RAMCHAND KUNDANMAL Vs. SARDARSINGH MOHANSINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revisional application raised a short question under Ss. 14 and 15 of the B. A. D. R. Act. The question arises in this way. Tile petitioner obtained a decree against the opponents in suit No. 170 of 1943 for Rs. 1,200/ -. It was a decree on mortgage. The decree was put in execution and a darkhast was filed. This darkhast was transferred to the B. A. D. R. Act Court under s. 19 and it was then numbered as Application No. 21000 of 1947. It would ap-pear that in this proceeding the debtor pleaded a subsequent adjustment as a result of which only Rs. 200/- were due from him to the decree-holders. The debtor also applied for the adjustment of his debts and his application was numbered 14472 of 1947. The two applications were then consolidated and were fixed for hearing on 8-8-1951. On this date the debtor No. 1 was examined, but creditor No. 1 was absent. In the result the learned judge dismissed the creditor's application. Ultimately on 25-9-1851 an award was passed and in this award the petitioner's claim wa3 rejected on the ground that he had failed to prove his debt. Against this award the petitioner preferred an appeal, He contended that it. was for the opponents to prove the alleged adjustment and since in their evidence the opponents had not deposed to the adjustment the award should have recognised the whole of the decretal debt as due and adjustable and the petitioner's claim should have been adjusted en that footing. The lower appellate Court allowed the appeal only in part. He held that the amount of Rs. 200/- which had been admitted by the debtors as due from them to the decreeholder should be awarded to the petitioner. The rest of the claim was rejected. It is this order which is challenged before me by Mr. Chandrachud on behalf ol the creditor.

(2.) MR. Chandrachud contends that his client has obtained a decree from the court of competent jurisdiction and in fact when the darkhast application was filed to execute the decree it had been transferred under Section 19, and that unless the Judgment-debtor proves that the decretal debt is satisfied or is adjusted or is otherwise barred it was incumbent on the B. A. D. R. Act Court to take the debt as proved and to deal with it under the provisions of the Act. In my opinion this argument is obviously sound. It is difficult to understand how the learned judge who heard the adjustment applications came to the conclusion that because of the absence of the 'decreeholder it followed that his debt had not been proved. In fact the decree-holder in such a case had merely to produce the decree which he had obtained and since the application before the adjustment court was thg result of a transfer made by the executing court under Section 19, it was hardly necessary for the decree-holder to take elaborate steps to prove his debt beyond producing the decree. The decree has been referred to in the darkhast application and the executing Court has transferred the darkhast application to the B. A. D. R. Act court. Therefore it seems to me that the learned Judges below were in error in taking the view that in the absence of proof about the subsistence of the debt the decree-holder waa not entitled to any claim at all. The lower appellate court has no doubt given relief to the petitioner to the extent of Rs. 200/-but that is on the ground that this amount was admitted by the judgment-debtor. Even this conclusion is based upon the erroneous approach to the problem. It is for the debtor to prove how the decretal amount claimed in the darkhast is adjusted or barred.

(3.) MR. Vaidya who appears for the oppo-nents has however attempted tc justify the conclusion of the lower courts with an ingenious argument. He contends that in fact the decretal debt due to the petitioner is extinguished under Section 15 of the Act. He concedes that he has not challenged the order of the lower appellate court holding that Rs. 200/- are due to the petitioner; but he argues and rightly that even so it would be open to him to support the rest of the order on the ground that the lower appellate court has given relief to the petitioner that he deserved in law and it is this argument raised under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act which calls for a decision in the present revisional application. Mr. Vaidya has Invited my attention to the provisions of Section 15 and he argues that the present decretal debt is one to which the last portion of Sub-section (1) of the Section 15 applies. Section 15 Sub-section (1) deals with the extinction of debts due from the debtors and one of the classes of debts to which the rule of extinction applies is covered by such debts as are due from debtors in respect of which statements are not submitted to the court by the creditors in compliance with the provisions of Section 14. In other words if a debt is due from a debtor and the creditor has not submitted a statement in compliance with the provisions of Section 14 in respect of the debt due to him the said debt shall be deemed to be extinguished. It is common ground that on the application made by the debtor for the adjustment of his debts a general notice was issued under Section 14. It is also common ground that in response to this general notice the petitioned did not file a statement and that provides the material on which Mr. Vaidya bases his argument about the extinction of the debt under Section 15. If it was necessary for the petitioner to file a statement in response to the general notice under the provisions of Section 14, Mr. Vaidya would be right. If on the other hand, it was not neces-sary for the petitioner to submit his statement though a general notice may have been issued under Section 14, the argument as to the extinction of the debt must fail. That is why it is necessary to examine the provisions of Section 14.