- (1.)This is a writ petition arising out of the proceedings under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (for short, "Tenancy Act"). By the impugned order dated 12-8-1983, passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Amravati (for short, "the S.D.O."), the management of the field survey No. 8, area 7.74 hectares of village Mhasla, Tahsil and District Amravati, was assumed by the State Government under section 80-A of the Tenancy Act on the ground that the petitioner/landholder to whom the said field belongs had kept the entire area of his aforesaid holding fallow for more than two consecutive years i.e. from 1978-79 to 1982-83.
(2.)The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid order of the learned S.D.O. on various grounds and in particular upon the ground that section 80-A of the Tenancy Act is unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India, relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of (Gulabrao v. M.T. Bokare, S.D.O., Amravati)1, 1969 Mh.L.J. Note 26. However, it is pointed out in the petition itself that after the aforesaid decision, by the Constitution. (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976 the Tenancy Act was included in the IXth Schedule of the Constitution and, therefore, it is protected from the challenges on the ground of violation of fundamental rights by virtue of Article 318 of the Constitution. The contention still raised is that since Article 14 which incorporates the principles of equality before law belongs to the basic structure of the Constitution, the provisions of section 80-A and the above Constitution Amendment Act incorporating the said provision in the IX Schedule are violative of basic structure of the Constitution. Apart from that the petitioner also challenges the delegation made by the State Government of its power under section 80-A to the subordinate officer viz., the S.D.O. On merits also it is urged that the impugned order is illegal and unjustified since it was beyond the control of the petitioner to protest such vast land from then nuisance of stray cattle by fencing it. It is then urged by filing the crop statements that during the pendency of this petition the suit land is brought under cultivation by the petitioner from 1983-84 onwards and, therefore, the submission is that since up till now the suit land is in possession of the petitioner the effect should not be given to the impugned order of the learned S.D.O.
(3.)It is not necessary to decide all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner in the instant writ petition. It is clear from section 80-A(2) that the provisions of Chapter VI are made applicable mutatis mutandis to the holding of which the management is assumed under section 80-A as they apply in relation to the holding, the management of which is assumed under section 62 in the said Chapter. A perusal of section 62 would show that the notification of assumption of management of holding must state the period for which such a management is assumed by the State Government. In my view, apart from section 62, it would be implicit in the concept of management itself and to distinguish from concept of ownership, that the period of management must be stipulated in the order or notification by which the management is assumed. The management as distinguished from ownership means that it is for a temporary period and not permanent. If the provisions of Chapter VI are to be made applicable, and in particular the provisions relating to termination of management in section 79, it would be clear that the notification or the order assuming the management must indicate the period for which the management is assumed. No such period is stipulated in the impugned order of the learned S.D.O. and on this short ground itself the impugned order is not within the four corners of section 80-A(1) of the Tenancy Act and is not, therefore, justified thereunder.