KHATRI,J. - (1.) THIS judgment governs First Appeals Nos. 215, 216 and 217 of 1974. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay challenges the decision of the learned Judge of the Bombay City Civil Court, (Shri H. Suresh), granting a declaration that the Corporation are not entitled to enforce the bills and notices of demand, under Section 203(1) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, (for short 'the Act') against the respondent Prakash Cotton Mills unless these documents are issued expressly in the name of the Mills, A perpetual injunction is also granted restraining the Corporation from proceeding against the respondents under Section 203(1) ibid on the basis of these bills and demand notices.
(2.) THE material facts necessary for the determination of question of law arising in these appeals are not in dispute. The respondents Prakash Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. are at present the owners of a large plot of land situated on Swami Vivekanand Road in Greater Bombay and popularly known as 'the Bombay Talkies Estate'. There are a number of structures on this plot. Originally this property belonged to National and Grindlay's Bank Ltd. as the sole trustees of the estate of the late Framroze Edulji Dinshaw. These trustees leased this property to Bombay Talkies Ltd. on a monthly rent of Rs. 2.000/ -. The Bombay Talkies went into liquidation and it appears that since before 1963 or so the present respondents have been in occupation of the plot and the structures as owners. The immediate predecessors -in -title of the respondents were one M/s. Filmstan Pvt. Ltd. It appears that the rateable value for the several structures as fixed by the Corporation was challenged by the M/s. Filmstan Pvt. Ltd. for the year 1960 -61 and 1961 -62. Appeals against those decisions are still pending. The present respondents have also challenged the rateable values determined from 1963 onwards up to 1970. It is not in dispute that on April 11, 1972 the. respondents received a number of bills from the Corporation in respect of these structures, purporting to be issued under Section 200(1) of the Act. Property Tax for the first half of the year 1972 -73 (from April to September 1972) was claimed under .these bills. On April 26, 1972 a set of demand notices was also received by the respondents from the Corporation, purporting to be under Section 202(1) of the Act. It is these bills and demand notices that are the subject matter of challenge in this litigation. The respondents' case was that these bills and demand notices are invalid in law and not binding on them, inasmuch as they are not made out in their own names, but in the names of their predecessors -in -title, namely, the Bombay Talkies and/or M/s. Filmistan Pvt. Ltd. It was also urged that in view of the pendency of the previous litigation regarding the quantum and validity of fixation of rateable value, it was not permissible to the Corporation to issue the bills and demand notices in respect of the year 1972 -73. According to the Corporation, the bills and notices served on the respondents duly complied with the requirements of Section 200(1) and 202(1) of the Act and were binding on them. According to the Corporation, it was not incumbent on them to expressly indicate the name of the respondents in these documents as claimed by them OF to wait till the decision of the previous litigation.
(3.) THE second ground of attack based on the pendency of the previous litigation, did not find favour with the learned Judge of the lower Court. However, he was impressed by the first contention, namely, that the bills and the notices should have been issued in the names of the respondents expressly. After considering all the material provisions of the Act in detail, the learned Judge concluded that the omission on the part of the Corporation to make out the bills in the names of the respondents, disentitled them from proceeding against the latter under Section 203(1) of the Act by issuing, distress process. The learned Judge, however, ruled that it was open to the Corporation to proceed under Sections 211 and 212 of the Act. Accordingly subject to this qualification, he granted declaration and injunction as indicated in the opening paragraph of this judgment.;