ANNA NAGAR, RAMVILAS NAGAR, MULLAI NAGAR, PEOPLE WELFARE ASSOCIATION Vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal arises out of a common order passed by a learned Judge in a writ petition filed by the appellant and another writ petition filed by the husband of the fourth respondent herein.

(2.) HEARD Mr. S.P. Maharajan, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. A.K. Baskarapandian, learned Special Government Pleader for the respondents 1 and 2, Mr. Aayiram K. Selvakumar, learned counsel for the third respondent and Mr. H. Arumugam, learned counsel for the fourth respondent.

(3.) AFTER notice was ordered, in the aforesaid writ petition in W.P(MD) No. 17514 of 2013, the husband of the fourth respondent filed a separate writ petition in W.P(MD) No. 5219 of 2014 seeking the issue of a Writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents 1 and 2 to consider his representations for the removal of the land of the extent of 50.22 cents in Survey No. 829/Part and 828/Part from the approved lay out of Perumalpuram Extension Scheme No. 7. In the writ petition in W.P(MD) No. 5219 of 2014, the husband of the fourth respondent did not make the appellant herein as a party. But fortunately both the writ petitions were clubbed together and heard by a learned Judge. By a final order dated 28.03.2014, the learned Judge disposed of both the writ petitions directing the second respondent to consider the representations given by both the parties and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law after giving an opportunity of hearing to both parties. In other words, the relief sought by both the rival claimants, had been granted by the learned Judge. However, the appellant has come up with the above appeal on a very short issue namely, that instead of giving a direction to the first respondent to pass orders, the learned Judge had wrongly given a direction to the second respondent to pass orders. According to the appellant, the second respondent has already considered the issue and issued proceedings dated 30.01.2012 and that what remains to be done is only a consideration of the representation of the appellant by the first respondent in the light of the order passed by the second respondent.