(1.) - Writ Petition NO. 78/86 along with Writ Petition Nos. 92/86, 93/86 and 94/86 are decided by this common judgment.
(2.) All these petitions will have to be allowed on the short ground that there has been an inordinate delay in the conduct, commencement and trial of the Criminal Cases filed against the petitioners. Writ Petition No. 78/86 is in respect of Criminal Case No. 17/81, Writ Petition No. 92/86 is in respect of Criminal Case No. 18/81, Writ Petition No. 93/86 is in respect of Criminal Case No. 19/81 and Writ Petition No. 94/86 is in respect of Criminal Case No. 20/81, all pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aurangabad. It is an admitted position that F. I. R. in respect of these cases was filed on 7th September, 1972 and till today even evidence has not been commenced. It is now well recognized that right to speedy public trial is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In a recent case Patna High Court in a Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1986 Pat 324, considering all the cases decided by various Courts including the Supreme Court has reiterated the principle that it is a fundamental right of every accused to have a speedy trial, so that the work of a trial should not be kept hanging for an individual. Para 12 of this judgment of the Full Bench would be cited with advantage here : "12. Coming nearer home, it would seen that the right to a speedy public trial as a constitutional guarantee is of a somewhat recent origin in our country. However, by now it is so well settled by precedential mandate of the Final Court itself that the right to a speedy public trial is a part and parcel of the constitutional guarantee under Article 21 that it would be wasteful and unnecessary to examine the issue on principle afresh. In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360, which was yet one of the series of cases from our own State, arising from the heart rending delays in the context of under trials, Bhagwati, J. (as he then was), after in terms quoting the Sixth Amendment to the American Constitution and also Article 3 of the European Convention on Humen Rights, observed as under : We think that even under our Constitution though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597. We have held in that case that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is, not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just.' If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not 'reasonable, fair or just', such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would bs entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now, obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be 'reasonable, fair or just' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable fair or just' and it Would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. Speedy trial is, as held by us in our earlier judgment, dated 26th February, 1979, an essential ingredient of 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure guaranteed by Article 21 and it is the constitutional obligation of the State to devise such a procedure as would ensure speedy trial of the accused."
(3.) In one of my own judgment relying on the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1360, I have held that a delay of more than ten years is violative of Article 21 and, therefore, proceedings hanging on for more than ten years m a Criminal Court without any progress being made, deserves to be quashed.