DAGADU BALU Vs. NAMDEO RAKHMAJI
LAWS(BOM)-1954-1-1
HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Decided on January 27,1954

DAGADU BALU Appellant
VERSUS
NAMDEO RAKHMAJI Respondents


Referred Judgements :-

KUNJA SAHU VS. BHAGABAN MOHANTY [REFERRED TO]



Cited Judgements :-

RANU THAKU KOKATE VS. SANTU GOGA BHANGARE [LAWS(BOM)-1966-10-2] [REFERRED TO]
PEM MAHTON VS. BANDHU MAHTO [LAWS(PAT)-1955-4-3] [REFERRED TO]
INDUBAI VS. VYANKATI VITHOBA SAWADBA [LAWS(BOM)-1965-3-2] [REFERRED TO]
KAJOR VS. KALYAN DAS [LAWS(RAJ)-1966-2-27] [REFERRED TO]
KHATRANI KUER VS. TAPESHWARI KUER [LAWS(PAT)-1964-1-4] [REFERRED TO]
VISHNU MARUTI JADHAV VS. KAMALABAI SADASHIV RAJAWADE [LAWS(BOM)-2018-10-246] [REFERRED TO]


JUDGEMENT

Chagla, C.J. - (1.)This second appeal raises a question as to the interpretation of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. Although the Act is a very short one, all questions of interpretation of that Act usually raise serious difficulties. Some Judges have observed that the provisions of the Act are obscure, and more charitable minded Judges have said that the drafting of the Act is not very happy.
(2.)The question that arises for our consideration arises on these facts. Rakhmaji and Krishna were two brothers who constituted a joint and undivided Hindu family. Krishnaji died on 25-9-1945, leaving a widow who is defendant No. 2 and a daughter who is defendant No. 3, and defendant No. 1 is the son of Rakhmaji. On 3-9-1946, defendant No. 2 sold her interest in the joint family property to the plaintiff for Rs. 5,000, and the plaintiff filed the suit from which this appeal arises for partition. The question that has been debated before us is whether under the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act a widow in a joint family has a right to alienate the share which her husband had in the property and which has devolved upon her by reason of the provisions of that Act.
(3.)Now, in construing this Act what has got to be borne in mind is that it was an Act ameliorative in character and intended to carry out an important social reform. Its express intention was to give better rights to women in respect of property and therefore the various provisions of the Act must be construed in the light of the intention which the Legislature had in placing this piece of legislation upon the statute book. We are concerned in this case with Sub-section (2) of Section 3 and that provides:
"When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu Law other than the Dayabhag school or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had."
Therefore, in this case when Krishna died he had an interest in joint family property and his widow by reason of the sub-section would have the same interest in the joint family property which her husband had. Sub-section (3) provides:
"Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate, provided however that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner."
Now, reading Sub-sections (2) and (3) together, it is clear that in Sub-section (2) the Legislature intended that the Hindu widow should have in the joint family property the same interest that her husband had, but the Legislature wanted to qualify the nature of that interest. If Sub-section (2) stood by itself without the qualifications contained in Sub-section (3), it can hardly be disputed that the Hindu widow would have had the totality of rights which her husband had in relation to the joint family property. But the Legislature did not wish to go as far as that and therefore it enacted Sub-section (3) and provided for certain limitation upon the rights of the widow, and the limitation is that although the interest of the husband would devolve upon his wife, the interest would not be an absolute interest but it would be a limited interest, an interest known to Hindu law as a Hindu woman's estate. The expression "Hindu woman's estate" is by no means a very happy expression. Hindu law knows of a Hindu widow's estate, but it is difficult to understand why the Legislature used an expression not known to Hindu law and omitted to use an expression which has been well understood for a long time in Hindu law. But there can be no doubt, and it is not disputed, that what the Legislature really intended was to use the expression "Hindu widow's estate". Therefore, having conferred upon the Hindu, widow a limited interest, the Legislature was at pains to, point out, lest it should be suggested that the widow having a limited interest had no right to partition which her husband had, that notwithstanding this limited interest the widow had the same right of claiming partition as a male owner would have. Therefore, if the Legislature's-intention was to give to the widow the same interest that her husband had, but make that interest a limited interest of the same character and kind as a Hindu widow's estate, what we have to consider is what are the incidents of a Hindu woman's estate? There is nothing in Sub-section (3) to suggest that having conferred the limited Hindu widow's estate the Legislature wanted further to limit it by conferring upon her only some of the incidents of that estate arid not all the incidents of that estate. The incidents of a Hindu woman's estate are well known and well settled. She cannot alienate her property except for legal necessity, but she has the right to alienate the property even without legal necessity during her lifetime. In other words, she can alienate her own life interest and the alienee can enjoy the property during her life in the same manner as the widow herself would have enjoyed it.


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