M.L.PENDSE, J. - (1.)BY this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging legality of order, dated December 30, 1985 passed by Officer on Special Duty (Appeal and Revision) Revenue and Forests Department, Government of Maharashtra. By the impugned order, the Officer on Special Duty confirmed the order of resumption passed by the lower authorities. The facts giving rise to the passing of this order are as follows:
(2.)THE petitioner secured lease in respect of land bearing City Survey No. 4764 admeasuring 56.95 sq. metres and situated at Sinnar in Nasik District from the State Government. The lease was executed by the petitioner after the rights were auctioned and the petitioner was highest bidder. The lease was granted on conditions and the principal condition was that the land shall be put to non -agricultural use within a period of two years from the date of the execution of the lease. The petitioner failed to comply with the requirement and thereupon on February 14, 1979, the Revenue authorities served show cause notice upon the petitioner to explain why the land should not be resumed. The Collector of Nasik passed order for resumption on May 6, 1979 and that order was confirmed in appeal by Additional Commissioner on March 31, 1984 and ultimately by Officer on Special Duty by impugned, order, dated December 30, 1985. These concurrent orders passed by the three authorities are under challenge in this petition.
Shri Sali, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the impugned orders of the Revenue authorities are incorrect and the land leased out to the petitioner should not have been resumed. It was also contended that the State Government had sold the land in favour of the petitioner and it was incorrect to suggest that the land was leased. It is impossible to accede to the submission of the learned Counsel for more than one reason. In the first instance, the findings recorded by all the three authorities below are pure findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence and it is not permissible to disturb the orders in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Secondly, the contention of the petitioner that the land was sold by the Government and the petitioner was not a lessee is wholly incorrect. The auction was held by the State Government to determine who should be the lessee and the lease was executed in favour of the highest bidder. The expression 'auction' should not be confused with the auction sale. The petitioner after being the highest bidder executed lease deed in favour of the State Government. It is not open for the petitioner thereafter to turn round and claim that the land was sold to the petitioner. A person in occupation of the Government land as a lessee cannot disclaim the title of the State Government. Thirdly, even on merits, we are unable to find any infirmity in the reasoning and the conclusion reached by the three authorities below.

(3.)THE land was leased to the petitioner on December 18, 1959 and the condition prescribed was that the petitioner will put the land to nonagricultural use within a period of two years. The petitioner claims that the adjoining owner had filed Suit in the Civil Court restraining the petitioner from carrying out construction. The suit was over on July 17, 1963 and thereafter within two years, the petitioner took no steps to make any construction or to put the land to non -agricultural use. It is claimed by the petitioner that in the year 1969, the petitioner started construction of septic tank and latrine and the work was over in February, 1970. There is no explanation whatsoever as to why construction was not carried out between year 1963 and year 1967. The construction of septic tank and latrine does not amount to putting the land to non -agricultural use. The land was granted for construction of building and not for construction of latrine. The petitioner thereafter on July 21, 1975 made an application to the Municipal authorities for construction of a building containing shops. The plan was rejected as it was not in order and the petitioner was informed that a fresh plan should be submitted within 7 days from July 31, 1975. Again the petitioner did nothing. Thereafter show cause notice was served on February 14, 1979 and the Collector passed order of resumption on May 6, 1979. The petitioner only thereafter sought permission from the Municipal Council for commencing construction. That permission was refused on the ground that the site is required for road widening. The attempts made by the petitioner to make construction after the Collector passed the order of resumption are of no consequence. In our judgment, even on merits, the orders passed by the three authorities below are correct and the petitioner is not entitled to any relief.