RAJADHYAKSHA J. - (1.)THESE four applications raise a short but important point with regard to the interpretation of Section 86 of the Bombay District Municipal Act (III of 1901). The applicant in all these applications is the Municipality of Anklesh -war. It had levied a rate on buildings and lands situated within the Municipal District and also a general sanitary cess. It presented bills to the opponents for the recovery of tax on lands as also the sanitary cess for the year 1951 -52 as provided for in Section 82 of the Act. The opponents preferred appeals against the claim included in the bills to the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ankleshwar, who was the Magistrate authorised to receive such appeals under Section 86 of the Act. It was contended that the bills were illegal, that the imposition of the levy and the assessment of the taxes were illegal, invalid and ultra vires of the powers of the municipality, that the municipality had not complied with the provisions of law in respect of the preparation and adoption of the assessment list and that the valuation was not proper. The learned Magistrate held that the bills issued by the municipality were not illegal, that the municipality had complied with the provisions of law with respect to the preparation of the assessment list of the house tax, but had not complied with the provisions of law with regard to the general sanitary cess. He found that the valuation put down by the municipality was proper. He, therefore, allowed the appeals so far as the claim in respect of the general sanitary cess was concerned, but he dismissed the appeals of the opponents with regard to the rate on buildings.
(2.)AGAINST that decision, both the municipality and the opponents went in revision to the Sessions Court of Broach as provided for in Sub -section(2) of Section 86. The municipality contended that the decision of the learned Magistrate with regard to the imposition of the general sanitary cess was wrong, and the opponents contended that the decision of the learned Magistrate upholding the validity of the imposition of the rate on buildings was incorrect. 'When the matter came before the learned Judge, it appears to have been agreed between the parties that the learned Judge should give a decision on the validity of the bills presented under Section 82 of the Act. The learned Judge observes as follows in para. 6 of his judgment: The legality of the assessment, list made and the bills issued by the Municipality and the authority of the Municipality to levy the tax, to increase it and to recover it is also challenged. The learned Advocate for the applicant has raised several objections in, this application. Among the objections urged, one is that the bill presented by the Municipality does not comply with the requirements of Section 82 of the Act and is therefore invalid. If the bill itself is invalid, the power to make the recovery also becomes invalid and the recoveries made thereunder. In that case it is agreed by both sides that the other questions need not be gone into. This objection, to my mind, goes to the root of the whole question. I have therefore hoard that point first and raised the following point for determination: Does the bill presented by the Municipality comply with the requirements of Section 82 of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901 and is it valid? The learned Sessions Judge held that the bill did not comply with the requirements of Section 82 in respect of two material points:
(1) the period for which the bill was presented was not specified as required by Clause (a) of Sub -section(2) of Section 82, and (2) that the time within which the bill may be preferred was also not specified as required by Clause (b)(ii) of Sub -section(2) of Section 82. In this view the learned Judge held that the bill was invalid and directed that the tax which was required to be deposited in Court under Clause (c) of Sub -section (1) of Section 86 as a condition precedent for the hearing and determination of the appeal should be refunded within three months. It is against that order that the municipality has come in revision in all these four applications.

Mr. S.M. Shah, who argued these applications on behalf of the municipality, has contended that both the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge had misdirected themselves as regards the scope of the appeal and revision. It is the submission of Mr. Shah that the scope of the appeal and revision is confined to the determination of the correctness of the valuation and the assessment and the learned Magistrate had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in going into the question of the validity of the imposition and in holding that the rate on buildings had been validly imposed and that the sanitary cess had not been validly imposed. He also urged that the learned Sessions Judge, in hearing the revision application, had also travelled beyond the scope of his jurisdiction when he held that the claim included in the bill could not be recovered because of certain defects in the presentation of the bill.

(3.)UPON these contentions being submitted it has been urged by Mr. Thakore by way of preliminary objection that the question of jurisdiction had not been raised either before the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge and could not be raised for the first time in the present revision applications. We do not think that this preliminary objection can be allowed to prevail. These applications can be entertained by the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, as has been laid down in Surat Municipality v. Hamiduddin (1937) 40 Bom. L.R. 387. It was held in that case that the High Court can entertain a civil revision application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against an order passed by the Sessions Judge in revision under Section 111 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, from an order passed by a Magistrate under Section 110 of the Act. But it will not interfere unless it appears that there has been a grave abuse of power by the Sessions Court or the decision is manifestly erroneous or unjust. That decision of a single Judge was further approved by a division bench of this Court in Lokmanya Mills Ltd. v. Municipal Borough, Barsi : (1939)41BOMLR937 . These decisions given in connection with the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, are equally applicable to the cases arising under the Bombay District Municipal Act whore also the provisions are similar to those of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act. The maintainability of these applications, raising a point which had not been taken either before the learned Magistrate or the learned Sessions Judge, has therefore got to be determined on the principles applicable in exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was argued by Mr. Thakor, relying on Haridas v. Ratansey : (1921)23BOMLR802 , that it is not the function of the High Court in revision to entertain a point of law which has not been taken in the Court below. But it is not merely a point of law which is being urged before us, but it is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge. It is true that this point was not taken before the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge and the parties submitted to their jurisdictions. But jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a Court by the consent of parties. See Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. v. Gov. -General (1947) 49 Bom. L.R. 530, p.c. Mr. Thakore referred to the decision of a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Dananjoy Das v. Ram Chandra Dash : AIR1927Cal388 , where it was stated that the High Court will decline to interfere in revision on an objection as to jurisdiction where it has been shown that no such objection was taken and that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. But that was a case where a suit which was instituted as an ordinary money suit was subsequently tried by a Judge who was invested with Small Cause Court powers. An objection was taken subsequently that the trial Court had acted without jurisdiction and with material irregularity in disposing of the case summarily as a small cause suit instead of as a regular suit, to the great inconvenience and prejudice of the petitioners. It was therefore a case not of inherent want of jurisdiction, but of irregular exercise of jurisdiction to which the parties had submitted. This distinction between inherent want of jurisdiction and the irregular exercise of jurisdiction has been pointed out by Mr. Justice Wassoodew in Ajam Ibram v. Hava Bibi (1938) 41 Bom. L.R. 892 where he held that where the defect in jurisdiction arises merely by reason of an irregularity in the commencement of the proceedings before a Court to which a case has been transferred by another Court in its administrative capacity and the defendant neglects to question the irregularity, ho cannot subsequently challenge the legality of the proceedings. What is alleged in the present applications is that both the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge have misconceived the scope of their jurisdiction in appeal and revision respectively and have travelled far beyond what was within their power to decide. We are, therefore, of the view that as these applications raise an important question of jurisdiction, it is open to us to entertain these applications, even though the question of jurisdiction was not raised either before the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge. See Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramaniya Sastri , where their Lordships held that 'no amount of consent under such circumstances could confer jurisdiction where no jurisdiction exists' and quoted with approval their earlier decision in Ledgard v. Bull (1886) L.R. 13 I.A 134, viz.,.when the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject -matter of a suit, the parties cannot, by their mutual Consent, convert it into a proper judicial process, although they may constitute the Judge their arbiter, and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him. But there are numerous authorities -which establish that when, in a cause which the Judge is competent to try, the parties without objection join issue, and go to trial upon the merits, the Defendant cannot subsequently dispute his jurisdiction upon the grounds that there were irregularities in the initial procedure, which, if objected to at the time, would have led to the dismissal of the suit. The question before us is not merely one of irregularities in procedure, but raises the question of jurisdiction to try an issue upon which the lower Courts purport to give a finding.