LAWS(MAD)-1995-1-12

N DORAISAMY Vs. ARCHANA ENTERPRISES AND

Decided On January 13, 1995
N.DORAISAMY Appellant
V/S
ARCHANA ENTERPRISES AND ETC. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In all these actions, I rather feel, there is no need or necessity to advert to the facts of each case, in as much as, what is challenged is the alleged commission of offence by certain Companies, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Act No. XXVI of 1881 as subsequently amended for short 'NI Act') for dishonour of cheques on account of either of the two contingencies or eventualities, as contemplated therein, viz., insufficiency of the amount of money standing to the credit of the account of the person, or it exceeded the amount arranged to be paid from the account of a person by an agreement with that Bank for which, prosecution had been launched by preferring individual complaints before competent Courts of jurisdiction purely on questions of law relatable to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the NI Act, by raising the following grounds :-.

(2.) Points Nos. 1 and 2 so raised may now fall for consideration in the arena of discussion. Section 141 of the NI Act dealing with offences by Companies, reads as follows :-

(3.) By a cursory glance or look at the provisions of Section 141, as extracted above, it is rather crystal clear that if an offence under Section 138, committed by a Company and for such commission of the offence, by the Company, every person, who at the time of the commission of the offence, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the Company, it is also liable along with the Company by a legal fiction. This apart, if the offence had been committed with the consent or connivance of, or, is attributable to, any neglect on the part of any director, manager secretary or other officer of the Company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and he shall be liable to be proceeded against along with the Company. Thus, on the fact of the express and explicit provision contained in Section 141, to say, that the Company, which commits the offence alone is liable to be prosecuted and punished leaving out the person in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, or the person, with whose consent or connivance or due to any neglect on his part, the offence had been committed, cannot be acceded to. Contrary opinions, however, came to prevail.