- (1.) THIS writ appeal is instituted by the management of the Mahalakshmi Textile mills, Pasumalai, from the judgment of Karnachanara Iyer J. (as he then was ) in w. p. No. 482 of 1959, before the learned Judge. Since the facts are very simple, and not in dispute for the most part, it is sufficient for us to be quite brief. The contesting res. pendent (S. M. Subrarnaniam Chettiar) was working as a clerk in the Time Keeper's office of the Mills. He was on leave, which expired on 3rd february 1958. But without rejoining duty, he absented himself without leave, any without taking steps to obtain the sanction of the management, for a period of nearly two months thereafter till. 13-4-1958.
(2.) IN its relationship to employees, in matters of discipline, the management is governed by certain Standing Orders framed for mill operatives. Under Section 18 (f) of these Standing Orders, "habitual absence without leave or absence without leave for more than ten consecutive days" constitutes "misconduct". The management framed charges under Section 18 (f), and issued notice to the worker. An enquiry on the basis of the charge followed, and it is the admitted case that the worker (respondent) absented himself, and did not participate in the enquiry. The management held that the charge had. been established, and issued an order of dismissal, which was communicated to the worker by letter dated 6-51956.
(3.) THE matter went up before the Labour Court, which, in effect, allowed the appeal by the worker, set aside the order of dismissal, and directed the reinstatement of the worker. It was the propriety of this judgment of the Labour court in I. D. No. 36 of 1958, which was canvassed before the learned Judge. The learned Judge (Ramachandra Iyer J.) was himself embarrassed by the fact that the labour Court had, in more than one context of its somewhat lengthy judgment, held that the misconduct was proved, and that the dismissal from service of subramaniam Chettiar (respondent) was justified, in that sense. It has to be frankly conceded that the judgment of the Labour Court presents difficulties in interpretation, as several passages are inconsistent with each other. Further, as the learned Judge (Ramachandra Iyer J.) himself emphasises, it is well settled that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to canvass the severity or otherwise of the punishment awarded by the management, unless it touches a question of victimisation or bona fides. However, the learned Judge interpreted the judgment of the Labour Court, in substance and effect, as amounting to a conclusion or finding that the punishment was invalid, because relevant matters had not been taken into consideration by the management in awarding punishment.;