V.V. Joshi, J. - (1.) THIS judgment shall dispose of both Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 1976 and Criminal Appeal No. 242 of 1976 since they involve the same question of law. These are two Criminal Appeals filed by the Corporation of the City of Nagpur, under section 378 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, against the acquittals of the respective first respondents in these two appeals of the offences of contravention of the provisions of section 7 (1) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948.
(2.) DATTATRAYA Balkrishna Naniwadekar, respondent No. 1 in Criminal Appeal No. 174 Of 1976 owns and runs a Mangal Karyalaya known as "Naniwadekar Mangal Karyalaya", situated in Dhantoli, Nagpur, within the limits of the Corporation of the City of Nagpur. He gives the said Mangal Karyalaya on hire for marriages, thread ceremonies, and other functions. This Naniwadekar Mangal Karyalaya, was not registered for the year 1972 -73 under section 7 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. These facts were not disputed in the case against Dattatraya Balkrishna Naniwadekar. Smt. Kamlabai w/o Hari Afale, respondent No. 1 in Criminal Appeal No. 242 of 1976, is the owner of "Asha Mangal Karyalaya" situated at Dharampeth, Nagpur, within the limits of the Corporation of the City of Nagpur. Smt. Kamlabai Afale gives the said Mangal Karyalaya on hire for marriage, thread ceremonies and other functions. Her husband Hari Ganesh Afale looks after the business of running the said Mangal Karyalaya. This Asha Mangal Karyalaya was also not registered under section 7 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 for the year 1972 -73. These facts were not in dispute in the case against Smt. Kamlabai Afale. 4 Balkrishna Kadu (P. W. 1), Shop Inspector visited the Naniwadekar Mangal Karyalaya on 9 -2 1973 at about 9.50 a.m. He found there was a pandal of permanent nature of the size 70' x 40', there was an office room, and one room for keeping articles (Bhandar Griha). The owner Dattatraya Balkrishna Naniwadekar gives the utensils on hire and a board of its rates was affixed there. A rate board for daily rent of the Karyalaya was also affixed there. All types of utensils necessary for cooking in marriages, etc were found kept in the Karyalaya for giving them on hire. About 2 or 3 servants were working in the Karyalaya. Dattatraya Balkrishna Naniwadekar provides cooks, gas lights, Baggis, etc. on commission basis. On being questioned by the Shop Inspector Balkrishna Kadu (P. W. 1), Dattatraya Naniwadekar told him that he had not taken licence or registered his business under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. He did not show any visit book. The Shop Inspector Kadu (P. W. I) wrote his inspection note Ex. 10 According to the Shop Inspector, Dattatraya Naniwadekar has been running the Naniwadekar Mangal Karyalaya for the last 15 years. After obtaining the sanction for prosecution, Ex 11, from the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Nagpur, the Shop Inspector Balkrishna Kadu (P. W. 1) on 7 -5 -1973 filed the complaint Ex. 1 in the Court of the Special Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur, against Dattatraya Balkrishna Naniwadekar, complaining of contravention of the provisions of sections 7(1) and 62 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. 5. Sudhakar Savalkar (P. W. 1), Shop Inspector visited the Asha Mangal Karyalaya, Dharampeth, on 28 -2 -1973. There was a board of the name of the Karyalaya as "Asha Mangal Karyalaya" in Marathi. There was an office and a well built structure admeasuring 40' x 50'. At the time of the visit. Smt. Kamlabai Afale's husband Hari Ganesh Afale was present. He revealed that he had been running the said Mangal Karyalaya in the name of his wife since 1966. The functions performed in the said Mangal Karyalaya were marriages, thread ceremonies and other ceremonies as gatherings, etc. The pandal is given on hire for such functions. All things required for such functions are kept in the Karyalaya. A rate board is fixed there showing the rent of the Karyalaya for each day. About 500 persons can be accommodated there. A store room is maintained where all utensils and other materials required for ceremonies are kept. The articles are supplied on hire even to outside people. At the time of the visit, the Shop Inspector Sudhakar Savalkar did not see any persons as employees. No visit book was kept. Shop Inspector Sudhakar Savalkar (P.W. 1) prepared the inspection note Ex. 18. After obtaining the sanction for prosecution, Ex. 19, from the Municipal Corporation Commissioner, K. B. Mandlekar, the Shop Inspector Sudhakar Savalkar (P. W. 1) on 22 -5 -1973 filed the complaint in the Court of the Special Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur, against Smt. Kamlabai Afale, alleging the contravention of the provisions of sections 7(1) and 62 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. 