K.V. GOVINDAN NAIR AND ANR. Vs. APPUKUTTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE only question in this Civil Revision Petition is whether there should be a stay of a suit pending in the Court of the Additional District Munsiff of Calicut for ejectment against the petitioners under Section 4 of the Madras Tenants ind Ryots Protection Act (XVII of 1946). The document under which the petitioners claimed cheir rights is described as an othi deed bearing date of the Malayalam year corresponding to 14th January, 1920. The District Munsiff held that the petitioners were not entitled to the benefit of the provisions of that section and dismissed their application for stay of the suit. When the Civil Revision Petition came on before Panchapagesa Sastry, J., he directed the petition to be posted for hearing and determination by a Bench, because of a conflict between the decision in Ranga Aiyar v. : (1942)2MLJ739 and the decision in Raman Nambiar v. : (1948)2MLJ381 .

(2.) UNDER Section 4(1) of the Madras Act XVII of 1946 a suit for the eviction of a tenant from his holding or a suit in which a claim for such an eviction is involved whether in addition to a claim for rent or not, shall be stayed, subject to certain conditions, which are not material now. Under Section 2(b) of the same Act the expressions, " eviction," " holding, " " rent " and " tenant " shall in relation to cases governed by the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, have the same meanings respectively as in that Act. In the Malabar Tenancy Act, a " tenant " is defined thus:

(3.) THERE can be no doubt that the transferees in this case would be intermediators, construing the definition of " intermediary " according to the plain language of the statute. They are persons having an interest in land and are entitled by reason of such interest to possession thereof. It is common ground that they have transferred such possession to others. An intermediary is expressly included in the definition of a 'tenant' in Clause (v) of Section 3 of the Malabar Tenancy Act... But it is contended by counsel for the respondent that a mere intermediary would of be a tenant but he should also be a person who had paid, or has agreed to pay, rent or other consideration for his being allowed to enjoy the land of the latter....This contention found favour with Horwill, J., in Raman Mambiar v. : (1948)2MLJ381 . The learned Judges held that though a usufructuary mortgagee was certainly a person who satisfied the definition of an intermediary in Section 3(j) of the Act, he would not be a tenant within the meaning of Section 3(o) because in the latter clause, the word intermediary has to be read with the other parts of the definition and the intermediary referred to must be an intermediary who pays rent or other consideration for his being allowed by another to enjoy the land of the latter. The learned Judge made a reference to the decision of a Bench in Ranga Aiyar v. : (1942)2MLJ739 . In that decision Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., held that a usufructuary mortgagee who had parted with possession in favour of others would be an intermediary. The following observations of Wadsworth, J., in that decision are very apposite: