- (1.)APPLICATION is taken up for hearing by consent of both the parties.
(2.)' Heard the learned Counsel for the applicant and the learned APP for the State.
' Applicant is aggrieved by the order passed by the Sessions Court who was pleased to reject his application for discharge.

' Brief facts are that on 3/11/2010 in the shop of the complainant viz Gala No.101 and 102 situated at Shakti Complex, Navghar, Vasai (East), Thane robbery took place between 00.30 hrs to 4.00 hrs in the morning and 10/12 unknown persons took away all mobile phones and other electronic items of the complainant which were valued at Rs.82 lacs and, according to the complainant about 2000 to 3000 mobile phones were stolen. Applicant was arrested on 14/11/2009 and in the recovery which was made at his instance, his own mobile phone was recovered. Apart from that, admittedly, no other stolen material was found either at his house or at any other place. In the charge-sheet, it is alleged that the applicant is a recipient of the stolen property and, therefore, he is also liable for the offence punishable under section 412 of the IPC.

(3.)' After having heard both the counsel at length, I am of the view that the applicant has made out a case for discharge. The Apex Court in State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018, has observed in para 4 as under:-
"4. ...............If the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by S.227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which- .......... .............. (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in S. 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under S. 227 or S. 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offense then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved .........."

' Keeping in view the aforesaid ratio laid down by the Apex Court, it has to be seen whether there is material on record to create even suspicion that the applicant was involved in respect of any commission of offence or receiving the stolen property. Applicant has annexed charge-sheet. Perusal of the charge-sheet clearly indicates that there is no iota of material to indicate the involvement of the applicant even as a recipient of the stolen property. There are no criminal antecedents against the applicant. This being the position, ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018, would squarely apply to the facts of the present case and, therefore, in my view, trial court has clearly erred in dismissing the application for discharge filed by the applicant.