6. In both these cases, the accused persons i. e. the respective first respondents in these two appeals pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The only evidence adduced to each of these two cases was the oral evidence of the respective Shop Inspector who had visited the premises and filed the complaints. No defence evidence was adduced in any of these two cases. In his case, Dattatraya Balkrishna Naniwadekar stated: "The evidence is all false. The pandal is temporary for the season, and I give my place on hire (for) religious ceremonies only. Registration is not necessary." In the other case, Smt. Kamlabai Afale, stated: "I give the pandal and portion of my house only for religious ceremonies. I have brought my say in writing. I file it." She then filed her written statement, Ex. 20, which is as follows: "Marriages of people following various customs and the manners from different states take place in our "Mangal Karyalaya." It is our main duty to see that the religious ceremonies like marriages and thread ceremonies, etc. are duly performed according to the religious rites and the custom's and conventions of the bride and the bridegroom, after achieving coordination and following different customs and manners between the two parties. For it, the study of customs, manners, conventions, prevailing amongst the people of different castes, is essential. It is a religious thing to have a pandal at the thread ceremony and marriage ceremony. Firstly the pandal is worshipped and then religious rites and rituals are performed. Further, some people serve dinner to Brahmins (Brahman Bhojan) or to the mother -in -law and father -in -law of one's son or daughter according to customs. For this we supply 'Pat' and utensils, etc. on nominal fees. Since the religious ceremonies like marriages and thread ceremonies, etc. are not performed always and the said ceremonies are performed on auspicious days only, servants on permanent basis or on daily wages cannot be engaged. Those who perform the ceremony engage the servants if required. We have no concern with it. In a marriage though the "Muhurt" (auspicious moment) is Goraj (in the evening) or Gopal (in the morning), there is a busy programme of functions throughout the night. Hence a servant cannot be engaged. Basically and according to the principle, the business of running a "Mangal Karyalaya" is of religious nature and hence it is essential to have thorough knowledge of religious and customs and conventions of cartes and tribes, e.g. Madrasi and Maharashtrian marriages, Naidu marriages, marriage of foreign castes. People belonging to different branches (of castes) and different States come. It is essential to have knowledge of their different conventions and customs and it is our principal duty to make available to them the persons they require in their functions according to the custom of their caste and to get functions duly performed by them by religious method. The marriages and other ceremonies of Hindus only are performed at our place. We do not supply any articles of dinner e.g. vegetables, grain etc. Shri Haribhau Afale is my husband. He helps me in the above functions." 7. In both these cases the trial Court held that it had not been proved that these Mangal Karyalayas were "commercial establishments" as defined udder section 2 (4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. In Smt. Kamaiabai Afale's case the trial Court further held that the respondent No. 1 Smt. Kamalabai Afale was a sham owner, all activities of the Karyalaya were being looked after by her husband Hari Ganesh Afale. The husband Hari Ganesh Afale being a family member could not be designated as an employee under section 2 (6) of the Act. So it could not be said that the respondent No. 1 Suit. Kamalabai Afale was an 'employer' under section 2 (7) of the Act. Coming to these conclusions, the learned trial Magistrate acquitted the respective first respondent in each of these two cases. Aggrieved by the said decisions the Corporation of the City of Nagpur has preferred these two appeals. 8. Miss Deshpande for the appellant has urged that the lower Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that Smt. Karoalabai Afale was not proved to bean 'employer' within the meaning of section 2 (7) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948, merely because her husband Hari Ganesh Afale was running the Karyalaya in her name. In this respect Miss Deshpande invited my attention to the answer given by Smt. Kamalabai Afale to question No. 2 put to her in her examination recorded under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. "Q. No. 2: It is in prosecution evidence that you are the owner of 'Asha Mangal Karyalaya' situated at Dharampeth Ward No. 70 at Nagpur. What have you to say about it. Answer :"Yes, it is a fact." At the end of the written statement Ex. 20 filed by Smt. Kamalabai Afale, also she has stated: "Shri Haribhau Afale is my husband. He helps me in the above functions." In view of these clear statements made by Smt. Kamalabai Afale, Miss Deshpande urged that the trial Court was not right in coming to the conclusion that Smt. Kamalabai Afale was not proved to be an "employer" as defined under section 2 (7) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. On this point Miss Deshpande would seem to be entirely correct. The definition of the term 'employer' under section 2 (7) of the Act is in following terms: "(7) "Employer" means a person owning or having ultimate control over the affairs of a establishment." Since it is admitted by Smt. Kamlabai Afale that she is the owner of the 'Asha Mangal Karyalaya', it is clear she would come under the first alternative clause under section 