THE KOLLEGAL SILK FILATURES LIMITED Vs. THE PROVINCE OF MADRAS BY THE DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal arises put of an award of compensation made by art arbitrator appointed under Section 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, which provides for the payment of compensation in accordance with certain principles for compulsory acquisition of Immovable property, etc. The appeal was filed admittedly beyond the time prescribed by Article 156 of the Limitation Act for an appeal to this Court. The appellant, while maintaining that the said article is not applicable to the case, also applied under Section 5 of that Act for admission of the appeal even if it was considered as presented after time, but that application was rejected on the ground that no sufficient cause was shown for not presenting it within the prescribed period. The appeal is now posted before us for determining whether, as contended by the appellant, no time limit has been provided for an appeal of this kind and it must accordingly be deemed to have been duly filed.

(2.) THE contention is based on two grounds : first, that clause {g) of Section 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, has the effect of excluding the application of the law of limitation to arbitration proceedings under that section, and, secondly, this is neither an appeal "under the Code of Civil Procedure " nor "an appeal from a decree or order" and consequently does not fall under Article 156. We are of opinion that the contention must be accepted on the first ground, and that it is unnecessary to consider the second which the Government Pleader for the respondent seeks to repel on the strength of Ramaswami Pillai v. : (1919)37MLJ110 .

(3.) IT is manifest that the words of exclusion in Clause (g) are very wide and must cover the Limitation Act as to which no saving provision is to be found in the section and none has been brought to our notice in any of the rules. It is, however,, urged by the Government Pleader that the exclusion operates only in respect of proceedings before the arbitrator and that an appeal to the High Court cannot be regarded as an " arbitration " within the meaning of the clause.,. Reliance is placed on Clause (b) of Sub -section (3) where " Proceedings before the arbitrator " are referred to as being something distinct from proceedings " on appeal". We are unable to accept the argument. In our opinion "arbitration" in Clause (g) covers the entire proceedings from their commencement before the arbitrator to their termination in the High Court on appeal where an appeal has been preferred. Although the appeal is given to the "High Court" under Clause (f), the appeal is against the "award" of the arbitrator, and it seems to us that the High Court in hearing and deciding the appeal acts essentially as an arbitration tribunal, no less bound than the arbitrator under Clause (e) to have regard to the considerations referred to therein. We find nothing in Clause (b) of Sub -section (3) militating against this view. As that clause contemplates provisions being made by rules for the apportionment of costs incurred before the arbitrator and on appeal reference had to be made to the proceedings in the two separate stages but such reference cannot in our view import any distinction in the nature of the proceedings. in their different stages.