S. M. Ali Mohamed, J. - (1.) IN this batch of petitions, a common question of law arises, viz. , whether the petition under Sec. 482, Crl. P. C. is maintainable, in view of the specific provision under Sec. 70 (2) of the Code of Criminal procedure. The petitioners in the respective criminal original petitions were enlarged on bail, but failed to appear before the concerned Magistrates/trial courts and the concerned Magistrates/trial courts have issued non-bailable warrants to compel the presence of the petitioners before the court for trial or enquiry. The petitioners have filed these criminal original petitions, under sec. 482, Crl. P. C. for recall or cancellation of the non-bailable warrant issued by the Magistrates/trial courts giving stereo-typed reasons for non-appearance before the courts, viz. , they were sick or down with jaundice or they were held in elsewhere due to alleged reasons beyond their control.
(2.) THE point for consideration is whether this Court has power under Sec. 482, Crl. P. C. to recall or cancel non-bailable warrant and direct the petitioners to present before the Magistrate/trial courts on a particular date in the teeth of specific provision containing in Sec. 70 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Karpagavinayagam, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner in Crl. O. P. No. 8531 of 1994, vehemently contended that inherent powers of the High Court given under Sec. 482, Crl. P. C. is wide and notwithstanding the specific provisions given under Sec. 70 (2) of the Criminal procedure Code, this Court has power to recall or cancel the non-bailable warrant issued by the courts below and direct the accused persons to present themselves before the Magistrates trial courts. In this connection, the learned counsel submitted that power under Sec. 482, Crl. P. C. has been exercised by the high Courts even when there are specific provisions in the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973. He further submitted that even if there is no provisions at all in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, various High Courts have exercised the power under Sec. 482, Crl. P. C. to render justice. He further submitted after referring to various rulings of the Supreme Court that power under Sec. 482, Crl. P. C. is wide and the Supreme Court in various decisions has only imposed certain conditions for the guidance of the High Court for the exercise of the power and the same are only illustrative and not exhaustive. He further submitted that the said restrictions are self-imposed by the court. In support of the above contentions, learned counsel cited the following rulings. (a) In Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration), A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 258, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "the first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court under Sec. 482 stands repelled when the revisional power under Sec. 397 overlaps. The opening words of Sec. 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Sec. 397 can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of sec. 482. . . . . . . . . . In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the court or other extraordinary situation excites the court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in the face. . . . . . . . . . The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. " (b) In V. C. Shukla v. State Through C. B. I. , A. I. R. 1980 s. C. 962 at 967, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "apart from the re visional power, the High Court under the Code of 1898 possessed an inherent power to pass orders ex debito justitiae in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court. This was a special Power which was to be exercised by the High Court to meet a particular contingency not expressly provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even in the present Code, the inherent power of the court has been fully retained under Sec. 482 which runs thus- "482. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. " (c) In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan rohtaqi, 1983 M. L. J. (Crl.) 440: A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 67: 1983 Crl. L. J. 159: (1983)1 S. C. C. 1: 1983 S. C. C. (Crl.) 115: (1983)1 S. C. R. 884. The Supreme Court observed as follows: "thus the scope, ambit and range of Sec. 561-A (Which is now Sec. 482) is quite different from the power conferred by the present Code under the provisions of Sec. 397. It may be that in some cases there may be overlapping, but such cases would be few and far between. It is well settled that the inherent powers under Sec. 482 of the present Code can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is provided by the Statute. Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to be exercised sparingly. " (d) In Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, 1993 Crl. L. J. (S. C.)600, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "sec. 482 which corresponds to Sec. 561-A of the old code and to Sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code proceeds on the same principle and deals with the inherent powers of the High Court. . . . . . . . . . Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts exist. The powers possessed by the high Court under Sec. 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. . . . . . . . . . This inherent power conferred by Sec. 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are of great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. In the exercise of this wholesome power the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interests of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations, is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the state and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contour of that salient jurisdiction. " (e) In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, A. I. R. 1978 s. C. 47, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "similar is the position apropos the inherent powers of the High Court. We may read the language of Sec. 482 (corresponding to Sec. 561-A of the Old Code) of the 1973 Code. It says: "nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. " At the outset, the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions: (1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. . . . . . . . . . On a plain reading of Sec. 