BARODA OIL CAKES TRADERS Vs. PARSHOTTAM NARAYANDAS BAGULIA
LAWS(BOM)-1954-1-13
HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Decided on January 25,1954

BARODA OIL CAKES TRADERS Appellant
VERSUS
PARSHOTTAM NARAYANDAS BAGULIA Respondents


Referred Judgements :-

DUNLOP V. HIGGINS [REFERRED TO]
BORTHWICK V. WALTON [REFERRED TO]
COOKE V. GILL [REFERRED TO]
BANK OF ENGLAND V. VAGLIANO BROTHERS [REFERRED TO]
EVANS V. NICHOLSON [REFERRED TO]
GREEN V. BEACH [REFERRED TO]
SEPULCHRE BROS V. KHUSHAL DAS [REFERRED TO]
VENKATA REDDY V. NATARAJA [REFERRED TO]
RATAN LAL V. HARCHARAN LAL [REFERRED TO]
POKHAR MAL V. KHANEWAL OIL MILLS [REFERRED TO]
CLARKE BROTHERS V. KNOWLES [REFERRED TO]
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.,CALCUTTA V. SEETHAMMAL [REFERRED TO]
MYLAPPA CHETTIAR V. AGA MIRZA [REFERRED TO]
PREMCHAND ROYCHAND VS. MOTI LALL AGARWALA [REFERRED TO]
BOMBAY STEAM NAVIGATION CO LTD VS. UNION OF INDIA [REFERRED TO]
MANILAL VS. MPVENKATACHALAPATHI IYER (DECEASED) [REFERRED TO]
ENGINEERING SUPPLIES LTD VS. DHANDHANIA AND CO [REFERRED TO]
AHMAD BUX ALLA JOVAYA VS. FAZAL KARIM [REFERRED TO]



Cited Judgements :-

RAJA BROTHERS CLOTH MERCHANTS CHANDNI CHOWK KUCHA REHMAN DELHI VS. CHANRAI UTTAM CHAND [LAWS(DLH)-1969-9-20] [REFERRED 3.]
INDO GULF INDUSTRIES LIMITED VS. UP STATE INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPN [LAWS(DLH)-2003-4-9] [REFERRED]
FIDA HUSEIN MAHOMEDALI ANTELAWALA VS. GOKALDAS [LAWS(GJH)-1962-9-16] [REFERRED]
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION VS. MODERN CONSTRUCTION AND COMPANY [LAWS(GJH)-1997-3-7] [REFERRED TO]
JAIPUR UDYOG LTD VS. INDIAN DRUGS AND PHARMACEUTICALS LTD [LAWS(ALL)-1984-1-2] [REFERRED TO]
ATUL CHAKRAVARTY VS. SUDHIR GOPAL PANDEY [LAWS(CAL)-1968-8-2] [REFERRED TO]
BIJAYESH VS. SUDHIR GOPAL PANDEY [LAWS(CAL)-1968-8-16] [REFERRED TO]
SHAH GANPAT PASU AND CO VS. GULZARILAL BHAIYALAL [LAWS(MPH)-1957-12-5] [REFERRED TO]
FIRM KANHAIYALAL VS. DINESHCHANDRA [LAWS(MPH)-1959-2-20] [REFERRED TO]
G VENKATESHA BHAT VS. KAMLAPAT MOTILAL [LAWS(MAD)-1956-8-27] [REFERRED TO]
BYOMKESH BANERJEE VS. NANI GOPAL BANIK [LAWS(CAL)-1986-8-37] [REFERRED TO]
STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DIVN NEW DELHI WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT NEW DELHI AND BRANCH OFFICE AT 123 MOUNT ROAD MADRAS 6 VS. S S MOHTE AND COMPANY REGISTERED FIRM OF PARTNERSHIP [LAWS(MAD)-1980-6-14] [REFERRED TO]
ZAINAB BAI WIFE OF HUSSAINBHAI EBRAHIM VS. NAVAYUG CHITRAPAT CO LTD [LAWS(BOM)-1967-12-4] [REFERRED TO]
PRASANNCHAND NAHAR SOLE PROPRIETOR HIRACHAND PRASANCHAND VS. MOHAMMEDSAH ABDUL [LAWS(MAD)-1993-6-40] [REFERRED TO]
Kannu Exports VS. Banque Nationale De Paris [LAWS(DLH)-2006-1-43] [REFERRED TO]
SADHOO LAL MOTILAL VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [LAWS(ALL)-1971-9-11] [REFERRED TO]
ALOPI PRASAD AND SONS PVT LTD VS. HARISH CHANDRA [LAWS(ALL)-1972-9-8] [REFERRED TO]
K MURUGESAN VS. SECTHALAKSHMI [LAWS(MAD)-1991-6-19] [REFERRED TO]
LARSON AND TOUBRO LTD ECC CONSTRUCTION GROUP MADRAS VS. KERALA STATE CO OPERATIVE HOSPITAL COMPLEX AND CENTRE FOR ADVANCED MEDICAL SERVICES LIMITED [LAWS(MAD)-1996-9-105] [REFERRED TO]
UNION OF INDIA VS. AJIT MEHTA AND ASSOCIATES [LAWS(BOM)-1989-8-28] [REFERRED TO]
INDIA CARBON LIMITED VS. GANESH PRASAD SINGH [LAWS(CAL)-2011-9-150] [REFERRED TO]
DHANDAPANI CEMENTS PRIVATE LIMITED VS. BINNY ENGINEERING LIMITED CHENNAI [LAWS(MAD)-2003-10-116] [FOLLOWED ON]
C R Sivanandam VS. V R Kushal Doss [LAWS(MAD)-2005-4-191] [REFERRED TO]
BALLORAM VS. FIRM SETH UTTAMCHAND BISHANDAS [LAWS(RAJ)-1960-4-4] [REFERRED TO]
NATHMAL GHASILAL VS. PHOOLCHAND RAMNARAIN [LAWS(MPH)-1961-1-31] [REFERRED TO]
NATHMAL GHASILAL VS. PHOOLCHAND RAMNARAIN [LAWS(MPH)-1961-4-18] [REFERRED TO]
MEGHA ENGINEERING AND INFRASTRUCTURES LTD VS. OIL INDIA LTD [LAWS(GAU)-2020-8-96] [REFERRED TO]