2 (7) reproduced above. She would then clearly be an "employer" within the meaning of section 2 (7) of the Act. 9. The real controversy in these two appeals centres round the question whether these two Mangal Karyalaya fall within the ambit of the definition of the term "Commercial Establishment" as defined in section 2 (4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. That definition is as follow: "4. "Commercial Establishment" means an establishment which carries on any business, trade or profession, or any work in connection with or incidental or ancillary to, any business, trade or profession, and includes a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and a charitable or other trust, whether registered or not, which carries on whether for profit or gain or not, any business, trade or profession, or work in connection with or incidental or ancillary thereto but does not include a factory, shop, residential hotel, Restaurant, eating house, theatre, or other place of public assessment or entertainment." 10. Miss Deshpande urged that the activities of the first respondents in these two appeals, carried on in their respective Mangal Karyalaya, would fall within the category of "business", from out of the three categories "business, trade or profession" enumerated in the definition of the term "Commercial Establishment" under section 2 (4) of the Act. Miss Deshpande contended that the first respondents in both these appeals have been regularly running their respective Mangal Karyalaya for a number of years. It is a systematic activity regularly carried on for gain or profit, it necessarily required an initial outlay of capital, and, therefore, it satisfies all the requirements of a commercial venture carried on regularly and systematically as a profit rendering occupation i. e. as a business. 11. There appears to be considerable force in these contentious of Miss Deshpande. The evidence shows that Asha Mangal Karyalaya of Smt. Kamlabai Afale is being run since the year 1966. The Naniwadekar Mangal Karyalaya is being run for the last 15 years (i. e. 15 years prior to November 1975 when the evidence was recorded). Each Karjalaya has a permanent pandal. Each has an office and a store room for storing articles which are given on hire for marriages, thread ceremonies and other functions for which the premises themselves are given on hire on daily basis. The evidence in Dattatraya Balkrishna Naniwadekar's case shows that Naniwadekar also provides cooks, gas lights, Baggis, etc. on commission basis. The evidence in Smt. Kamlabai Afales case shows that the utensils and other articles stored on the premises are supplied on hire to even outside people. All these details brought out in evidence in these two cases have not been challenged in the cross -examination, and will have, therefore to be accepted, since at any rate there is no evidence to the contrary brought on record. On this point, the counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that these details in evidence could not be used in these cases, as they had ail not been specifically put to the respective accused in their examination under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This contention cannot, however, be accepted. All that was necessary to be put to the accused in his examination under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code were the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, and these were broadly put to him, i.e. that he or she was owning and running the Mangal Karyalaya in question, and giving it on hire for marriages thread ceremonies and other functions, and that it had not been registered for the particular year under section 7 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. These questions were put to each of the accused, and these facts were not disputed. The other matters regarding the details in the evidence on these points need not have been put to the accused in the examination of the accused under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The evidence discussed above clearly shows that these Mangal Karyalayas are being run as a regular and systematic business for gain or profit. An initial outlay of capital must have been required for erecting the pandal and purchasing the pots, utensils and other articles which are made available to the persons taking the Mangal Karyalaya on hire for marriages, thread ceremonies and other functions, on payment of additional hire charges for such articles. The Maintenance of an office room in each Mangal Karyalaya, the designation of each Karyalaya by a specific identifying came, the presence of rate boards showing the rates of hire for the Karyalaya, as also for the articles available on hire, clearly go to show that the activity is carried on regularly and systematically as a business activity. This was a test applied by the Supreme Court in Chief Commissioner of Delhi v. Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce : A I R 1974 S C 1527 to determine whether the activities of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry were a "business" bringing it within the definition of the term "Commercial Establishment" under section 2 (5) of the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, 1954, a definition almost similar to the definition of that term in the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. 