MALJI MANILAL KAMDAR Vs. LALJI HARIDAS
LAWS(BOM)-1962-1-8
HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Decided on January 30,1962

MALJI MANILAL KAMDAR Appellant
VERSUS
LALJI HARIDAS Respondents


Referred Judgements :-

EMPEROR V. RACHAPPA YELLAPPA [REFERRED TO]
MERCHANT MOHINI FLOUR MILLS CO.LTD. V. COMMR. OF INCOME-TAX,PUNJAB [REFERRED TO]
EOOSEIN EASAM DADA INDIA LIMITED VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [REFERRED TO]
BRAJNANDAN SINHA VS. JYOTINARAIN [REFERRED TO]
VIRINDAR KUMAR SATYAWADI VS. STATE OF PUNJAB [REFERRED TO]
R M SESHADRI VS. INCOME TAX OFFICER SECOND ADDL [REFERRED TO]
CHAPARALA KRISHNA BRAHMAM VS. GUDURU GOVARDHANAIAH [REFERRED TO]
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VS. NEMCHAND PASHVIR PATEL [REFERRED TO]
IN RE: PUNAMCHAND MANEKLAL VS. STATE [REFERRED TO]
EMPEROR VS. NARAYAN GANPAYA HAVNIK [REFERRED TO]



Cited Judgements :-

JAIN AND JAIN VS. UNION OF INDIA [LAWS(BOM)-1981-3-34] [REFERRED TO]


JUDGEMENT

Chainani, C.J. - (1.)The facts giving rise to this Criminal revision application briefly are that the Income-tax Officer, Jamnagar, was holding proceedings under Section 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, in regard to the assessment of the income of me second respondent, hereinafter referred to as the respondent. During the course of those proceedings the income-tax Officer, Jamnagar, came to Bombay and examined the petitioner on oath. The respondent's case is that the petitioner then made statement, which to the knowledge of the petitioner, were false. He, therefore, filed a complaint against the petitioner for an offence under Section 193 I.P.C., in the Court of Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court. An objection was raised to the maintainability of the complaint by the petitioner. It was contended by him that an Income-tax Officer is a Revenue Court within the meaning of Clause (b) in Sub-section (1) of Section 195 Criminal P.C. and that consequently the Court could not take cognizance of any offence under Section 193 I.P.C. alleged to have been committed by the petitioner in the course of proceedings before the Income-tax Officer, except on a complaint In writing by the Income-tax Officer or of some other authority to whom he was subordinate. This objection was overruled and the learned Magistrate rejected the application made by the petitioner, in which he had raised this preliminary objection. Against the order made by film the present application has been made.
(2.)The question, which we have to determine, is whether an Income-tax Officer, while holding proceedings under Section 23 of the Indian Income-tax Act, is a Court within the meaning of Clause (b) in Sub-section (1) of Section 1965 Criminal P.C. The word "Court" is not defined in the Code. Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, defines "Court" as including alt Judges and Magistrates and all persons except arbitrators legally authorised to take evidence. This definition has been held to be not exhaustive but framed only for the purposes of the Evidence Act and is not to be extended beyond its legitimate scope; see Queen Empress v. Tulja, ILR 12 Bom 36, and Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, (1955) 2 SCR 955 at 961 : ((S) AIR 3956 SC 66 at p. 69). As pointed out by Fry, L.J. in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson, (1892) 1 QB 431, there are many Courts which, though not Courts of Justice, are nevertheless Courts according to law. The word "Court" does not, therefore, have a uniform meaning in all the enactments. The question whether a particular tribunal is a Court must, therefore, be decided in each case having regard to the provisions of the enactment under which that tribunal is constituted.
(3.)Section 195(1) (b) provides as follows: "(1). No Court shall take cognizance ....(a) of any effence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code, namely, Sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, when such offence Is alleged to have been committed, in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate." Sub-section (2) of Section 195 is in the following terms :
"(2). In Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1), the term 'Court' includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, out does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877."
The object of this section is to protect persons from being harassed by baseless and vexatious prosecutions at the instance of individuals actuated by malice, illwill or motives of revenge and to save the time of the Courts from being wasted by frivoious and needless prosecutions. Having regard to this object, it has been held that the word "Court" in Section 195 should be given a wide meaning, See Raghoobuns Sahoy v. Kokil Singh, ILR 17 Cal 872, in which at p. 875 it was observed:
"The word 'Court' is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, and it certainly has a wider meaning than a Court of Justice as defined In the Penal Code. Having regard to the obvious purpose for which Section 195 was enacted, we think that the widest possible meaning should be given to the word 'Court' as therein mentioned, and that it would include a tribunal empowered to deal with a particular matter and authorised to receive evident' bearing on that matter in order to enable it to arrive at a determination."
In that case it was held that a Collector acting is appraisement proceedings under Sections 69 and 70 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, is a Court within the meaning of the term as used in Section 195. The observations made in the above case that the widest possible meaning should be given to the word "Court" occurring in Section 195 were cited with approval in Nanchand Shivchand in re., ILR 37 Bom 365, in which a District Judge hearing an election petition under Section 22 of the Bombay District Municipalities Act, was held to be a Court within the meaning of Section 195(1) (b) Cr.P.C. Wide meaning to the were "Court" has also been given in other cases. In Queen-Empress v. Munda Shetti, ILR 24 Mad 121, a Tahsildar, when holding an inquiry as to whether a transfer of names in a land register should be made or not, was held to be a Revenue Court. A similar view was taken in Emperor v. Narayan Ganapaya, ILR 39 Bom 310 : (AIR 1914 Bom . 232), in which it was held that the mamlatdar holding an inquiry relating to Record of Rights, under Chapter XII of the Land Revenue Code, is a Revenue Court within the meaning of Section 195(1)(c) Criminal P.C., see also Emperor v. Rachappa Yellappa, AIR 1936 Bom 221. I may here mention that Sub-section (2) of Section 195 originally defines ..... the term "Court" as meaning a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court. By Act 18 of 1933 the word "includes" was substituted for the word "means". The definition was, therefore, enlarged to bring within the scope of Section 195 tribunals, which are not Courts in the accepted sense of the word "Court".


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