JUDGEMENT

- (1.)THIS is an appeal against the order passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Baroda, directing that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the propert Court. By his plaint the plaintiff had claimed to recover Rs. 10,800 from the defendants on the ground that there was a valid contract between the parties and that the defendants had failed to perform their part of the contract. In other words, it is an action for damages for breach of contract. The defendants reside at Kanpur, outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge at Baroda, and the plaintiff conceded that the Civil Judge in whose Court he filed the plaint would have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit under the provisions of Section 20, Sub-sections (a) and (b), of the Code of Civil Procedure. He, however, alleged that the cause of action had accrued partly within the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge and so the suit as filed before him would be competent under Section 20 (c), Civil P. C. The defendants denied this allegation and contended that the whole of the contract had been made outside the jurisdiction of the trial Judge and so the provisions of Section 20 (c) were inapplicable to the present case. The learned Judge has upheld this plea and in the result an order has been passed directing the return of the plaint to the plaintiff. Thus the only question which arises before us is whether the trial Court was right in holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 20 (c ). The decision of this point would depend upon the answer to the question as to whether part of the cause of action in respect of the plaintiff's claim has arisen within the local limits of the trial Court.
(2.)IT is common ground between the parties that the contract in question was for sale of 200 tons of groundnut cakes and it had been entered into by telegrams. The plaintiff sent a telegram from Baroda offering to purchase the said groundnut-cakes from the defendants. The defendants conveyed their acceptance to the plaintiff by telegram despatched from Kanpur and the said acceptance reached the plaintiff at Baroda in due course. The plaintiff's case was that the proposal or offer had been sent from Baroda and so a part of the cause of action had arisen in Baroda. The plaintiff also pleaded that the acceptance had been received by him in Baroda and that again means in law that a part of the cause of action had arisen in Baroda. It is these two pleas that require consideration in the present appeal. The point thus raised prima facie appears to be short and simple; but it has led to conflict of judicial opinion amongst the Indian High Courts, and that is why Mr. Justice Shah, before whom this appeal was originally placed for final disposal, has referred it to a Division Bench.
(3.)SECTION 20 (c) provides that every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The expression "cause of action" has received judicial interpretation on numerous occasions. Every student of the Code is familiar with the explanation of this expression which describes it as a bundle of essential facts necessary to be proved by the plaintiff in order to succeed in his suit. This explanation appears to be clear and facile; but it is not always easy to decide which facts can legitimately enter this bundle and which must be excluded from it. The observations of Lord Justice Fry in -- 'read v. Brown', (1888) 22 Q B D 128 at p. 132 (A) which explain the meaning of the expression "cause of action" have now become a classic on the subject and are cited by every commentator on the Code of Civil Procedure: "everything," observed Lord Justice Fry "which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, must be part of the cause of action. " mr. Justice Brett put the same position in a somewhat different form in -- 'cooke v. Gill', (1873) LR 8 CP 107 (B) by making this lucid observation:
" 'cause of action' has been held from the earliest time to mean every fact which is material to be: proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed,--every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse".
It is, however, important to bear in mind that the bundle of facts which constitute the cause of action in a civil suit does not and is not intended to comprise every fact which may be proved in evidence. It is only material facts which must be proved by the plaintiff before he can obtain a decree that constitute the cause of action. Facts which the plaintiff may allege incidentally and facts which may be brought in evidence as 'res gestae' would not necessarily constitute a part of the cause of action. The distinction between facts which are relevant and material and those that are incidental and immaterial is sometimes not easy to be drawn; but the said distinction is nevertheless important for the purpose of deciding which facts constitute the cause of action and which are not included in it. The position under Section 20 (c) is very clear, if it is shown by the plaintiff that the cause of action has arisen wholly or in part within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the trial Court, the trial Court would be entitled to deal with the suit.


Click here to view full judgement.
Copyright © Regent Computronics Pvt.Ltd.