- (1.) THERE appears to be a very large number of industrial disputes between the petitioner company and the recognised union, the first respondent which have given rise to equally large number of legal proceedings between both of them before the Courts/tribunals under either the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 or the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. The recognised union has been nominating or deputing a large number of its members (employees) i. e. 2 employees to appear or act in each of the Court proceedings before the Labour courts, Industrial Courts/tribunals and the High Court. The union claims to exercise its right to do so under section 23 of the MRTU and PULP Act (for short PULP Act ). This appears to have resulted in frequent non-availability of a large number of employees on the shop-floor and in the offices of the petitioner. Many a times abrupt leaving of the employees to attend the Court cases without a reasonable notice or intimation to the superiors appears to have caused disruption in working of the petitioner company at various levels even at crucial periods. The unruly exercise of their right under section 23 of the PULP Act by the Union appears to have compelled the petitioner company to regulate this right in its own way to be able to manage its routine affairs in the offices and working on the shop floors to smoothen the erratic attendance and to regularise the irregular movements of a large number of their employees. The petitioner company by its notice dated 11-5-1999 framed certain internal rules to be observed by the employees before exercising their right under section 23 of the PULP act.
(2.) IRKED by the said notice the union filed a complaint before the Industrial Court, Maharashtra at Mumbai under section 28 read with section 30 and items 5 and 9 of the schedule IV of the Act, alleging that the petitioner company has engaged in an unfair labour practice by issuing such a notice which is restrictive of free exercise of its right and privilege under section 23 of the PULP Act. According to the union the notice was a blatant breach of section 23 of the PULP Act and was motivated to curb and curtail its legitimate trade union activities. The Union also applied for an interim order in the nature of injunction against the company from enforcing the said notice and from preventing its members to attend the Court s proceedings to appear or act under section 23 of the PULP Act. The Industrial Court heard both the parties and passed the impugned order. The industrial Court has recorded its detailed prima facie reasons to grant such an interim order in favour of the recognised union staying the implementation and execution of clause Nos. 1 to 4 of the notice dated 11-5-1999.
(3.) THE petitioner company is aggrieved by the aforesaid interim order passed by the Industrial Court and has filed the present petition to challenge its legality and validity under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Shri P. K. Rele, the learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that though the impugned order is at interim stage, it has a strong tinge of finality and since the issue of rights under section 23 of the PULP Act often arises in the industry, it requires to be decided finally by this Court. I do not know about any finality though, however, I agree with Shri Rele that the point in the petition often arises. Shri Naphade, the learned Counsel for the respondent-recognised union, also fairly consented for final hearing of the petition at the admission stage with a rider that I should not exercise my jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution at the interlocutory stage and should allow the Industrial Court to decide the complaint finally on its merits. I may mention here that both the learned counsel were equally brief and relevant though both were equally vehement in their submissions. Both have cited some judgments in support of their respective contentions but I am not referring to them in view of my own interpretation of the section 23 of the act, which I do not find in any of the cited judgments, which were on different points though relating to the same section. I have decided the issue raised before me wholly on the basis of the section 23 of the PULP Act with the able assistance of both the learned Counsel though none had read the provision as I have ventured to do. I say so with respect to both of them.;