12. In the definition of the term "Commercial Establishments" under section 2 (4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. 1948, the Legislature has used the words "business trade or profession'' words which the Supreme Court has characterized as "words of wide import." These words have given rise to cases where it had to be considered whether various professional establishments would come within the purview of that definition. In Dr. D. M. Surti v. State of Gujarat : AIR 1969 S C 63 the question was whether the professional establishment of a doctor would come within that definition. The Supreme Court applied the principle of noscitur a sociis and observed in para 6: "In the present case certain essential features or attributes are invariably associated with the words "business and trade" as understood in the popular and conventional sense, and it is the colour of these attributes which is taken by the other words in the definition of section 2 (4) of the Act, though their normal import may be much wider. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the professional establishment of a doctor cannot come within the definition of section 2 (4) of the Act unless the activity carried on was also commercial in character. As to what exactly is meant by "Commerce" it may be difficult to define, but in any early case Mckay v. Rutherford, (1848) 6 Moore P C 413 at p. 425, Lord Campbell gave useful definition "Commerce is that activity where a capital is laid out on any work and a risk run of profit or loss; it is a commercial venture." It is true that the definition of Lord Campbell is the conventional definition attributed to trade or commerce, but it cannot be taken to be wholly valid for the purpose of construing industrial legislation in a modern welfare State. It is clear that the presence of the profit motive or the investment of capital tradition associated to the notion of trade and commerce cannot be given an undue importance in construing the definition of 'Commercial Establishment' under section 2 (4) of the Act. In our opinion the correct test of finding whether a professional activity falls within section 2 (4) of the Act is whether the activity is systematically and habitually undertaken for production or distribution of goods or for rendering material services to the community or any part of the community with the help of employees in the manner of a trade or business, in such undertaking............". (Italics supplied) Further on, in para 7 of the said judgment the Supreme Court Observed: "It is therefore, clear that professional activity must be an activity carried on by an individual by his personal skill and intelligence. There is a fundamental distinction therefore between a professional activity and an activity of a commercial character and unless the profession carried on by the appellant also partakes of the character of a commercial nature, the appellant cannot fall within the ambit of section 2 (4) of the Act." (Italics supplied) 13. In R. S. Dashpande v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, 1975 Mh. L J 160 the question whether a partnership him carrying on busmen's of Insurance Surveyors would come within the definition of the term "Commercial Establishment" under section 2 (4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. There it was observed in para 11 : "But in order to qualify for being reckoned as liberal profession, a profession has to satisfy certain conditions viz. that the activity carried on by it must not be an activity of a commercial nature as a trade or business. The main asset of the professional man which he brings into the practice of his profession must be intellectual skill or manual skill controlled by intellectual skill - - - - -" 14. In Sakharam Narayan Kherdekar v. City of Nagpur Corporation : 1963 Mh. L J 533 the question for determination was whether a lawyer who is practising as and advocate is an 'employer' within the definition of section 2 (7) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. The definition of the term "Commercial Establishment" under section 2 (4) of the Act came to be examined in that context. In para 25 of the reported judgment, it was observed : "Therefore, in giving the meaning to the definition of the phrase "Commercial Establishment" in sub -section (4) of section 2, emphasis is obviously laid on the character of an establishment as a "Commercial Establishment". Unless an establishment, even though carrying on business trade or profession, is of a commercial character, or the activities are of a commercial nature, it cannot be said that it is within the meaning of the Act." (Italics supplied) In that case also, in order to find out what was "Commerce", reliance was placed on the definition of that term by Lord Campbell in Mckay v. Rutherford, and it was observed in para 27 of the reported judgment: "Thus the very concept of any activity which can justifiably be called a commercial activity, must imply some investment of capital and the activity must run the risk of profit or loss. Understood in this sense, therefore, we are inclined to hold that it is not every establishment in the sense of premises or buildings where business, trade or profession as carried on that is intended to be governed by the Act, but only those premises though carrying on one or the other of these kinds of activities, which are of a commercial nature." 