M RAMA RAO Vs. APPU AND ORS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The first point raised in this second appeal is that Ex. I is a lease for 70 years and not for 100 years. Mr. Sitarama Kao for the appellant relies upon the wording of the lease and contends that it must be taken to mean that the rent was payable at a certain rate for the first ten years, at a certain other rate for the next ten years and at a third rate for 70 years from the date of Ex. I. The Subordinate Judge has interpreted the deed to mean that for the first ten years the rent payable was at a certain, rate, for 20 years thereafter the rent was to be at a certain other rate and for 70 years thereafter the rent was to be at another rate. If the language is clear that the rent for the first ten years was to be at a certain rate for the next ten years at a certain other rate and for the 70 years thereafter at another rate, there would be no difficulty in interpreting this document. But in the document no word meaning for has been used. The Subordinace Judge has interpreted the document as meaning, for the first ten years so much, for the next 20 years, so much and for 70 years thereafter at a certain rate. Considering the view that the Subordinate Judge has taken of the language of the document, I am not prepared to say that he has gone wrong.

(2.) Mr. Sitarama Rao relies upon Ex. II, series and says that Ex. II series were not considered by the Judge and that, if they had been considered, they would have shown that the language used in the document supported his contention. In a matter like this where it cannot be said that the lower Court has gone wrong, it would not be right for this Court to interfere with the interpretation of the document placed upon it by the lower Appellate Court. I disallow this contention of the appellant.

(3.) A portion of the land covered by Ex. I was given on darkhast to the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff in 1870 under Ex. P. What this portion of the land in dispute is has not been stated by either party. The contention of the appellant is that inasmuch as the land was granted on darkhast by the Government, any right derived from the grantee before the grant came to an end on Government granting it on darkhast. In the case of lands in South Kanara it is usual for pattadars to occupy lands adjoining their patta lands for the purpose of convenient enjoyment of their own holdings under patta, or for purposes of cultivation, etc. The Government generally grants such land known as kumki land on darkhast to the pattadars. When the land is kumki granted on darkast, any right previously granted by the wargd or in favour of a tenant as regards the kumki land comes to an end, and even if there is a mortgage right on the land created by the ivargdor, it comes to an end, as soon as the grant is made by the Government to the wargdar or any other person. Kodi Sankara Bhatta v. Moidin 49 Ind. Cas. 147 : 35 M.L.J. 120 : 8 L.W. 100. In that case the plaintiff owned a warg land and there was a mortgage on the land kumki to it, and the land was subsequently granted by the Government on darkhast to the plaintiff it was held, that the mortgage right came to can end as soon as the land was granted on darkhast. This decision followed a number of previous decisions on the point vide Hattikudur Narain Rao v. Andar Sayad Abbas Sahib 27 Ind. Cas. 785 : 28 M.L.J. 44 and Swaminatha. Mudali v. Saravana Mudali 40 Ind. Cas. 58.