Radcliffe, J. - (1.)THESE are two appeals from the High Court of Judicature at Patna. They have been consolidated, and the central point upon which each appeal turns is the same : which of the parties is to be treated as the lawful owner of the piece of property in dispute? That piece of property is a four annas undivided share out of a fourteen annas partitioned share of an estate called Touzi No.7898 in Mouza Awari, Pargana Lautana, District Darbhanga, and it is hereinafter referred to as "the disputed property. "
(2.)THE two suits out of which the appeals arise were respectively a partition suit, (No.89 of 1932) filed by the appellant on September 16, 1982, and a title suit (No.72 of 1933) filed by the respondents in the second appeal on November 7, 1933. THE appellant, who is the mahanth of a math or asthal called the Birpur Asthal, sought by the partition suit to obtain a declaration of his title to the, disputed property and an order for partition of the lands of which that property was an undivided share. He was met by a defence on the part of those respondents who formed the defendants first party to his suit to the effect that on various grounds, some of which will be noticed later, he had no title to the disputed property. THEse respondents were the mahanth and the deities (acting- through the mahanth) of another math or asthal known as the Pokrauni Asthal, and it was they who instituted the title suit in which they asked for a declaration against the appellant that the disputed property is debottar property of the Pokrauni Astha) and that the appellant had no right to any interest in it. As it is plain that the real question at issue is, to which of these two religious institutions does the disputed property belong, it will be convenient to use the term respondents to refer to the respondents Mahanth Ramfcirpal Das and the idols Sri Thakurji, Ramji, Lachhmanji and Jankiji.
In their Lordships' view, as will appear later, the appellant has a good defence to the title suit under the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908) as subsequently amended, and, although other grounds of appeal were argued before them, it is upon this ground that they think that the appeals should be allowed. So much of the narrative of the complicated history of this case as follows is recorded therefore in order to explain how the question of limitation arises rather than to give any comprehensive account of the various issues in the suits.

The appellant's claim to the disputed property comes through his predecessor as mahanth of the Birpur Asthal, one Priya Das. In the year 1910, Priya Das had lent 500 maunds of grain to the then mahanth of the Pokrauni Asthal. Damodar Das. The loan was not repaid, and on May 16, 1913, Priya Das obtained a decree against Damodar Das in the Court of the Munsiff at Muzaffarpur ordering Damodar Das to pay him the sum of Rs. 1 562-8-0, the monetary equivalent of the loan, together with costs and interest. This was followed by a sale of the disputed property at public auction in execution of the decree. Priya pas was himself the: purchaser, and on April 6, 1915, he received the usual Court certificate confirming his purchase. One of the questions that was in issue in the present suits was the question whether this loan of 500 maunds was for any "justifying necessity" of the Pokrauni Asthal itself. The relevance of the enquiry was that, had the loan been made for any such necessity, the disputed property, even if it did belong to the Asthal, instead of being the private property of the mahanth, would have been validly disposed of by an execution sale pursuant to the decree for payment of the value of the loan. The Subordinate Judge, after reviewing the evidence, decided that Damodar Das did not "run into the debt in question for any justifying necessity of the Asthal. " On appeal the High Court expressed their agreement with the trial Court on this finding. The appellant sought to challenge the High Court's decision on this point: but in their Lordships' view there are concurrent findings of fact in the two Courts without any apparent misapplication of the relevant law to those facts, and, that being so, an appeal cannot be entertained on that ground.

(3.)IN the year 1918 a suit (No.1 of 1918) was instituted against Damodar Das in the Court of the District Judge at Darbhanga. It was a suit under the provisions of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in it Rajkumar Das, a former claimant to the office of mahant then held by Damodar Das, and certain other persons interested in the proper administration of the Pokrauni Asthal claimed that Damodar Das ought to be removed from the mahantship, a new mahant appointed in his place, and a scheme of administration settled by the Court for the asthal. It is not necessary to go into the details of these proceedings. IN the end, on March 16, 1922, judgment was delivered in the District Court holding that the properties of the asthal were not debottar and that, accordingly, the Court was not entitled to entertain the suit under Section 92. An appeal from this decision was taken to the High Court, but while the appeal was still pending, Damodar Das died, being succeeded in the mahantship by the present respondent Ramkirpal Das, and Rajkumar Das abandoned the appeal.
The dates of three events incident to this suit should be mentioned. On September 10, 1918, the Court appointed a receiver of the asthal properties. On August 28, 1919, an ex parte decree was made declaring that the Pokrauni Asthal had trust properties and removing Damodar Das from the mahantship. On September 12, 1919, Rajkumar Das was appointed mahant in his place. These steps in the proceedings were however set aside on appeal to the High Court and the judgment given on the rehearing in the District Court on March 16, 1922, was inconsistent with the basis on which they were made. It follows that after that judgment Damodar Das must have resumed his mahantship