15. The cases discussed above are instances where the main activity was a professional activity and it was necessary to ascertain if it carried any commercial tinge so as to bring the said activity within the ambit of the definition of the term "Commercial Establishment" under section 2 (4) of the Act. The present cases in these two appeals are cases of pure business activity of a commercial nature, without there being any involvement in a skilled profession. A feeble attempt has been made by Smt. Kamalabai Afale in her case by filing the written statement Ex. .20 to try to raise her activity in the 'Asha Mangal Karyalaya' to the level of an activity in a skilled profession involving specialized knowledge. The attempt is really pathetic, there cannot be any involvement of professional skill or specialized knowledge when admittedly all that the owner of the 'Asha Mangal Karyalaya' has been doing is to give on hire the said Mangal Karyalaya and the articles stored there, for marriages, thread ceremonies and other functions. There is nothing to show that the owner of the said Mangal Karyalaya takes any part in the performance of the rites or ceremonies attending those marriage and thread ceremony functions. Admittedly, even according to the said written statement Ex. 20, all that is claimed to be done is "to make available to them (i. e. to the people belonging to the different branches of castes and from different States) the person they require in their functions according to the custom of their caste and to get functions duly performed by them by religious method" That would hardly make it a profession. A profession, to elevate itself to the status of a liberal profession, must satisfy the various tests laid down in para 11 in R. S. Deshpande v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. 16. On the authority of the observations of the Supreme Court in Popatlal Shah v. The State of Madras : A I R 1953 SC 274 and Municipal Corporation of the City of Hubli v. Subha Rao Hanumantharao Prayag : A I R 1976 SC 1398, the Learned Counsel for respondent No 1 in these appeals urged that as a settled rule of construction for ascertaining the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute have to be read together, the statute must be read as a whole, and every provision in the statute must be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Statute, so as far as possible to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. About this proposition, there can be no dispute. Building up the argument further, the Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in these appeals drew my attention to the several sections in Chapter III of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. As the title to this chapter shows, the provisions of this Chapter govern shops and commercial establishments. Sections 10 and 11 prescribe the earliest opening hours and the latest closing hours for different categories of shops. Section 13 prescribes the earliest opening hours and the latest closing hours for commercial establishments. Section 14 prescribes that no employee shall be required or allowed to work in any shop or commercial establishment for more than nine hours in any day and forty eight hours in any week. Section 15 prescribes that no period of continuous work for an employee in a shop or commercial establishment shall exceed five hours and that no employee shall be required or allowed to work for more than five hours before he had an interval for rest of at least one hour. Section to prescribes that the spread over of an employee in a shop shall not exceed eleven hours in any day, and section 17 prescribes that the spread over of an employee in a commercial establishment shall not exceed eleven hours in any day. Section 18 prescribes for one day as a holiday in every week, on which day every shop and commercial establishment is to remain closed. It was pointed out that the evidence in these cases show that the Mangal Karyalayas work round the clock, the processions of marriages go on till midnight, and in view of the very nature of the functions going on in the Mingal Karyalayas, these Mangal "Karyalayas could not be amenable to such control and regulation as is envisaged under the above referred several provisions of Chapter III of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948, therefore, the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948, could not apply to Mangal Karyalayas. It was urged that the provisions of section 2 (8) of the Act, defining the term 'establishment' have to be interpreted in this light -That definition is as follows: "(8) "Establishment" means a shop, commercial establishment, residential hotel restaurant, eating house, theatre, or other place of public amusement or entertainment to which this Act applies and includes such other establishment as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be an establishment for the purposes of this Act;" (Italics added). It was argued that the underlined words "to which this Act applies "mean" to which the provisions of this Act could apply"; since the provisions of Chapter III of the Act could not properly apply to these Mangal Karyalayas, as discussed earlier, these are not establishments "to which this Act applies," as defined in section 2(8) above. So, the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948, do not apply to these Mangal Karyalayas. That was the argument advanced. 