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code which would include Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 397 also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 397 operate only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. . . . . . . . . . The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and/or to secure the ends of justice. " (f) In Lalit Mohan Mondal v. Benoyendra Nath Chatterjee, a. I. R. 1982 S. C. 785, the Supreme Court observed as follows:" "we have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the judgment of the High Court. We agree with the High Court that against an order passed in appeal under Sec. 341 of the Criminal Procedure code, the order would not be revisable by the High Court under Sec. 397 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, but there can be no doubt that the Court is entitled to examine the matter under Sec. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code which expressly overrules the bar contained in Sec. 341 of the Code. " (g) In Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Assistant Collector of customs, Bombay, 1967 Crl. L. J. 1576, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "the court makes no express provision for the cancellation of a bail granted under Sec. 496. Nevertheless, if at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, it is found that any person accused of a bailable offence is intimidating, bribing or tampering with the prosecution witnesses or is attempting to abscond, the High Court has the power to cause him to be arrested and to commit him to custody for such period as it thinks fit. This jurisdiction springs from the overriding inherent powers of the High court and can be invoked in exceptional cases only when the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice will be defeated unless the accused is committed to custody. For the reasons given in Talab Haji Hussain's case, 1958 S. C. R. 1226: A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 376, we hold that this inherent power of the High Court exists and is preserved by Sec. 56-A of the Code. The person committed to custody under the orders of the High Court cannot ask for his release on bail under Sec. 496, but the High Court may by a subsequent order admit him to bail again. " (h) In Pampapathy v. State of Mysore, 1967 Crl. L. J. 287, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "the inherent power of the High Court mentioned in sec. 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised only for either of the three purposes specifically mentioned in the section. The inherent power cannot be invoked in respect of any matter covered by the Specific provisions of the code. It cannot also be invoked if its exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code. It is only if the specific provisions of the Code that Sec. 561-A can come into operation. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that can possibly arise and it is an established principle that the courts should have inherent powers, apart from the express provision of law, which are necessary to their existence and for the proper discharge of the duties imposed upon them by law. This doctrine finds expression in Sec. 561-A which does not confer any new powers on the High court, but merely recognizes and preserves the inherent powers previously possessed by it. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in a proper case, the high Court has inherent power under Sec. 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code to cancel the order of suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the appellant made under Sec. 426, Criminal Procedure Code and to order that the appellant be re-arrested and committed to jail custody. " The learned counsel has also referred to the following rulings of various High Courts, in the matter. Bhavanesh Kumar alias Pappu v. Union of India, (1992)3 Crimes 777 (Del.), Rajeev Bhatia v. Abdulla Mohammed gani, 1992 Crl. L. J. 2092 (Bom.), Venkatakrishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1989 l. W. (Crl.) 44 (Mad.), V. N. S. Viswanathan In re. , 1977 Crl. L. J. 173 (Mad.), court on its own motion v. Vishnu Pandit, 1993 Crl. L. J. 2025 (Del), Ravisingh v. State of Bihar, 1980 Crl. L. J. 330, Assistant Collector of Customs v. Madam ayabo, (1992)2 C. C. R. 2164 (Bom.), Prem Chand v. State, 1985 Crl. L. J. 1534 (Del.), State v. Sadanandan, 1982 Crl. L. J. 1117 (Ker.), H. K. Rawal v. Nidhi prakash, 1990 Crl. L. J. 961 (All.), Sgyam M. Sachdev v. The State, 1991 Crl. L. J. 300, Charan Singh v. S. D. M. , Jallandhar, 1992 Crl. L. J. 671, Gulaba Ram V. Smt. Hiri, (1991)2 Crimes 521 (H. P.), Thaniel Victor v. State, 1991 Crl. L. J. 2416 (Mad.), Bhanu M. Vakil v. Oshiram Keswani, 1991 Crl. L. J. 2819 (Bom.), krishna Sadan Ghosh v. Govind Prasad Saraf, 1985 Crl. L. J. 1121 (Pat.), Inspector of Police, C. B. C. I. D. v. Sathyanarayanan, 1988 L. W. (Crl.) 393 (Mad.), Subbiah alias Raju Gounder In re. , 1981 L. W. (Crl.) 356 (Mad.), Puran Singh v. Ajit singh, 1985 Crl. L. J. 897 (P. & H.), Ramseuak v. State of M. P. , 1979 crl. L. J. 1485 (M. P.), Ali Ahammed v. State of Kerala, 1985 M. L. J. (Crl.) 522 (Ker.) and Mrs. K. Jayanthi v. V. Ramaswamy, Crl. O. P. No. 8158 of 1993 (Mad. ). On the other hand, Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned Public prosecutor submitted that the matter in issue is already covered by a ruling of a learned single Judge of this court reported in P. A. Saleem and others v. State represented by Inspector of Police, R-4, Pondy Bazar Police Station, madras, 1994 Crl. L. J. 402: (1994) 2 L. W. (Crl.) 402, wherein in Janarthanam, j. , has elaborately considering the different aspects of the matter, and the same requires no reconsideration. The learned Public Prosecutor further pointed out that except Sec. 70 (2), Crl. P. C. there is no other particular provision in the Criminal Procedure Code for the cancellation of the non-bailable warrant and it has been the recent practice of this Court to exercise power under Sec. 482, Crl. P. C. to recall or cancel the non-bailable warrant and direct the accused to appear before the Magistrate/trial court on a particular date and the same has been misused by the accused. The learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that invariably the accused persons failed to appear before the court on the date of the trial and then file applications under Sec. 482, Crl. P. C. and when non-bailable warrants were issued by the Magistrate/trial court, immediately the petitions under Sec. 482, Crl. P. C. were filed and stay of the proceedings were obtained with the result, the trials before the courts have been unduly delayed. It has been held by the Supreme Court in several rulings that speedy trial is guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution. He further submitted that the Magistrates/trial courts when they see that the accused person is not present for trial on the date fixed, issue non-bailable warrant to make it sure that the accused person is present at the time of the trial and in particular he referred to Sec. 273 of the Criminal Procedure Code which states that the evidence is to be taken in the presence of the accused person. Therefore, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that there is no illegality committed by the trial courts/magistrates who have issued non-bailable warrants for the presence of the accused persons at the time of the trial. In this connection learned Public Prosecutor referred to the rulings of a Division bench of this Court in Ruperat J. Barnabas v. Hosephine Bharani Patimson, 1990 l. W. (Crl.) 27, to highlight the abuse of process of court in this regard. Learned Public Prosecutor also pointed out several cases, where the accused persons deliberately avoided to appear before the court and thereby prevented the trial of the case and straightaway approach the High Court for recall/or cancellation of non-bailable warrant under Sec. 482, Crl. P. C. without even filing an application under Sec. 70 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code for cancellation of the bail before the court, which issued it. Learned Public prosecutor also referred to the rulings of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 47, wherein the Supreme Court has categorically pointed out certain principles to be followed in the exercise of the inherent powers by the High Court in the following terms: "at the outset, the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions: (1) That the power is not to be resorted to, if there is a specific provision in the Code, for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party: (2) That it would be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice: (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code". Learned Public Prosecutor emphasized on the first principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court, viz. , the power is not be resorted to, if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. Learned Public Prosecutor has also pointed out that as per sec. 70 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, there is a specific provision under the Code for the redressal of the grievance of the petitioner by filing a separate petition for cancellation of the non-bailable warrant before the Court which issued the same. In view of the same, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the petitions filed by the various petitioners before this Court under sec. 482, Crl. P. C. are not maintainable and that they are liable to be dismissed, in limine. In support of the said contention, learned Public prosecutor has also cited the following decisions: (a) In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 866, the Supreme Court held as follows: "the inherent powers of High Court, under Sec. 561-A, criminal Procedure Code, cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. The inherent jurisdiction of the high Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. " (b) In Ratilal Bhanji v. Assistant Customs Collector, bombay, A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 286, the Supreme Court held as follows: "the Code of Criminal Procedure makes express provision for the cancellation of a bail granted under Sec. 496. Nevertheless, it at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, it is found that any person accused of a bailable offence is intimidating bribing or tampering with the prosecution witnesses or is attempting to abscond, the High Court has inherent power to cause him to be arrested and to commit him to custody for such period as it things fit. This overriding inherent power can be invoked in exceptional cases only when the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice will be defeated unless the accused is committed to custody. " I have considered the respective contentions of learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Public Prosecutor. The point that arises for consideration in this batch of petitions is the'power' of the High Court, under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to recall or cancel a non-bailable warrant issued by the concerned magistrate/trial court when there is a specific provision under Sec. 70 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which says that'every such warrant shall remain in force until it is cancelled by the court which issued it, or until it is executed. The ruling of this Court in P. A. Saleem v. State, 1994 Crl. L. J. 402 (1994) 2 L. W. (Crl.) 402, supports the contentions of the learned Public Prosecutor. In the above ruling Janarthanam, J. has stressed the need for speedy trial guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution and the presence of specific provision by way of Sec. 70 (2), Criminal Procedure Code. In this connection the learned Judge has observed as follows: "simpliciter, recall of a warrant, in exercise of power under Sec. 482 of the Code, in anyone of these actions, is not legally permissible and this will be patent, on a cursory perusal thereof. The said section prescribes that nothing in this Code, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is thus patently clear that the inherent power is capable of being exercising either to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 're-call'of a warrant can, by no stretch of imagination, be stated to come under the former clause to give effect to any order under this Code, which would mean that this Court has power to see whether the warrant that has been issued by a Magistrate under Sec. 70 had been executed by the issuance of a proper direction to the police officer, or any other person, to whom the same had been issued, if such an officer is keeping the warrant, without executing it, thereby hampering the progress of speedy trial. In view of Specific provisions engrafted under Sub-clause (2) of Sec. 70 of the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved accused and further remedy by way of revision either under Sec. 397 or 401 of the Code, simpliciter re-call warrant cannot be stated to attract the latter clause also namely, to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.' However, the scope, ambit and range of the powers of the high Court under Sec. 482 of Criminal Procedure Code have been considered by various rulings of the Supreme Court. In Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Assistant collector, Bombay, A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1639, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme court has considered the inherent powers of the High Court under Sec. 561-A of old Criminal Procedure Code corresponding to Sec. 482 of the new Criminal procedure Code. The Supreme Court has observed as follows: 'now the question is whether the inherent power of the High Court is conferred by or has the sanction of enacted law. From its very inception, the High Court has possessed and enjoyed its inherent powers including the power to prevent the abuse of the process of any court within its jurisdiction and to secure the ends of justice. These powers inhere in the High court and spring from its very nature and constitution as a court of superior jurisdiction. All the existing powers of the High Courts were preserved and continued by legislation from time to time. Sec. 