Tendolkar, J. - (1.)THE question that arises for determination in these rules and also in other rules in respect of orders of requisition issued under Section 6, Bombay Land Requisition. Act, 1948, is whether a writ of certiorari lies in respect of such an order. It has been argued in all the rules, although this judgment is headed only in some of the rules typical of the two classes of cages which arise under Section 6, viz. (1) where an intimation of vacancy has been given and (2) where no such intimation is given.
(2.)IN P. V. Rao v. Girdharlal Lallubhai, 51 Bom. L. R. 418 : (A. I. R. (36) 1949 Bom. 303) a Division Bench of this Court, to which I was a party, came to the conclusion that an order of requisition under Sub-section (4) of Section 4, Bombay Laud Requisition Ordinance, 1947, wag a quasi-judicial Act, and, therefore, subject to the writ of certiorari. IN order to appreciate what actually was decided in that appeal it is necessary to look at the scheme of Section 4 of the Ordinance and the facts of the appeal. Sub-section (1) of that section casts an obligation on the landlord to give intimation of a vacancy to the Provincial Government, vacancy being decided in that sub-section. Subsection (2) provides for the period during which such intimation should be given. Sub-section (8) prohibits the landlord from letting out; the premises for a month after the receipt of the intimation by the Provincial Government. Sub-section (4) enables Government to requisition vacant premises whether or not an intimation has been given. Sub-section (5) prescribes a penalty for not giving the intimation.
It is apparent that there are two classes of cases in which vacant premises may be requisitioned by the Provincial Government: (1) where an intimation has been given by the landlord and (2) where no such intimation has been given. The decision in P. V. Rao v. Girdharlal Lallubhai, 51 Bom, L. Rule 418: (A. I. R. (36) 1949 Bom. 303), was given in a case in which no intimation of vacancy had been given to the Government and Government had to determine, before they could proceed to requisition, whether a vacancy existed. No argument was addressed to us during the course of hearing of that appeal as to whether an order of requisition made after an intimation of vacancy had been received by Government was 1960 B/19 & 20 or was not a quasi-judicial Act: and that question is, therefore, still open for determination. With regard to the question actually decided in that appeal, it is urged that there has been a change in the law; and even accepting the ratio of our decision, which, of course, the Provincial Government challenges, the order of requisition under Section 6, Bombay Land Requisition Act. (Bom. XXXIII [33] of 1948), is not quasi-judicial.

It would be next convenient to consider the provisions of Section 6 of the Act, which takes the place of Section 4 of the Ordinance, The arrangement of the five Sub-sections remains the game, Sub-section (1) has been modified in respect of the definition of vacancy by deleting therefrom the words "by the termination of A tenancy or by the eviction of a tenant", so that while the concept of vacancy under the Ordinance was a legal concept and not merely a physical concept in the sense of non-occupation it may be said that the concept under the new Sub-section (1) is merely physical. But an explanation has been added to this sub-section which provides that premises shall be deemed to be or become vacant in certain circumstances therein enumerated. So that, reading the sub-section with the explanation, the concept of vacancy still remains legal. There is no material alteration in Sub-sections (2), (3) and (5 ). The new Sub-section (4) is in the following terms. "whether or not an intimation under Sub-section (1) is given and notwithstanding anything contained in Section 5, the Provincial Government may, by order in writing (a) requisition the premises and may use or deal with the premises in such manner as may appear to it to be expedient; or (b) require the landlord to let the premises to specified persons or class of persons or in specified circumstance: Provided that where an order is to be made under Clause (a) or (6) requisitioning or requiring to let premises in respect of which no intimation is given by the landlord, the Provincial Government shall make such inquiry as it deems fit and make a declaration in the order that the premises were vacant or had become vacant, on or after the date referred to in Sub-section (1) and such declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the premises were or had so become vacant; Provided further that no order under Clause (b) shall be made without hearing the landlord if the landlord resides in the building of which the premises form a part. " This Sub-section up to the end Clause (a) in a re-production of the corresponding sub-section of the Ordinance. The rest is an addition.

(3.)THE first question that has been urged by Sir Jamshedji Kanga on behalf of one of the petitioners is that the power to requisition given under this sub section relates to "the premises" which can only mean vacant premises as defined in Sub-clause (1) read with the explanation. THE word ''premises" in its turn has been defined in Section 4 (3); and it is only premises which fall within that definition that can be requisitioned. That definition is as follows : " 'premises' means any building or part of a building let or intended to be let separately including (i) the garden, grounds, garages and out-houses, it any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building, (h) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include a room or other accommodation in a hotel or lodging houses ;"
The Advocate-General contends that Section 6 (1) talks of "any premises" and the definition of "premises" in Section 4 (3) is not applicable because it is repugnant to the subject or context of Section 6 (1) According to the Advocate-General the Government are entitled to requisition buildings or parts of buildings whether or not they were let or intended to be let. I am of the opinion that this argument is untenable. A definition given in an Act must be substituted for the word defined wherever it occurs in the Act; and I see no repugnancy in the subject or context of Section 6 (1) to induce me to hold that the definition does not apply to the words "any premises" used in that sub-section. Moreover, the only operative part of the Act relating to "premises" is Section 6; and, indeed the word does not appear in any other section. If, therefore, the definition is not applied to the word "premises" in that section it may as well have not been given in the Act. I am not prepared to hold that Government has, under Section 6, power to requisition vacant premises unless they were let or intended to be let, If that be the correct interpretation, whether or not an intimation of vacancy has been given, Government has, before it proceeds to requisition, got to determine that what it proposes to requisition are "premises" within the definition. The existence of "premises" within the meaning of the definition is, therefore, a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of requisition ; and that condition, in so far as premises intended to be let are concerned, is not capable of subjective determination, nor is there any indication in the Act that it is left to the subjective determination of the Government. The order of requisition under Section 6 is, therefore, a quasi-judicial act.