17. This argument has to be repelled at once. That is not the meaning to be drawn from the words "to which this Act applies", appearing in section 2 (8). These words are included in that sub -section, because even in respect of certain shops, or commercial establishments and other type of establishments properly coming within the ambit of the Act, the provisions of the Act may not apply because of the exemptions granted by the State Government under section 4 of the Act. The difficulties about regulating control of Mangal Karyalayas under the provisions of the various sections appearing in Chapter III of the Act are not really germane to the determination of the point in question, which is the question of applicability of the provisions of the Act to these Mangal Karyalayas on the basis of the definition of 'commercial establishment' under section 2 (4) of the Act. The difficulties put forth can easily be removed by the State Government notifying appropriate exemptions, acting under the proviso to section 4 of the Act. 18. The next argument of the Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 in these appeals was like this: At the time the Shop Inspector, Balkrishna Kadu (P. W. 1) visited the Naniwadekar Mangal Karyalaya, he saw only 2 -3 servants working in the Karyalaya. At the time the Shop Inspector, Sudhakar Sawalkar (P. W. 1) visited the Asha Mangal Karyalaya, he did not see any person working there as an employee. The inspection note Ex. 10 and Ex. 18 recorded by the visiting Shop Inspectors in these two cases show 'Nil in the column of "Number of Employees". The preamble of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948, shows that it is an Act enacted for consolidating and amending the law relating to the regulation of conditions of work and employment in shops, commercial establishments, etc. Since no employees are employed in these Mangal Karyalayas, the provisions of the Act would not apply to these Mangal Karyalayas. "WHERE AS it is expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to the regulation of conditions of work and employment in shops, commercial establishments, residential hotels, restaurants, eating houses, theatres, other places of public amusement or entertainment and other establishments and for certain other purposes hereinafter specified: It is hereby enacted as follows :" The words underlined by me above show that there were also some other objects behind the enactment, and not merely the intention to regulate conditions of work and employment. Again 'regulation of conditions of work' in the various specified establishments need not necessarily relate to employees, they could as well relate to 'employers' as defined in the Act. More important than all this, the definitions of the term 'Establishments' and 'Commercial Establishment' in sub -sections (8) and (4) of section 2 of the Act are absolutely without any reference to 'employee'. The definition of the term 'employee' under sub section (6) of section 2 of the Act excludes a member of the employer's family. The definition of the term 'Employer' in section 2 (7) of the Act is as follows: "(7) "Employer" means a person owning or having ultimate control over the affairs of an establishment." 19. Even this definition of the term 'Employer' is without any reference to "Employee". A person who owns an establishment is an 'Employer', though there may not be any employee at all in the establishment. The same would be the position where the workers working in the establishment are the members of the employer's family. So, viewed in any manner, the existence of any 'employees' on an establishment is not a condition precedent to the application of the Act to the said establishment. 20. It would seem to me, therefore that these two Mangal Karyalayas are 'commercial establishments' within the meaning of section 2 (4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948, and the provisions of the Act are applicable to these Mangal Karyalayas. The respective first respondents in these two appeals, by not getting the Mangal Karyalayas registered under section 7 (1) of the said Act have contravened that provision. They have committed offence punishable under section 52 of the said Act. These two appeals will have, therefore, to be allowed. A fine of Rs. 25 for each of the accused in these two cases (in default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for 7 days) will meet the ends of justice in these two cases. 21. Both appeals, Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 1976 and Criminal Appeal No. 242 of 1976, filed by the Corporation of the City of Nagpur are allowed. The orders of the lower Court acquitting the first respondent in each of these two appeals are set aside and instead it is ordered that each of them is convicted under section 7 (1) read with section 52 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948, and each of them is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 25 (in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 7 days). The respondent No. 1 in each of these two appeals is given ten days' time to pay the fine amount. ;