LAKSHMIAMMAL Vs. SIVAKAMU NATESAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE second appeal and civil revision petition arise out of a suit in ejectment filed by the respondent before the Second Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. The defendant in the suit, who is the appellant in the second appeal and petitioner in the civil revision petition, in defence, claimed the benefits conferred on a tenant of land under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act (III of 1922) and, by LA. No. 855 of 1961, applied under Section 9 of the Act for purchase of the plaintiff's right in the suit land. The decree in ejectment granted and dismissal of the application under the Act by the trial Court were confirmed on appeal by the Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. The second appeal is directed against the decree in the suit and the civil revision petition is from the order of dismissal of the appeal against the trial Court's Order in LA. No. 855 of 1961.

(2.) THERE is no dispute about the title of the plaintiff to the suit plot No. 6, Dr. Nair Road, T. Nagar in the City, stated to measure about six grounds. The suit land abuts Jagadambal Street on one side and Dr. Nair Road on another. It was the plaintiff's case that, when the watchman of the property vacated the hut on the land in 1951, she permitted the defendant to occupy the hut free of rent on the understanding that it should be vacated whenever the plaintiff required. The plaint averred that, in 1959, when the plaintiff called upon the defendant to vacate the hut so that she could put up a construction on the property, the defendant failed to vacate the same and proceeded to put up further huts. There have been exchange of notices between the parties preceding the suit. The plaintiff's case is that the defendant is a licensee without any interest in the land. The defendant pleads that she is not a licensee, but a tenant of the land and that she put up the superstructure. Her case is that she became a tenant of the land about 15 years previously that is, in 1945 or 1946, on a monthly rent of Rs. 3, that the rent was raised to Rs. 5 per month in 1958 and then to Rs. 6 in 1959, and that the rent was deducted from the price of milk which was supplied by the defendant to the plaintiff. There is evidence that the defendant has built a small cattle yard on the land, and that she is a milk vendor. That the defendant has been supplying milk to the plaintiff, is admitted by P.W. 1, nephew of the plaintiff. The documentary evidence consists of notices that passed between the parties, the payment of licence fee by the defendant in 1956 -57 to the Corporation of Madras and vouchers for return of money orders sent as ground rent by the defendant to the plaintiff in the beginning of 1961. The Second Assistant Judge, from the attendant circumstances referred to by him, inferred that the defendant was not a tenant but licensee of the plaintiff, and that she was not entitled to the benefits under the City Tenants Protection Act. The Second Assistant Judge, having regard to the evidence and a conviction of the defendant in 1947 for keeping cattle in Dhanikachalam Chetti Road, rejected the defendant's case that she entered on the suit land in 1945 or 1946. He would find that the defendant did not occupy the suit land prior to 1951, and he accepted the case put forward by the plaintiff, that the defendant must have occupied a hut on the land in 1951.

(3.) ALTERNATIVELY the Second Assistant Judge held that, as the rent had been raised in 1958 and 1959, subsequent to 1955 a fresh tenancy had been created after the amendment of the City Tenants Protection Act in 1955. As the amended Act applied only to tenancies subsisting on the date of the amendment even assuming that the defendant was a tenant under the Act when the amended Act came into force, it was held that she was not entitled to any relief under the Act, as there was termination of the original tenancy and creation of a fresh tenancy when the rent was varied. On appeal, the learned Additional Judge, City Civil Court, would hold that the defendant was a lessee of the "plaintiff, and that what was leased by plaintiff was a vacant site in 1951. He would hold that the superstructure standing on the land belonged to the defendant. However, he agreed with the learned Second Assistant Judge that, as there was an increase in the rate of rent, a new tenancy came into being, and the defendant lost the benefits of the City Tenants Protection Act.