K.A. SWAMI, C.J. - (1.) THIS appeal is preferred against the order dated 12.7.1993 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 12672 of 1993. Learned Single Judge has rejected the said Writ Petition. Hence the petitioner therein has come up in appeal.
(2.) IN the Writ Petition, the petitioner has sought for quashing the order dated 28.6.1993 passed by the State Government, rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for staying the order dated 20.4.1993. passed by the Joint Commissioner of Civil Supplies, Ezhilagam, Chepauk, Madras 5. in K4/22617/93. Facts necessary for the purpose of determining the contentions urged before us are as follows:? The petitioner was granted wholesale dealer's licence under the Tamil Nadu Kerosene (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the ?Kerosene Order?, issued under the powers conferred by the Essential Commodities Act. By the order dated 20.4.1993. the Joint Commissioner of Civil Supplies, Madras, has cancelled the licence, setting aside the order passed by the District Revenue Officer, Periyar District, Erode, who had restored the licence, on imposing certain penalty to the petitioner. The Joint Commissioner exercised the revisional powers suo motu and cancelled the licence on the ground that the case deserved cancellation of the licence. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has preferred a revision petition before the State Government under S. 27(1) of the Kerosene Order. Pending disposal of the revision petition, the petitioner has sought for staying the operation of the order passed by the Joint Commissioner. The State Government did not initially consider that application. Therefore, the petitioner approached this Court in W.P. No. 10840 of 1993, by Order dated 16.6.1993, this Court directed the Stale Government to decide the application filed by the petitioner for staying the order of the Joint Commissioner within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the order and further stayed the order of the Joint Commissioner till the application was disposed of. Pursuant to that order, the State Government has passed the order on 28.6.1993, rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for staying the operation of the order passed by the Joint Commissioner. The said order reads thus:? ?I am directed to invite a reference to the stay petition cited, filed along with the revision petition dated 29.4.93. against the order of the Joint Commissioner of Civil Supplies cancelling the licence of your concern. The Government have carefully examined the slay petition under S. 27(2) of the Tamil Nadu Kerosene (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1973, with reference to details and they consider that the stay requested need not be granted.? It is the correctness of this order that was challenged in W.P. No. 12672 of 1993. Learned Single Judge has held that as the licence granted to the petitioner has been cancelled, it is not just and proper to interfere with the order passed by the Stale Government refusing to grant stay. Accordingly, learned single Judge has dismissed the Writ Petition at the stage of admission. Hence, this appeal. As the appeal lies in a narrow compass, we have directed learned Government Pleader to take notice. Accordingly, he has appeared for the Stale and we have also heard him. It is contended by learned Counsel for the appellant/petitioner that the impugned order of the State Government is not a speaking order, in as much as it does not contain any reason and as such there is no application of mind. The State Government under R. 27 of the Kerosene Order not only exercise the statutory power vested in it but also exercises a quasi judicial power; therefore it is required to consider the prayer made in the application its per the provisions contained in R. 27 of the Kerosene Order, which has not been done. The power conferred upon the Stale Government is a power coupled with a duty to act judicially which the State Government has not discharged properly. It in also contended that this Court in similar matters has been granting interim orders, pending disposal of the revision or appeal, and directing the Appellate/Revisional Authority to dispose of the revision/appeal on merits and therefore, there is no reason whatever to decline to pass a similar order in the case on hand. In support of the last contention, orders passed by this Court in various writ petitions (W.P. Nos. 10633/89 dated 8.8.1919, 7884/91, dated 30.6.1991, 18271/91, dated 26.12.1991, 15085/92, dated 1.10.1992, etc.,) have been produced. In addition to these, decisions of the Supreme Court in C.C. Revenue Authority v. M.S. Mills (AIR 1950 S.C. 218), The Comptroller & Auditor General v. K.S. Jagannathan (AIR 1987 S.C. 537) and Bir Rajrang Kumar v. State of Bihar (AIR 1987 S.C. 1345) are also relied upon. The relevant provisions contained in R. 27 of the Kerosene Order are as follows:? ?27. Appeal: ? (1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed or action taken under this order by the Officer specified in column below may within 30 days of the receipt by him of such order or of action taken, appeal to the Officers specified in column (ii) below within their respective jurisdiction. (i) (ii) (a) The Revenue Divisional Officers and District Supply Officers. District Revenue Officer, Additional Collector. (b) The P.A. (General to Collector in the District of Nilgiris, the Revenue Divisional Officers and the District Supply Officers in the District of Kanyakumari.) Collector. (c) District Revenue Officer, Additional Collector. Collector. (d) Assistant Commissioners of Civil Supplies in the case of Madras City and the belt area comprising Saidapet Taluk and Avadi Township in Chingleput District. Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies (City). (e) The Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies (City) and Collector. The Commissioner of Civil Supplies or Joint Commissioner of Civil Supplies. (f)The Joint Commissioner of Civil Supplies and Commissioner of Civil Supplies. Government (2) The Commissioner of Civil Supplies may by his own motion or on application call Tor and examine the record of any officer subordinate to him and the Government may, of their own motion or on application call for and examine the record of the Commissioner of Civil Supplies, in respect of any proceeding to satisfy himself or themselves as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision passed or order made therein; and if, in any case, it appears to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies. or The Government that any such decision or order should he modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for consideration he or they may pass orders accordingly. Provided that every application In the Commissioner of Civil Supplies or the Government for the exercise of the powers under this sub clause shall be referred within 30 days from the date on which the proceedings, decision or order to which the application relates was communicated to the applicant. (3) No order adversely affecting any person shall be made under this clause unless the concerned person has been given reasonable opportunity of staling his case in writing. (4) Pending disposal of an appeal under sub-Clause 2(1) above all proceedings for revision under sub-Clause (2) above appear to the authority specified in sub-Clause (1) above or the Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner of Civil Supplies the Government as the case may be, may by an order, direct that (i) the whole or any part of the order covered by the appeal or revision shall not take effect subject to such conditions as may be specified; or (ii) Issue such interim directions as he or they may so deem fit pending disposal of the appeal or the proceedings for revision or for any specified period. (5)Any person aggrieved by a seizure made under the provisions of this clause may, within fifteen days thereof appeal to the licensing authority, who may pass such order or issue such directions as he may deem fit. It is clear from the aforesaid sub-Rule (4) that in the case of appeal or revision filed before the Appellant/Rcvisional Authority, interim relief can be sought for by the appellant or the petitioner and such an interim prayer is required to be considered by the Appellant/Revisional Authority. Of course, there is a discretion in the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority as the case may be, to grant or not to grant the interim prayer. Whenever a quasi-judicial or judicial authority is endowed with the discretionary power, it is required to exercise it judicially. In other words, such exercise of that power has got to be for reasons staled in the order. In the impugned order, there is no reason coming forth, nor is there any indication that the State Government has applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, on the face of it, the order cannot be construed to be a speaking one. In such circumstances, in a case where discretion is to be exercised by an Authority or the Court, it has to state the necessary facts in brief of the case, the contentions of the parties, the conclusion as to whether there is a prima facie case and, if so, whether on taking into consideration the balance of convenience, the case is one for granting or refusing to grant interim prayer. Only then the order will be disclosing as to whether the concerned Authority has applied its mind and exercised its discretion judicially; otherwise it would be arbitrary exercise of the discretionary power which is opposed to law and justice. Applying these tests, the impugned order cannot be sustained. 6. The next contention is that in such matters, normally this Court has been issuing interim orders and therefore such an interim order should also be passed in the instant case as well, pending consideration of the revision by the State Government. It may be relevant to notice that the orders relied upon by learned counsel for appellant/petitioner do not contain the facts and circumstances under which such directions were issued. Therefore, it cannot be said that those decisions lay down any proposition of law that in such cases invariably interim orders of stay should be granted. All that can be said is that learned single judges hearing those matters were convinced of certain facts and circumstances of the cases, and in the exercise of their jurisdiction, thought it was necessary to issue such directions. As long as those circumstances are not on record, and no principle of law is stated, the directions issued therein cannot be taken as laying down certain propositions of law or the norms for the purpose of exercising discretionary power by the Appellate or Revisional Authority under R. 27(4) of the Kerosene Order. As we have already pointed out, in such cases, the norms staled above should be applied in order to indicate that there is proper and judicious application of mind and the discretion is judiciously exercised. In the view we take, the aforesaid decisions and those of the Supreme Court relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner cannot be of any assistance, though the proposition laid down therein cannot at all be disputed. It is also relevant to notice that if the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, it follows that in such cases an interim order of slay or direction should as a matter of course be passed by the Appellate or Revisional Authority, pending disposal of the appeal or revision and if no such interim order is passed, the High Court has to pass such an interim order, if the party approaches the High Court in a petition under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Such a situation would not only be contrary to law, but it would put an end to the discretion vested in the Appellate and Revisional Authorities and also the High Court, and such a position would not only be very much detrimental to justice but would also result in travesty of justice. This Court should take care to ensure that it does not give rise to such a situation.
(3.) FOR the reasons stated above, this Writ appeal is allowed in part. The order dated 12.7.1993 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 12672 of 1993 is set aside. The order dated 28.6.1993 passed by the State Government is quashed. The case will now stand remitted to the State Government with a direction to consider the application for stay within a period of four weeks from to-day in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order. It is also open to the State Government to consider the revision petition itself within the aforesaid period. There will be no order as to costs.;