THE MANAGEMENT OF EIFCO OIL ENGINE INDUSTRIES, COIMBATORE Vs. THE PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, COIMBATORE AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this writ petition, the petitioner challenges the award of the first respondent in I. D. No. 10 of 1978. The reference to the first respondent relates to the non-employment of 39 workmen. The questions posed are as to whether the non-employment is justifiable and if not, to what relief each would be entitled to compute the relief, if any, awarded in terms of money, if it could be so computed. The petitioner specifically put forth a case that it had closed down with effect from 7-11-1977 and hence, the reference itself was bad in law. The moot question that came up for consideration before the first respondent was as to whether, in fact, there was a closure as put forth by the petitioner. This question became relevant because, the petitioner specifically pleaded that because of the closure of the unit, the question of providing employment to the concerned workmen could not be countenanced. Hence, the question of closure has been gone into by the first respondent as a matter relevant and related to the question of non-employment of the concerned workmen. On 30 10-1974, there was a settlement between the petitioner and its workmen under Sec. 12 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act. This, settlement has been marked as Ex. W-l. lt related to the 39 workmen in question. The case of the petitioner is that the unit as such was leased out to a third party, one Srinivasan for a period of two years from 16-12-1974 and however, before the lapse of the said period, the said Srinivasan surrendered back the unit to the petitioner with effect from l-4-l976 and thereafter it assumed charge of the unit. The further case of the petitioner is that unable to run the unit, it again closed it with effect from 5-8-1976. It is admitted by the petitioner that there was a re-opening once again in 4-11-1976. On 18-2-1977 a settlement was reached between the petitioner and its workmen under Sec. 12 (3) of the Act, marked in this case as Ex. M. 14. Ultimately, the petitioner would contend that it finally closed down the unit with effect from 7-11-1977. This case of the Management has been tested by the first respondent with reference to the factual materials placed before him.

(2.) Mr. S. Jayaraman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would contend that the principle is that the motive and bona fides with regard to closure should not be probed into by the Labour Court and even with regard to assessment of the facts on the question of factum of closure, the first respondent has merely acted on presumptions without actually assessing the actual materials. I am afraid, this submission of the learned counsel is not a correct one and, as contended by Mr. A. L. Somayaji, learned counsel for the second respondent, the first respondent has made an overall assessment of all the factual materials placed before him and he has come to the conclusion that there had been no factual closing down of the unit, as the petitioner would put forth. By this time the principle is well settled that it is not open to the concerned Tribunal to go into the question as to the motive of the Management in closing down its unit and to enquire as to whether the closure is a real and a genuine one, or a sham or a pretence of a closure. The entire gamut of circumstances and facts have got to be assessed when there is a judicial endeavour to find out whether;, in fact, there had been a closure and the forum concerned cannot be asked to confine itself to any particular fact or set of facts or circumstances. The essence of the matter is, the factum of closure as such must be established. Once that is established, the other principle of preclusion from enquiring into the motive or bona fides will come in the way. The first respondent finds that in the lease document, Ex. M. 3 dated 16-12-1974, there is no reference to the settlement, Ex. W-l dated 30-10-1974 at all. This is one of the reasons which have weighed with the first respondent to doubt the lease arrangement.

(3.) Mr. S. Jayaraman, learned counsel for the petitioner, places strong reliance on Ex. M. 21 dated 6-11-1977, an intimation by the petitioner to the Inspector of Factories, and Ex. Mi-22 dated 23-11-1977, a letter from the petitioner to the concerned Labour Officer, to state that they clinchingly bear out the closure as put forth by the petitioner. In Ex. M-22, reasons have been given for closing down the unit. It is stated that the unit raced severe crises, in that it did not get enough raw materials at reasonable prices; there had been lack of orders for the product, lack of I. S. 1, marks for 3 H. P. engines and there had been financial troubles and lack of co-operation from the workers. Apart from producing these documents, Ex. M-21 and M-22, no attempt was made by the petitioner to substantiate what has been averred as reasons for closure. Rightly, the first respondent points out that the petitioner has not placed any material whatever to show that due to financial loss and for want of orders and for non-co-operation from the workers, its unit had to be closed down. Summing up, the first respondent holds that it is constrained to find that the petitioner is plainly attempting to get rid of the agreement entered into with the workmen and the first respondent categorically finds that the Industry still continues. These are factual reasoning and the limitations of this Court, sitting in writ jurisdiction, are well-known. These limitations mean that the findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as the result of appreciation of evidence cannot be re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. This is a case where the findings of fact cannot be stated to have been based on no evidence. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference drawn from the said findings are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior Court or Tribunal and the said point cannot be agitated before a writ court. The first respondent has made an assessment of the materials placed before him and he has found them adequate to demonstrate that there had been in fact, no closure as put forth by the petitioner. This Court cannot convert itself into an appellate forum to once again assess the facts and come to the conclusion there was, in fact, a closure as put forth by the petitioner. I do not find that the first respondent has overstepped his limits with regard to testing the factum of closure as pleaded by the petitioner in answer to the claim for re-employment.