- (1.)THE Nagpur Corporation has imposed octroi tax under section 114 (1) (e) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948. The Corporation filed a complaint which was received by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur, on 1-9-1959 against the applicant. Paragraph I of the complaint stated that the applicant took delivery of a new truck outside the octroi limits after the Kamptee Road that the truck was for immediate export to Kelzar and obtained a transit pass on the same day. After having the truck registered with the Regional Transport Authority the applicant took the truck to Exit Outpost No. 8 on the Wardha Road, Surrendered the transit pass there and then went outside the octroi limits with the truck. The applicant is then alleged to have brought back the truck within the octroi limits. Before doing so, however he is alleged to have changed the temporary number plate and fixed on the truck the number place with the registration number issued by the Regional Transport Authority on the day. The Octroi Inspector questioned applicant when the truck was brought back within the octroi limits as to whether he had paid the octroi duty in respect of the truck but the applicant declared that the truck was going to Kelzar and that it was to be stationed t Kelzar. The applicant is also alleged to have stated that he had a garage for the truck at that place.
(2.)IT is then stated that on subsequent occasions the applicant brought the said truck within the octroi limits of the City of Nagpur for being used within the Corporation limits but no duty was paid. It was also alleged that the applicant has his residence or business accommodation in the City of Nagpur limits and that he had no business accommodation at Kelzar revealing that the applicant had no residential of business accommodation outside the City limits of Nagpur. It was then stated that the applicant had given a false declaration with a view to defraud the Corporation of its octroi duty payable on the truck.
(3.)ON receipt of the complaint, the Magistrate seems to have decided to try the case as a summons case. Under section 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the accused appears of is brought before the Magistrate, the Magistrate is required to state to the accused the particulars of the offence. I do not find from the record any such particulars which the Magistrate may have stated to the accused. It is only mentioned in the order-sheet of 13-1-1960 - this is probably not in the hand-writing of the Presiding Officer at all - that the particulars of the offence are explained to the accused and that he pleads not guilty. Very probably this order sheet is written by the clerk attached to the office of the Magistrate. It is desirable that the Magistrates must bear in mind that the requirement of the law under section 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is performance of a judicial act. The law enjoins that the particulars of the offence have to be stated to the accused by the Magistrate and the record must show what were the particulars which were explained or stated to the accused by the Magistrate. This requirement is not a formality. It is essential in the case of trials held by summons procedure that the accused must know what is the charge that he has to meet. There is no framing of charge in summons trials and the only opportunity the accused has to know what the accusation against him is by the statement of the particulars which the Magistrate is in law bound to explain to the accused. In my opinion, the Magistrates must bear in mind this requirement of the law in summons cases and non-compliance thereof is likely to result in serious prejudice to one side or the other. The facts of this very case reveal the necessity of strict compliance with this provision.