Raju, J. - (1.) THE above writ appeal has been filed by the College management against the order of a learned single Judge of this Court dated 7. 10. 1991 in W. P. No. 9635 of 1983, whereunder the learned single Judge was pleaded to allow the writ petition filed by the first respondent herein seeking for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for and quash the proceedings of the second respondent herein Private Colleges Appellate Tribunal dated 29. 7. 1983 in T. A. C. No. 6 of 1982, wherein the Tribunal has chosen to allow the appeal filed by the appellant- Management by setting aside the order of the State government, holding that the orders of the appellant Management dated 23. 3. 1981 relieving the first respondent from the post of Head Clerk of the College, is bad in law and directed reinstatement in service with immediate effect.
(2.) THE first respondent herein has joinedthe services of the appellant- College ever since its inception and due to certain unpleasant happening of events, the first respondent appears to have submitted a letter of resignation on 31. 8. 1979 to the Secretary of the College. It is seen that the Secretary of the College has made an endorsement on the said letter that till alternate arrangements are made and the first respondent is relieved, he must continue in service and mat the first respondent also consented for the same, though the stand taken for the first respondent at the relevant point of time was that due to persuasion he withdraw on the very same day the letter of resignation and that he-has continued to serve in the institution. While matters stood thus, on 23. 3. 1981, the secretary of the College while adverting to the letter dated 31. 8. 1979 has informed the first respondent that alternate arrangements have been made and therefore, he is being believed with effect from the afternoon of 31. 3:1981 and he may hand over charge to the principal and clear his dues and collect the service certificate as also the relieving order. THE first respondent made representations to the Secretary protesting about the action taken explaining the factual position according to him and the circumstances under which he continued in service in addition to making representations to the Director of college Education. Since mere was no positive response to grant him the relief, the first respondent moved the Government invoking its powers under Sec. 20 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976, and the rules. made thereunder seeking for setting aside the order dated 23. 3. 1981. THE Government by its order dated 18. 6. 1982 accepted the plea of the first respondent that he withdraw the resignation letter and without considering this aspect, me management could not have passed the relieving orders and such orders could not be sustained in law. Consequently, the Govern. . ment directed reinstatement with immediate effect. THE aggrieved appellant-Management approached the private Colleges Tribunal at Madras, by filing T. A. C. No. 6 of 1982. THE tribunal by its order dated 29. 7. 1983 was of the view that since the termination was brought about by violation of the first respondent- employee, if cannot be said to be a termination by the appellant- management by way of punishment and therefore, set aside the order of the Government. Aggrieved, the first respondent filed W. P. No. 9635 of 1983. THE learned single Judge by his order under challenge held that the resignation was not the one submitted under or dealt with in accordance with clause 9 of the statutory contract of service prescribed in Form No. 7-C under Rule 11 (2x0 of the Rules and since the letter was addressed only to the Secretary of the College and not to the College committee and that the College Committee has not taken any decision on the letter of resignation given by the first respondent, which alone is the competent authority to deal with and decide such matters, the order of the tribunal treating the case as one of normal resignation is contrary to law and therefore, allowed the writ petition and thereby restored the order of the government. In coming to such a conclusion, the learned single Judge applied the principles laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in R. Jesudasan v. K. Selvaraj and others, (1989)1 L. L. J. 470. Hence, the above appeal. Mr. N. R. Chandran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously contended that the learned single Judge committed an error in applying the terms of the agreement contained in Form 7-C to the instant case and being a case, wherein even according to the first respondent-employee, the submission of the letter terminating his services was on his violation, the first respondent after the expiry of the time stipulated in clause 9 automatically ceased to be member of the services of the appellant-College and therefore, merely because he was allowed to continue in service till alternate arrangements could have been made by the Institution, it is no ground to come to the conclusion that there was any violation of any of the rules or conditions of service, warranting interference with the orders of the authority below by the Government or this Court Argued the learned Senior counsel further that as long as the appellant- College has acted only on the letter submitted by the the first respondent on his own violation, mere is no question of termination of service involved to justify either filing of an appeal or granting the first respondent any relief, particularly in the absence of any positive proof of the alleged withdrawal of the said letter of resignation. Per contra, Mr. K. Chandra, learned counsel for the first respondent- employee, while adopting the reasons assigned by the learned single Judge, contended that the case on hand is not one, which could be said to fall within the scope of or claim to be in conformity with clause 9 of the contract of service prescribed in Rule 7-C of the Rules and that being the position, the services of the first, respondent could not be put an end to in any, manner otherwise than in / accordance with the said clause and if such an end to the services of the first respondent is brought about in any other manner than as visualised under Clause 9 it would be a clear case of termination by way of punishment, as held by the Government and also by the learned single Judge and such decision is inevitably valid in view of the division Bench judgment of this Court in RJesudasdn's case, (1989)1 L. L. J. 470. Argued the learned counsel further that in view of the subsequent attempts made and on persuasion made by some of the staff members of the College, the letter of resignation has been withdrawn on that day itself and that is how the first respondent was allowed to serve for such an indefinite period and all on a sudden, the impugned relieving order came as a belt from the blue on 23. 3. 