RAMJIBHAI VIRPAL SHAH Vs. GORDHANDAS MAGANLAL BHAGAT
LAWS(BOM)-1954-1-17
HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Decided on January 06,1954

RAMJIBHAI VIRPAL SHAH Appellant
VERSUS
GORDHANDAS MAGANLAL BHAGAT Respondents


Referred Judgements :-

MEWA KUWAR V. HULAS KUWAR [REFERRED TO]
HOWARD V. SHAW [REFERRED TO]
ERRINGTON V. ERRINGTON [REFERRED TO]
BOOKER V. PALMER [REFERRED TO]
MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. V. SMITH [REFERRED TO]
GLENWOOD LUMBER CO. V. PHILLIPS [REFERRED TO]
KRISHNA TANHAJI V. ABA SHETTI PATIL [REFERRED TO]
HEMANTA KUMARI DEBI V. MIDNAPUR ZAMINDARI CO. [REFERRED TO]
KHUNI LAL V. GOBIND KRISHNA NARAIN [REFERRED TO]
BASANGOWDA V. IRGOWDATTI [REFERRED TO]
KALLY DASS AHIRI V. MONMOHINI DASSEE [REFERRED TO]
SECY. OF STATE V. SATI PRASAD [REFERRED TO]
INDIAN HOTELS CO. V. PHIROZ SORABJI [REFERRED TO]
JANARDAN V. RAMCHANDRA [REFERRED TO]
HUNSRAJ V. BEJOY LAL SEAL [REFERRED TO]
SHERIF DADUMIYAJI V. EMPEROR [REFERRED TO]
SECY. OF STATE V. BHUPALCHANDRA RAY [REFERRED TO]
SUMATIBAI V. ANANT BALKRISHNA [REFERRED TO]
O.C. GANGULY V. KAMALPAT SINGH [REFERRED TO]
BALDEODAS MAHAVIRAPRASAD V. SONAVALLA [REFERRED TO]
GOVIND WAMAN VS. MURLIDHAR SHRINIVAS [REFERRED TO]



Cited Judgements :-

KRISHNA OBEROI VS. UNION OF INDIA UOI [LAWS(APH)-2002-6-40] [REFERRED TO]
PURBAN PVT LTD VS. DEB KUMAR SHAW [LAWS(CAL)-1977-5-14] [REFERRED TO]
PURBAN PVT LTD VS. DEB KUMAR SHAW [LAWS(CAL)-1977-5-33] [REFERRED TO]
BABULAL GULABCHAND VS. NATHULAL BADRILAL [LAWS(MPH)-1975-7-5] [REFERRED TO]
SANKARAN NAMBOORIPAD VS. MATHAN [LAWS(KER)-1963-12-10] [REFERRED TO]
BAI MANUBEN VS. BHIMABHAI NAGARJI [LAWS(BOM)-1957-10-5] [REFERRED TO]
ANINHA DCOSTA VS. PARVATIBAI M THAKUR [LAWS(BOM)-1964-11-5] [REFERRED TO]
RATILAL NARBHERAM VS. WELJI NAGJI [LAWS(BOM)-1974-9-3] [REFERRED TO]
KANMAL VS. HUKAMCHAND [LAWS(RAJ)-1965-8-10] [REFERRED TO]
KANMAL VS. HUKAM CHAND [LAWS(RAJ)-1965-12-11] [REFERRED TO]
NARENDRA BACHUBHAI DAVE VS. JETHALAL S. DAVE [LAWS(BOM)-1974-10-16] [REFERRED TO]
SHRI BHAGWAN DASS AND OTHERS VS. S. RAJDEV SINGH AND ANOTHER [LAWS(DLH)-1969-9-25] [REFERRED TO]
WAMAN SHIVRAM MAHADIK VS. M.W. DESAI [LAWS(BOM)-1973-2-11] [REFERRED TO]
BHAGWAN DASS AND OTHERS VS. S RAJDEV SINGH AND ANOTHER [LAWS(DLH)-1969-9-28] [REFERRED]


JUDGEMENT

- (1.)SECOND Appeal No. 917 of 1952 and two other matters have been referred to a Division Bench because they raise a common question of law of some importance. In all these matters the landlord had determined the lease in favour of his tenant and had sued to eject the tenant. The landlord's claim was resisted by the tenant; but ultimately a compromise decree was obtained by the parties. By reason of the compromise decree the defendant was allowed to remain in possession of the property for a stated period. At the end of this period the landlord sought to execute the compromise decree and claimed possession by execution process. The defendant resisted this claim on the ground that the compromise decree made him a tenant of the decree-holder and under the provisions of the Rent estriction Act, 57 of 1947, it was not open to the landlord to obtain possession. It is somewhat remarkable that in all the three matters the Courts below have held that the compromisedecree did not make the judgment-debtor a tenant of the decree-holder and they have accordingly allowed the decree-holder's claim for possession. The judgment-debtors who have come to this Court against this decision contend that the consent decrees have not been properly construed and they argue that the Courts below were wrong in directing them to deliver possession to the decree-holders. That is how the principal question which arises in all these matters is one of construction of the compromise decrees and the principles which apply to the construction of such decrees. It may be convenient to set out the terms of the compromise decree which has given rise to second appeal No. 917 of 1952.
(2.)THE compromise decree in this case was passed in civil suit No. 2476 of 1948 on 22-10-1947. This decree provided that the defendant do vacate and cause to be vacated the house in suit by 22-110-1949, and give possession to the plaintiff. This is the effect of Clause (1) of the decree. Clause (2) provided that Rs. 200 had been ascertained to be due to the plaintiff by the defendant in respect of rent and mesne profits as from 5-12-1946, on which date the cause of action had accrued, to 5-10-1947. This clause further allowed appropriation by the landlord of the amounts which had been deposited by the tenant in Court pending the hearing of the suit. Clause (3) directed the defendant to pay to the plaintiff regularly every month on 5-11-1947, and on the 5th of every succeeding month Rs. 20 in respect of the mesne profits until the house in suit is handed over. It also gave the right to the plaintiff to take possession of the house in case the defendant failed to pay mesne profits for any three months. The Courts below have held that this decree merely permitted the defendant to stay in the house and did not confer upon him the status of a lessee or a tenant. Mr. Patel for the appellant contends that in coming to this conclusion the Courts below have misapplied the principles which govern the construction of such decrees and have not given the words used in the decree their natural and reasonable meaning.
(3.)COURTS have often had occasion to deal with compromise decrees passed in suits in which the landlords had claimed possession of the demised properties from their tenants after determining the tenancy in question. In construing such decrees, much difficulty was not experienced so long as the landlord's rights to deal with his own property were not fettered by the provisions of the Rent Restriction Acts. After the introduction of the Rent Restriction Acts, the rights of the landlord have been restricted and special protection has been given to the tenants. Even so, in suits which fall to be decided under the provisions of such Rent Restriction Acts compromise decrees are sometimes passed and the question as to the relationship which results from such compromise decrees has often to be considered by civil Courts. In considering this question, however, an initial difficulty arises because in such cases it is not always easy or possible to attribute to the landlord the intention to lease out his property afresh to the tenant even after he had determined the lease and even though he knows that the tenant would acquire certain additional and special rights under the Rent Restriction Acts. The fact that a compromise decree in a suit between the landlord and his tenant is passed where the tenant claims the protection of the Rent Restriction Act is apt toput upon the question of the construction of the decree a different complexion.


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