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code declared that'nothing in this Code declared to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order passed under this Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The section was inserted in the Code by Act XVIIII of 1928 to obviate any doubt that these inherent powers have been taken away by the Code. In terms, the section did not confer any power, it only declared that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the existing inherent powers in the High Court, see King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazia Ahmed, A. I. R. 1945 p. C. 18 at 22: 71 I. A. 203 at 218. Then came another enactments which were framed differently. Sec. 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 provided: subject to the provisions of this part of this Act, to the provisions of any order in Council made under this or any other Act and to the provisions of any act of the appropriate Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Act, the jurisdiction of and the law administered in any existing High Court and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the court, including any power to make rules of court and to regulate the sitting of the court and the members thereof sitting alone or in division courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act. The section enacted that the jurisdiction of the existing high Courts and the powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice'shall be'the same as immediately before the commencement of Part III of the Act. The statute confirmed and revested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers. Then came the Constitution. Art. 225 of Constitution provides: 225. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the court, including any power to make rules of court and to regulate the sitting of the court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution. The provision to the Article is not material and need not be read. The Article enacts that the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts and the powers of the judges thereof in relation to administration of justice shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. The Constitution confirmed and revested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers, and its powers to make rules. When the Constitution or any enacted law has embraced and confirmed the inherent powers and jurisdiction of the High Court, which previously existed that power and jurisdiction has the sanction of an enacted'law'within the meaning of Art. 21 as explained in A. K. Gopalan's case, A. I. R. 1950 S. C. 27: 1950 S. C. R. 80. The inherent powers of the High Court preserved by Sec. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are thus vested in it by'law' within the meaning of Art. 21. The procedure for invoking the inherent powers is regulated by rules framed by the High Court. The power to make such rules is conferred on the High Court by the Constitution. The rules previously in force were continued in force by Art. 372 of the Constitution. The order of the High court cancelling the bail and depriving the appellant of his personal liberty is according to procedure established by law and is not violative of Art. 21.'
(3.) THE Supreme Court in Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan, a. I. R. 1983 S. C. 67, has held that the power given under Sec. 561-A (old criminal Procedure Code) and Sec. 482 (New Criminal Procedure Code) are one and the same. THE Supreme Court observed as follows: 'it may be noticed that Sec. 482 of the present code is the ad verbatim copy of Sec. 561-A of the old Code. This provision confers a separate and independent power on the High Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where the process of the Court has been seriously abused.' In view of the above rulings of the Supreme Court, the inherent powers of the High Court under Sec. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code are wide. However, the various rulings of the Supreme Court have imposed certain self-imposed restrictions of exercise of such inherent powers. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 866), Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was), has considered the power of this court, under Sec. 561 -A of the old Criminal Procedure Code in the following terms: 'it is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings, at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible or desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceedings in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, the High court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may for instance furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegation in the F. I. R. or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged to such cases, no question of appreciating evidence arises: it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the f. I. R. to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not, in such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and case where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Sec. 561-A, the High Court would not embark upon inquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec. 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (vide: In Re. , Shripad G. Chandavarkar, A. I. R. 1928 Bom. 184, jagat Chandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress, I. L. R. 26 Cal. 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. State of Punjab, 56 Punj. L. R. 54: A. I. R. 1954 Punj. 193, Nripendra Bhusan roy v. Gobinda Bandh Majumadar, A. I. R. 1924 Cal. 1018 and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. Sivarama Subramania, I. L. R. 47 Mad. 722: A. I. R. 1925 Mad. 39.' ;