1981 and that the said action of the appellant-management cannot be justified in law. Both the learned counsel invited our attention to several judgments in respect of their respective stand. We are of the view that it is unnecessary to advert to all of them, except those, which are directly in point and relevant to the issue before us. In the decision in State of UP. v. Ved Prakash Sharma, (1995)2 S. C. C. (Supp.) 582, the Apex Court was dealing with a case of termination of the contract of service of a temporary employee, who was served with notice of resignation to take effect on the expiry of thirty days, when the relationship of master and servant would come to an end, but allowed and continued in service for nearly five months beyond the said date. The Apex Court was of the view that when under the terms of the contract, the employee was entitled as a matter of right to terminate the contract by one month's notice the management did not come into the picture as the right was absolute and on the expiry of thirty days the relationship came to an and his continuance till four months on the expiry of the said period made no difference and consequently, there was no question of such employee being taken back after nearly four years in that case when the employee concerned sought to withdraw his letter of resignation. In our view, the principle underlying the said decision though would help to arrive at a conclusion on the nature of the power or privilege recognised under clause 9 of Form 7-C, the course of action taken by the supreme Court in that case cannot be adopted as appropriate for the case on hand for the reason that in this case the gravamen of the grievance is not only that the resignation letter was withdrawn on that evening itself when it was submitted, but the said letter neither did conform to clause 9 of the statutory contract, nor was properly acted upon or accepted by the competent authority and therefore, the relieving order passed by the Secretary would constitute termination of service of the first respondent by means of punishment without following the procedure prescribed under the statutory rules made under the act. It is on this peculiar aspect of the case, the learned single Judge adverted to the factual details and applied the law declared by a Division bench of this Court in the decision in R. Jesudasan s case, (1989)1 L. L. J. 470. As a matter of fact, the learned judges of the Division Bench have referred to an earlier decision of a single Judge in Stella Jayaraj v. The Private Colleges appellate Tribunal, (1987)2 M. L. J. 194, by one who authored the judgment of the division Bench and quoted with approval the view taken in the earlier case that unless the resignation, in the eye of law, conformed to the requirements of the rules made under the Act and was in the requisite form, particularly clause 9, of the statutory contract it cannot be said that the termination was on the violation of the employee. Adverting to paragraph 4 of the said judgment in stella Jayaraj's case, (1987)2 M. L. J. 194, the learned judges of the Division Bench held as follows: 'When the statute says that a particular act has to conform to a particular prescription, method other than the one prescribed if adopted will have no sanction in law, any other view to be taken will be only tending to render the statutory prescriptions nugatory and meaningless. This is sufficient for the headmaster to have the letters of resignation ignored. The fact that he was the author of the letters of resignation and he did resign voluntarily will not alter the legal position. At the relevant point of time, condition 9 alone, on the aspect of resignation, remained in the statute book. Though it apparently looks as if it is intended to benefit only the private school when it speaks about the teacher giving notice for prescribed periods or making payments in lieu of such no- tice, it not apprently and inherently so. This condition has got to be viewed as the only meager safeguard for the teacher against the capricious and arbitrary conduct on the part of the private school, in cutting off the services of the teacher and throwing him out of employment overnight, unceremoniously, by obtaining letters of resignation adopting unorthodox and unconscionable means. If the teacher could go out of service of his own volition only as per condition 9, that must be viewed atleast as a slender safeguard against resignation taking place by force or coercion or undue influence. It is not normally expected of a teacher to shell out money out of his pocket, if he has no definite intention of his own to go out employment forthwith for better prospects or on account of other conveniences of his own. Condition 9 alone was envisaged and adumbrated in the statute book earlier. We have to view it as beneficial both to the teacher and the private school. Otherwise, we will be doing violence to the very intendment behind the provision.' It is on account of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case that the learned single Judge applied the ration of the Division bench Judgment and we have no hesitation in holding that the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Ved Prakash Sarma's case, (1995)2 s. C. C. (Supp.) 582 will have no application to the case on hand and that the learned single Judge was right in interfering with the order of the tribunal by applying the principles laid down in RJesudasan s case, (1989)1 L. L. J. 470. In me view we have taken of the nature of me letter, said to be a letter of resignation dated 31. 8. 1979 and the manner in which it has been dealt with and the legal implications flowing therefrom and the illegalities and infirmities involved in the action taken by the Secretary, viewed in the context of the law declared by the Division Bench in the decision in RJesudasan s case, (1989) 1 l. LJ. 470, it is unnecessary for us to enter into consideration of the other aspects of the matter. We are also unable to agree with the learned Senior counsel Mr. N. R. Chandran that there is conflict between the decision of the division Bench in RJesudasan's case, (1987)1 l. L. J. 470 on the one hand and the decision in Grama Committee High School v. I. Arunachalam, 100 L. W. 543 on the other. These cases turned on the respective provisions of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act and the rules framed thereunder and the statutory form of contract prescribed in Form 7-A carrying a similar clause like clause 9 in Form 7-C relating to the Tamil Nadu private Colleges (Regulation) Act. So far as the School Act and the rules are concerned, Rule 17a has come to be introduced to deal with a peculiar situation arising out of the claims of minority institutions and it is in the teeth of existence of Rule 17-A on the one hand and the statutory contract with a clause like clause 9 on the other, the learned Judges of the Division Bench, who decided the case in Grama Committee High School's case, 100 L. W. 543 seem to think that there have been two avenues different in form and procedure available to an employee under the Schools Act to get his services terminated. So far as the College Act and the conditions prescribed therein are concerned, there is no such parallel rule similar to Rule 17-A of the School Act and therefore, the principles laid down in R. Jesudasan's case, (1989)2 L. L. J. 470 Would squarely apply to the case on hand and consequently, we see no conflict or even any possibility of conflict arising among the ratio laid down by the two Division Bench judgments referred to above. Consequently, we are of the view that the learned single Judge was right in applying the principles laid down in RJesudasan's case, (1989)2 L. L. J. 470 to this case and in arriving at the conclusion that the resignation letter given in this case did not conform to the statutory requirements and particularly Clause 9 of Form No. 7-C and therefore, relief of the 1st Respondent could not be said to be a termination brought about on the volition of the employee. Therefore, we see no error in the order of the learned single Judge, warranting out interference. The writ appeal therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. . ;