2014 by the Appellate Authority (AA). Aggrieved by these orders, the applicant has filed this O.A. before us seeking the following relief: - - "(a) To call for the records of the case and set aside/quash the Findings dt. 2.2.2011, Order of punishment dt. 15.3.2011 and Appellate Order dt. 9.4.2014 with all consequential benefits including looking after charge of the rank of SI w.e.f. 29.7.2013 and arrears of pay. (b) To Award cost of the proceedings in favor of the applicant and pass such other and further orders as deemed it and proper in the circumstances of the case to meet the ends of justice."
(2.) THE applicant has contended that the impugned orders were illegal, arbitrary, unjustified, unreasonable and passed in violation of principles of natural justice. She has alleged that HC Randhir Singh had never deposited the motor cycle in the Malkhana, as such, the allegation of releasing the motor cycle is wrong. She has further stated that from the evidence adduced in the enquiry, it is clear that the owner of the motor cycle, who was challaned, had a valid driving licence as well as RC. Therefore, Sections 3/181 and 39/192 could not have been applied. Therefore, the applicant was right in correcting the challan. Moreover, since the owner of the vehicle was driving the same without helmet, the applicant challenged him under Section 129/177 of Motor Vehicles Act. She has also contended that she had kept the SHO informed as has been admitted by SHO during the DE proceedings. Further, she has stated that what she has done was the practice followed in traffic police and when the documents of the vehicle were produced by the vehicle owner, there was no reason to keep the vehicle impounded and curtail the rights of the vehicle owner. Lastly, she has stated that HC Randhir Singh was subordinate to her and she was only performing her bona fide duty to correct the wrong committed by him In their reply after narrating the facts of the case, the respondents have disputed the averments of the applicant. They have stated that the applicant had intentionally made entry of a lighter section in the challan book and released the vehicle on her own, whereas it could be released only after the orders of the Hon'ble Court. The applicant exceeded her limits and took such an important decision suo moto even without informing the SHO. For this lapse the applicant was placed under suspension on 12.11.2009 and reinstated on 15.01.2010. In the enquiry, the charge framed against the applicant was found to be proved without any shadow of doubt. Consequently, the DA awarded punishment of censure to her and her suspension period was decided to be treated as period spent on duty for all intents and purposes. Appeal filed against the above order before the AA was dismissed on 09.04.2014.
(3.) WE have heard both sides and have perused the material on record. It is clear from the stand taken by the applicant in her defence statement as well as in the OA that she is not disputing that she had made cuttings in the challan and deleted Sections 3/181 & 39/192 of Motor Vehicles Act, and inserted Section 129/177 of the same Act. It is also not denied by her that she had released the vehicle which had been impounded by HC Randhir Singh. She has disputed that the vehicle was deposited in the Malkhaa. Further, she has tried to justify her actions by saying that she was superior officer of HC Randhir Singh and was duty bound to correct the mistakes committed by her subordinate. She has further defended herself by saying that there was no complaint against her from the vehicle owner or any other source. 4.1 We have considered the applicant sub -missions. Even if it is accepted that the vehicle was not deposited in the Malkhana, it cannot be denied that HC Randhir Singh had impounded the same under Section 207 of the Motor Vehicle Act. The aforesaid Section is reproduced below: - - "Power to detain vehicles used without certificate of registration permit, etc. -(1) Any police officer or other person authorised in this behalf by the State Government may, if he has reason to believe that a motor vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of the provisions of section 3 or section 4 or section 39 or without the permit required by sub -section (1) of section 66 or in contravention of any condition of such permit relating to the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used, seize and detain the vehicle, in the prescribed manner and for this purpose take or cause to be taken any steps he may consider proper for the temporary safe custody of the vehicle: Provided that where any such officer or person has reason to believe that a motor vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of section 3 or section 4 or without the permit required by sub -section (1) of section 66 he may, instead of seizing the vehicle, seize the certificate of registration of the vehicle and shall issue an acknowledgment in respect thereof. (2) Where a motor vehicle has been seized and detained under sub -section (1), the owner or person in charge of the motor vehicle may apply to the transport authority or any officer authorized in this behalf by the State Government together with the relevant documents for the release of the vehicle and such authority or officer may, after verification of such documents, by order release the vehicle subject to such conditions as the authority or officer may deem fit to impose." 4.2 Under Section 207(2) the vehicle could have been released only by transport authority or any officer authorized by the State Government. The applicant could not produce any document to show that she had been so authorized by the State Government under this Section. As such, there is merit in the contention of the respondents that she exceeded her authority while releasing the vehicle. Further, she has also admitted to the charge of amending the Sections in the challan by making cuttings in the challan book. 4.3 In her defence she stated that she had kept the SHO informed, and that this is corroborated by the SHO in his statement in the DE proceedings. We find that Inspector Ram Sunder appearing as PW -8 in the DE proceedings has stated that the applicant had told him that she had checked the documents of the vehicle and finding them to be correct had returned the vehicle to its owner. From this statement it is obvious that the applicant had herself taken the decision to make cutting in the challan and release the vehicle. She merely informed the SHO post facto. Thus, we find that the charge of making cuttings in the challan book and releasing the vehicle on her own does not get altered by this. 4.4 The applicant had also stated that she had only done her duty and rendered justice to the vehicle owner who had produced the relevant documents which were found to be correct. While, it is true that no quid pro has either been alleged nor proved against the applicant, yet it cannot be denied that she exceeded her jurisdiction in trying to provide instant relief to the vehicle owner. The vehicle should have been legitimately released only by the Court or an officer authorized by the State Government. As such, we find no infirmity in the orders of the respondents censuring the applicant for the same.;


Click here to view full judgement.
Copyright © Regent Computronics Pvt.Ltd.