Mahajan, J. - (1.)THIS is an appeal from a judgment of a division bench of the High Court of Bombay cancelling a writ of prohibition issued by Coyajee J. against the Industrial Tribunal to which a dispute between the Western India Automobile Association and its workers had been referred under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947.
(2.)THOUGH a number of points were raised before Coyajee J. and before the division bench, the principal question raised by this appeal relates to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under the Act to entertain the dispute which had been referred to it. The controversy is firstly as to the scope of the Act, i. e. , whether the Act has application to cases of private employers or is limited only to cases where either the Central or the Provincial Government, or a local authority is the employer, and secondly, as to whether the dispute as to reinstatement of certain dismissed employees is a matter which is referable to the Tribunal.
On an application for a writ of prohibition and a writ of certiorari against the Tribunal restraining it from proceeding with the investigation of this dispute it was held by Coyajee J. that the Western India Automobile Association was an employer and any dispute between it and its workers fell within the ambit of the Act. He, however, held that the dispute as to reinstatement of dismissed employees was outside the scope of the Act. A writ was accordingly ordered to issue. Against this decision an appeal was preferred by the Province of Bombay and another appeal by the Western India Automobile Association. The appeal by the Province of Bombay contested the second finding of the Judge, while in the association's appeal the first finding was challenged. The learned Judges of the division bench by separate judgments dismissed the appeal preferred by the association and confirmed the decision of Coyajee J. on the first point. The appeal filed by the Province was allowed and the decision of Coyajee J. on the second point was set aside. It was held that the dispute as to reinstatement of dismissed employees was an "industrial dispute" between the employer and the employees within the meaning of the Act and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it. The same two points that were seriously canvassed before the High Court were urged before us.

As regards the first contention raised on behalf of the association that the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is only limited to cases of industries or of undertakings carried on by Government or local authority and that it does not include within its scope industries carried on by private individuals, we have no hesitation in repelling it. The argument on this point is based on the definition of the term "employer" given in Clause (g) (i) of Section 2 of the Act, which runs thus : 'employer' means (i) in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of a Government in British India, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed, the head of the department; (ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of that authority. "industrial dispute" has been defined in Clause (k) of the same section in the following terms: 'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employees, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected, with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. It was contended that as the association did not fall within the definition of the word "employer" given in the Act (the definition being exhaustive), in its case there was no power to make a reference to the Tribunal and that the scope of the Act was limited to cases of Government-run concerns or those in which a local authority was the employer. In our opinion, the definition given is neither exhaustive nor inclusive. In plain terms, the definition says that "employer" in relation to an industry carried on under the authority of any department of Government in British India means the head of the department (where no other authority is prescribed) and in the case of an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, it means the chief executive officer of the authority. In relation to such industries a definition has been given of the term "employer. " As it was not easy in such cases to discover with certainty an individual or an officer who would answer that description, this definition indicates who shall be regarded as employer in the particular cases. No attempt, however, was made to define the term "employer" generally or in relation to other persons carrying on industries or running undertakings.

(3.)IN the Trade Disputes Act, VII of 1929, this expression was denned in Section 2 (c) in the following terms : 'employer' in the case of any industry, business or undertaking carried on by any department of any Government in British INdia, means the authority prescribed in this behalf, or, where no authority is prescribed, the head of the department. It was conceded by Mr. Setalvad that the definition given in Act VII of 1929 was a limited definition in relation to Government departments only. He, however, urged that the definition had been worded differently therein. The word "means" was not used in the beginning of the definition but was so put in the context that it clearly indicated that the definition was restricted to businesses or undertakings of departments of Government. IN Act XIV of 1947, however, the Legislature by saying "'employer' means" has made the definition exhaustive. IN our judgment, there is no such difference in the meaning of the two definitions given in the Act of 1929 and in the Act of 1947. IN one definition, the word "means" has been used after the industries had been particularized, and in the other it has been used in relation to those industries. The words "in relation" used in the definition make the intention of the Legislature quite clear and they indicate that it was in relation to those particular industries only that the expression "employer" was defined. This interpretation is also consistent with the phraseology employed by the Legislature in different sections of the Act. IN Section 18 it has been laid down that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under the Act or an award which was declared by the appropriate Government to be binding shall be binding on all parties to the industrial dispute; and where a party referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates. It is difficult to apply this provision, in the Act to heads of Government department. The manner in which the section is drafted shows that disputes concerning all industrial concerns whether owned by Government or private person were included within the ambit of the Act.
The preamble to the Act gives a wide scope to it, when it says that it is expedient to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes thereinafter appearing. It does not limit its sphere to businesses run only by the Government or local authorities. The scheme of the Act fits in with the interpretation we are placing on the expression "employer", and any other construction of it would create incongruity and repugnancy between different sections of the Act. The Act was intended to be a more comprehensive law on trade disputes than its predecessor, the Trade Disputes Act, 1929. It was not denied that under that Act, the term "employer" included within its scope industries owned by persons other than Government departments or local authorities. In the Act of 1947 an elaborate and effective machinery for bringing about industrial peace has been devised. Provision has been made for Works Committee, Conciliation Boards, Courts of Enquiry and Industrial Tribunals, to achieve the object. Strikes and lockouts are made illegal without fourteen days' notice. It is, in our opinion, not possible to argue that this elaborate machinery was devised for the benefit of industries run by Government and local authorities only and that the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, was repealed in order to exclude from its ambit industries run by private persons. The result is that the decision of Coyajee J. and of the division bench of the High Court on the first point, in our opinion, is correct.